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Abstract
The first halfof this thesis delineates two different dialectical approaches present in
Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology, which help shape both the structure and the
Trinitarian content of the system. The first is a polar form of dialectic, present largely
in the first volume of the Systematic Theology, which helps shape Tillich's dialectical
ontology ofbeing and non-being, and which closely resembles the dialectical
approach of F.W.J. Schelling. The second is a triadic form of dialectic, observable
throughout all three volumes of the Systematic Theology, which helps shape Tillich's
existential description of salvation and history in terms of essence and existence, and
which suggests a heretofore unexplored resemblance to the distinctly triadic
systematic approach ofG.W.F. Hegel. This half of the thesis concludes that, taken as
a whole, the dialectical structure ofTillich's system more closely resembles a
Hegelian, triadic shape.
The second halfof this thesis explores the Trinitarian structure of Tillich's Systematic
Theology, as well as the concept of the Trinity as employed by Hegel and Schelling.
As with the concept of dialectic, the concept of the Trinity is also significantly
different in the Hegelian and Schellingian systems. This part of the thesis
demonstrates that Tillich's systematic employment of a Trinitarian framework is
significantly removed from Schelling's interpretation of the Trinity in his lectures on
religion. It further demonstrates that Tillich's use of the Trinity more closely
resembles Hegel's use of it in his lectures on religion.
In addition to its demonstration of the presence of Hegelian concepts and content
within the Systematic Theology, this examination is unique in its consultation of
recent English language publications concerning German Idealism. In the case of
Schelling, this includes recent translations and critical editions of some of his major
works; in the case ofHegel, it includes recent critical editions of some of his major
works, compiled from original manuscripts and early translations and editions.
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Introduction
Paul Tillich introduces his Systematic Theology by describing the task of apologetic
theology as answering questions implied in the human situation in the power of the
eternal message, or keiygma. (STI, 6) The answers that theology provides, however,
are formed with the "means provided by the situation" (STI, 6), which Tillich later
describes as philosophy, art, science, psychology and many other fields. Of these
fields of study, however, none is more frequently consulted and utilized by Tillich
than philosophy, an approach for which he is well known. For Tillich, there is an
intrinsic relationship between the study of existence and theology. God can be
understood as "being-itself', the ground of all human existence and thought. (ST1,
157, 163ff.) Second, "being-itself' is humanity's "ultimate concern". (STI, 211)
Third, "the God ofAbraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the God of the philosophers is the
same God." (BR, 82)
From these and other statements, it is clear that Tillich's theological approach makes
significant use ofphilosophical tools and concepts.1 However, as some of his
commentators have pointed out, Tillich's philosophical approach to theology lacks
clarity.2 Even to those familiar with the various philosophical tools and traditions to
which he appeals, Tillich leaves the task of discerning when and to what extent he has
altered and employed them.
In this thesis I address this lack of clarity in relation to the dialectical and Trinitarian
structure ofTillich's Systematic Theology. To do so, I delineate the significantly
different approaches to dialectic and the Trinity found in the major works ofGeorg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. I demonstrate that
two different kinds of dialectic provide the actual structure of the Systematic
Theology. The first is a polar form of dialectic, which shows a connection to the
concept of dialectic developed by Schelling. The second is a triadic form of dialectic,
' See Victor Nuovo, "Fables of Identity," in Gert Hummel, ed., God and Being: The Problem of
Ontology in the Philosophical Ontology ofPaul Tillich, Contributions made to the II international Paul
Tillich symposium held in Frankfurt 1988 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 30
~ The seminal work in this regard is by John P. Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation: Paul Tillich and
the Possibility ofa Mediating Theology (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980). See also Kenneth Hamilton, The
System and the Gospel: A Critique ofPaul Tillich, pp. 27-31, and Bernard Martin, The Existentialist
Theology ofPaul Tillich (New Haven, CT: College & University Press, 1963)
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which shows a connection to the concept of dialectic developed by Hegel. I argue
that, while Schelling's concept of dialectic resembles the structure of the first volume
ofTillich's system, Hegel's concept of dialectic provides a better model for
understanding the structure of the whole of Tillich's system.
Finally, I argue that this structural connection between Hegel's dialectic and Tillich's
dialectical approach is mirrored in a similarity between the Trinitarian approach of
Hegel and Tillich. By considering Tillich's concept of the Trinity, and comparing it to
Schelling's and Hegel's employment of the Trinity in their systems, I demonstrate that
Tillich's description of the Trinity more closely resembles a Hegelian Trinity than a
Schellingian Trinity. In doing so, my thesis will accomplish three critical tasks that
have not yet been performed adequately in Tillich scholarship.
Firstly, the Systematic Theology is seldom considered as a whole. Those works that do
focus on the system exclusively almost invariably concentrate on the first volume and
its restatement of the doctrine of God in terms of "being", "non-being" and "being-
itself'.3 Comprising the first volume, the first two sections of the Systematic Theology
do discuss the human capacity for reason in the face of revelation, and the relationship
between the ontological concept of "being-itself' and the theological concept of God.
However, the first volume ofTillich's system is merely a beginning, in which the
theologian establishes the character of his system as ontological and existential. Only
by considering all three volumes ofTillich's system can the structures supporting it be
fully understood.
The first task of this thesis, then, is methodological: to consider all three volumes of
the Systematic Theology as a comprehensive statement ofTillich's theology. When
the second and third volumes of the system are analyzed together with the first, the
initially abstract concept of "being-itself', for example, receives much more detail. By
relating each part ofTillich's system to the whole, I demonstrate that specific
contextual theological concerns prompt each ofTillich's doctrinal discussions.
3 For example, Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation., Flamilton, The System and the Gospel', and
Alistair Macleod, Paul Tillich. An Essay on the Role ofOntology in his Philosophical Theology
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973)
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Secondly, in the introduction to the Systematic Theology Tillich presents many
different tenns and concepts that help him to describe his apologetic and existential
approach to theology, including: kerygma, or "message", and "situation" (STI, 6); the
roles and commitments of the theologian and the philosopher (STI, 8-11); the criteria
ofproposition and content in relation to the concept of "ultimate concern" (ST I, 12-
15); theology and philosophy (ST 1, 18-28); religion and culture (STI, 38); the
experiences and norms of theology (ST I, 40-53); the rational character of theology
(STI, 53 ff.); dialectic as static ontology and as dynamic ontology (STI, 56-59); and
the "method of correlation", which shapes Tillich's theological approach (STI, 59-
66). Many of these have been investigated in previous Tillich scholarship. However,
while the concept of dialectic in Tillich has, in two instances, been considered,4 a
detailed consideration of the various dialectical structures that appear in the
Systematic Theology has not occurred.
The second task of this thesis, then, is to highlight the significance of dialectic for the
structure of the Systematic Theology. Tillich's system, taken as a whole, reveals the
presence ofmore than one dialectical structure within the system. A two-sided or
polar dialectical structure, appearing mainly in the first volume of the system,
describes the balanced relationship of being and non-being in essence and its
imbalance in existence. Because Tillich refers to the relationship ofbeing and non-
being as "polar", 1 refer to this form of dialectic as the "dialectic ofpolarity."
A three-fold or triadic structure, however, provides a framework for all three volumes
of the system. It is this triadic structure that allows Tillich to describe revelation and
the human participation in it in terms of divine essence, human existence, and
essentialization - the reunion of essence and existence. In three successive sections of
the system, Tillich relates the concept of essence (harmonious being and non-being)
with "God", existence (conditioned being and non-being) with "the Christ", and the
process of essentialization (reunion of essence and existence) with the Spirit, or
"Spiritual Presence". Because "essentialization" is the term Tillich gives to the
reunion of essence and existence (STIII, 400 ff.), I refer to the triadic dialectic, begun
4 See Lasse Halme, The Polarity ofDynamics and Form: The Basic Tension in Paul Tillich's Thinking
(Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2002). Academic Dissertation published online at
http://ethesis.helsinki.fi/iulkaisut/teo/syste/vk/halme/thepolar.pdf. See also Adrian Thatcher, The
Ontology ofPaul Tillich, p. 86 ff.
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with essence and existence, as the "dialectic of essentialization". Other terms, such as
actualization, or salvation, though they do perform tasks in Tillich's system, are not
used by Tillich to describe the process and telos of human life and history: the reunion
of essence and existence.
Thirdly, the historical influence of Schelling on Tillich is widely attested to and is not
further elaborated on here.5 However, because the different dialectical structures that
this thesis outlines as present in the Systematic Theology have not been investigated,
neither has the relative presence ofHegelian and Schellingian concepts in the system
been considered in the depth this delineation suggests. In addition, the opportunity to
consult critical editions of the major texts ofHegel and Schelling, and recent
translations of other Schelling texts, has increased recently. In the past few decades,
German Idealism has been the focus of renewed interest and fresh interpretations. Yet,
the connection between specific concepts developed during this period ofphilosophy
and illumination of their presence in Tillich, especially in light of recent
interpretations based on critical editions, has not yet occurred.
Therefore, the third task of this thesis is to rehearse the dialectical and Trinitarian
arguments of Hegel, Schelling and Tillich, in order to draw conceptual connections
between Tillich's dialectical and Trinitarian Systematic Theology, and the systematic
and philosophical accounts of consciousness, history and the nature of revelation
developed by Hegel and Schelling. This thesis is neither concerned with the historical
influence ofHegel and Schelling on Tillich's educational formation, nor with
attestations by Tillich or his commentators to the same. Rather, it is focused on
illuminating the dialectical structures and Trinitarian content inherent in Tillich's
system and their conceptual resemblance to the dialectical structure and Trinitarian
content ofHegelian and Schellingian systems.
Tillich's equivocal use of dialectic within the system, together with a recent increase
in publications devoted to the study ofGerman Idealism, renders this as a necessary
5 Previous studies of the influence of Schelling on Tillich include Reinhold Mokrosch, Theologische
Freiheitsphilosophie: Metaphysik, Freiheit unci Ethik in derphilosophischen Entwicklung Schellings
und in den Anjangen Tillichs, Studien zur Philosophic und Literatur des neunzehuten Jahrhunderts
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976); and Guenter Sommer, The Significance ofthe Late
Philosophy ofSchellingfor the Formation and Interpretation ofthe Thought ofPaul Tillich, PhD
(Durham, NC: Duke University, 1960).
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task, which has not yet been performed in Tillich scholarship in a concentrated or
methodical way. In order to do so, this thesis pays significant attention to the
conceptual differences between Hegel and Schelling and demonstrates the relevance
of recent discussions of these differences on the study of dialectic and Trinity in
Tillich. As a result, attention is divided almost equally between Tillich on the one
hand, and Hegel and Schelling on the other.
These tasks are accomplished in two stages. The first and second chapters delineate
the two different concepts of dialectic employed in the Systematic Theology and relate
each to the dialectical approach of a different philosopher: polarity to Schelling and
essentialization to Hegel. The third and fourth chapters consider the centrality of the
Trinity in Tillich's system and in Hegel and Schelling respectively, in order to
determine to which philosopher's concept of the Trinity Tillich's is more closely
linked.
The purpose of rehabilitating the origin and function of dialectic and Trinity in Tillich
is not to enter him as a contributor to current theological discussions. It is also not my
intention to re-introduce the philosophical approach to religion of the nineteenth
century, exemplified by Hegel and Schelling, to contemporary Christian thought. It
may be that the conclusions ofmy argument concerning the dialectical and Trinitarian
nature ofTillich's Systematic Theology prompt further investigation into the current
relevance of his theology. However, my aim in this investigation is to illuminate the
conceptual and structural similarities between the philosophical systems of Hegel and
Schelling and Tillich's Systematic Theology, especially where dialectic and Trinity are
concerned.
Before undertaking this dialectical and Trinitarian analysis ofTillich's Systematic
Theology and the conceptual connections to system building in Hegel and Schelling,
however, three brief discussions - on the nature of Tillich's systematic approach to his
concerns for theology, some of the challenges of discussing Tillich's use of
philosophical concepts, and some of the challenges facing the analysis of Hegel and
Schelling - help to introduce the main arguments of this thesis.
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The necessity of the first discussion, on the nature ofTillich's systematic approach to
theology, is to demonstrate the consistency between some ofTillich's theological
concerns and his philosophical approach to theology, and to consider some of the
critiques that result. The second discussion introduces the notion that Tillich's use of
certain philosophical concepts is very different than their use within the philosophical
systems to which they are related. The third and final discussion here describes some
of the opportunities and challenges associated with recent philosophical scholarship
on Hegel and Schelling.
A. The Nature ofTillich 's Systematic Approach
According to Tillich, theologians work within an arena of commitment, a "theological
circle". (STI, 8) They are bound within a covenant of faith to study, interpret and
spread the Christian kerygma, the unchangeable truth or "message" of Christ. This
message is communicated through the source of Scripture, mediated by experience,
and attested to under the norm ofbaptismal confession. Though it is not irrational,
theology's transmission of this message is constrained by particular historical and
cultural contexts, what Tillich calls the human "situation". Thus, theology must
responsibly transmit the eternal truth of the Christian Gospel and attend to the
changing demands of the situation in and to which it is transmitted. Problems arise in
theology both when the situation is elevated above the message, and when the
message does not take adequate account of the context of its transmission. (ST I, 13)
Tillich's attempted repair of these twin problems compels his own system and informs
his critique of historical and contemporary theological approaches. He offers critiques
of three approaches to theology against which he positions his apologetic theology:
the kerygmatic, the natural, and the logical. (STI, 64-66)
Firstly, Tillich is concerned with what he calls a supranaturalistic approach in which
the absoluteness of the "message" obscures the "situation" of revelation. Though
Tillich does not attach any names to supranaturalism, he is likely thinking of Barth.
Evidence of this comes earlier in the introduction to the Systematic Theology where
Tillich refers to Barth's theology as kerygmatic, as asserting the unchangeable truth of
the Christian message "over" the changing demands of the human situation. Tillich
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describes this approach as "throwing a stone" of revelation "at" the human situation,
instead of seeing revelation as involving human participation in, or at least reception
of, revelation. (STI, 7)
The consequences of supranaturalism include a dichotomy between revelation and the
world, or message and situation, and a devaluing of human experience and thought in
the face of divine transcendence. The division of revelation from the experience of it,
as though divine truth simply falls into a corrupted world, results in two theological
approaches: orthodoxy and fundamentalism. Tillich claims that the former emphasizes
the unchangeable nature of eternal truth in confessional statements that stultify
theology, while the latter tends to exalt the past as "an unchangeable message against
the theological truth of today and tomorrow." (ST I, 3) Tillich also condemns a form
of fundamentalism that he calls "biblicism", an approach that avoids philosophical
terminology in a futile effort to deliver a "pure" message. The folly is two-fold. First,
philosophy has always influenced Christian doctrine and confession. Second, "The
Bible itself always uses the categories and concepts which describe the structure of
experience... time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement, freedom,
necessity, value, knowledge, experience, being and not-being. (STI, 21)
Supranaturalism, and the related approaches of orthodoxy, fundamentalism and
biblicism, make faith irrational and unhistorical. Theology is made static by
simplifying and elevating Scripture itself to an extent which denies both its interaction
with other thought processes and the diversity of thought present in Scripture itself.
Secondly, Tillich is concerned with a naturalism caused by romanticizing the human
condition, or exalting the power ofhuman cognition. This can be the result either of
situation overwhelming message, or of situation and message being confused. The
targets here include Spinozistic pantheism, as well as natural theology and the false
hope of Christian socialism, though in this case also Tillich does not identify his
critique with particular people. He does distinguish naturalism from the reasoned
argumentation for the existence ofGod, which he calls dualism, and which is
addressed below. Tillich also groups natural theology and religious socialism together
as attempts to reduce the vision of kerygma to a practical or moral Utopia, thereby
negating the transcendent vision of the kerygma. (ST I, 131)
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Finally, Tillich is concerned with what he calls dualistic theology. Though briefly,
Tillich characterizes dualism as the approach to revelation according to rigid
categories of argument. (STI, 65) Dualism places theology within closed systems of
argument and is therefore distinct from naturalism, pantheism and vitalism, which
reduce God to what is worldly. Tillich's clearest comment on this subject comes later
in the first volume of the Systematic Theology,
The task of a theological treatment of the traditional arguments for the
existence ofGod is twofold: to develop the question of God which they
express and to expose the impotency of the 'arguments,' their inability to
answer the question of God. These arguments bring the ontological analysis to
a conclusion by disclosing that the question of God is implied in the finite
structure ofbeing. In performing this function, they partially accept and also
partially reject traditional natural theology, and they drive reason to the quest
for revelation. (STI, 210)
Theology, for Tillich, is an attempt to describe the conflicts of human existence and
the resolution of them that occurs through revelation. "[Theology] answers the
questions implied in the 'situation' in the power of the eternal message and with the
means provided by the situation whose questions it answers." (STI, 6) Good theology
has a responsibility to portray revelation neither as completely inaccessible, nor as
accessible only through nature and/or argumentation.
Whether its emphasis is kerygmatic, natural, or logical, a theological approach, for
Tillich, is insufficient when its focus becomes too narrow. Despite criticisms
indicating the contrary, this includes the theological approach that emphasizes the
centrality ofhumanity to the exclusion of the transcendence of revelation.6 For Tillich,
all theology, by virtue ofbeing a human endeavor, is theology "from below".
However, he does not want the extreme estrangement of the human situation to be
tragically exalted. This concern has an epistemological correlate: the reduction of
cognition either to abstraction or to empiricism. (STI, 176) Both demonstrate a one¬
sided emphasis on the basis of knowledge as either subjective or objective. Thus,
6 For example, Lewis S. Ford, "Tillich's Implicit Natural Theology," Scottish Journal ofTheology 24
(1971) 257-270; and Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology ofPaul Tillich: a review and
analysis (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1964). McKelway ends most of his chapters with a
reference to Tillich's "natural theology".
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Tillich proposes that existence is "encounter", and reflects the mutual participation of
subject and object in the act of cognition.
Tillich does say that, "Man is the question he asks about himself, before a question is
formulated". (STI, 62) However, Tillich also states that, "The existential question,
namely, man himself in the conflicts of his existential situation, is not the source for
the revelatory answer formulated by theology". (STII, 13) Later, Tillich emphasizes
that, "If God were not also in man so that man could ask for God, God's speaking to
man could not be perceived by man." (STIII, 127) The aim ofTillich's system is to
maintain the ontological priority of the "answer", or revelation, while maintaining the
apologetic priority of the "the question man asks about himself'.7 However, the
theological framing of existential questions and responses involves many other
disciplines and systems of thought, not the least ofwhich is philosophy.
Though its definition depends on its contextual use, philosophy is generally
concerned, says Tillich, with categories, structural laws and universal concepts. (STI,
18-20) While theology studies the meaning ofbeing, philosophy is the study of the
structures of being. (ST I, 22) As a method of analyzing existence, philosophy tends to
fonnalize and objectify. Yet, because it analyzes the human condition and expresses
the experience of existence and cognition, philosophy is inherently involved in the
theological task. "Philosophy necessarily asks the question of reality as a whole, the
question of the structure of being. Theology necessarily asks the same question, for
that which concerns us ultimately belongs to reality as a whole; it must belong to
being." (STI, 24) Philosophy is also foremost among all disciplines related to
theology, for Tillich, because "the analysis of the human situation is done in tenns
which today are called 'existential'." (STI, 62)
This indicates that, for Tillich, theology and philosophy are united in asking "the
question ofbeing" (ST I, 22), what it means to be, to speak, to create, to know. There
are no duplicate worlds: a real world, the province of philosophy, and a transcendent
world, the province of theology. (ST I, 21) Rather, both disciplines serve the one
logos:
1 See Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation, p. 184
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The Christian claim that the logos who has become concrete in Jesus as the
Christ is at the same time the universal logos includes the claim that wherever
the logos is at work it agrees with the Christian message. No philosophy which
is obedient to the universal logos can contradict the concrete logos, the Logos
"who became flesh." (STI, 28)
Problematically, Tillich sometimes characterizes philosophy as little more than an
empirical science. J. Heywood Thomas argues that Tillich's overly empirical
characterization of philosophy is the result of his confusion between the precision of
philosophical investigation and the precision sought in scientific testing.8 According
to Tillich, the philosopher tries to maintain "detached objectivity toward being and
structures", with a passion "only for truth, not for the personal". (STI, 22) By
contrast, the theologian is "involved with his object" and is concerned with the
"meaning of existence", not the "structure of existence" only. (ST I, 21-22) The
weakness of such distinctions is readily apparent, not least because Tillich elsewhere
says that the object of philosophical investigation is the same logos as that of
theology.
Although he acknowledges that there are many different kinds ofphilosophy, Tillich's
inventory falls within two categories: natural idealism and logical positivism. The
conflation of idealism and naturalism is the result ofTillich's narrow definition of
their common origination in an experience of a "mystical a priori". (ST I, 9) When
philosophy is not naturalism or the "epistemology and ethics" which he identifies with
"the neo-Kantians" of the nineteenth century, it is "logical positivism", with which no
one is identified. (ST I, 19-20, cf. 40, 86) These caricatures of idealism and positivism
are never explained by Tillich and, even together, fall far short of an adequate
definition ofphilosophy, which is plainly as concerned with the meaning of existence
as is theology.9
The distinction between theology and philosophy in this manner, however,
demonstrates that, for Tillich, the difference between them is not necessarily their
8 J. Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, pp. 37-38
9 See Martin, The Existentialist Theology ofPaul Tillich, p. 33; and Ford, "Tillich's Implicit Natural
Theology," Scottish Journal ofTheology 24 (1971) pp. 257-261
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object, but what constitutes an authoritative account of their object. Tillich suggests
that the theologian is committed to accepting revelation as authoritative while the
philosopher is not. (ST I, 26-27) He is also clear that the authority of revelation, for
theology, must not be superseded by what he calls the "dream of a 'Christian
philosophy'". Tillich is wary of subjecting the meaning of revelation to an authority
other than the universal logos itself, e.g. the data ofhistorical research, a particular
theologian or philosopher, or ecclesial authority. (ST/, 27-28) A Christian philosophy
would also problematically subjugate philosophy to theological concerns.
Nonetheless, for Tillich, theology and philosophy do not offer competing accounts of
existence and experience, but complimentary ones, even though they articulate
different criteria for what constitutes the authoritative data of experience. The
significance of this, as we see in subsequent chapters, is that, for example, what
philosophy means by transcendence, i.e. self-consciousness, is not what theology
means by transcendence, i.e. divinity. The purpose of this thesis is to help clarify the
nature of these and other concepts in the Systematic Theology, especially those
associated with dialectic and the Trinity.
In doing so, it may be possible to answer some of the critiques aimed at Tillich's
approach to theology. At one end of the spectrum stand the critics of a theological
interpretation of reality. For example, Douglass Lewis argues that questions arising
out of any non-theological context cannot be answered from of a theological context.
To do this, says Lewis, "is like a physicist asking: "What is the [physical] source of
the light of the world?" and the theologian answering: "Jesus Christ is the light of the
world!"10 Lewis contends not only that there is a problem of logical incoherency, but
that transferring a concept from one context to another reduces all concepts and their
"logical environments" to one level of discourse.
At the other end of the spectrum is a set of criticisms concerning the reduction of faith
at the hands of a philosophical approach. The charge of rationalization is exemplified
by T.F. Torrance, who suggests that Tillich's philosophical theology is guilty not only
of emptying theological concepts of their intended meaning, but of then filling them
10
Douglass Lewis, "The Conceptual Structure of Tillich's Method of Correlation," Encounter 28
(1967) p. 269
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up with a philosophical and cultural content that is detached from God. Torrance
charges that Tillich,
.. .has declared in a number of his works that faith-knowledge is symbolic and
non-conceptual so that ifwe are to pursue theology we must borrow
conceptualities from philosophy or science in order to rationalize faith. That is
to say, ultimately Tillich worked with a romantic, non-conceptual approach to
God.11
Torrance does not explain what he means by a concept, "conceptual knowledge", "a
romantic approach to philosophy", or how Tillich's approach is "non-conceptual".
Even less certain is how Torrance can claim that Tillich is both romantic and non-
conceptual. However, Torrance's critique of Tillich is incidental to the larger purpose
of the chapter in which it occurs: a description of the rationalistic "eclipse" ofGod.
Kenneth Hamilton also argues that Tillich defines theology and philosophy in such a
way that there is no difference between them. Hamilton blames this on two things: the
"essentialist" character ofTillich's analysis of existence, and his symbolic rendering
of the Christian message. In this way, he argues that Tillich moulds the situation to fit
the message, and vice versa; this is "the product of one philosophical outlook and fits
no more than one type of theological system.'"2 His conclusion is that Tillich
problematically creates a theology which sits in judgment of Christianity.
However, this criticism has clearly missed Tillich's frequent discussion of the self-
critical capacity of the ketygma with which theology is ultimately concerned. As early
as 1935, Tillich argues that neither the form nor the content of human discourse,
which he identifies with culture and religion respectively, can transmit or encapsulate
the "ultimate concern" of human existence. ("Dialectic", 128-130) Rather, there is a
third dimension beyond question and answer, beyond form and content. Throughout
Tillich's career he calls this dimension, the "beyond", by different names; in the
Systematic Theology it is called "the depth ofbeing-itself'. Yet always, for Tillich,
this depth is the basis of all life and thought, and is what keeps the finitude of
theology and the Church from elevating itself.
1' Thomas F. Torrance, God and Rationality, p. 47
12
Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 135
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Self-criticism is particularly evident, for Tillich, in the largely Protestant projects of
the Refonnation, and in contributions of historical criticism. (ST II, 107, c.f 145) For
this reason, Tillich refers to the principle of theonomy - the revealed principle of self-
critique that resolves the conflict within existence between the autonomy of reason
and the heteronomy of religion - as the Protestant principle. (PE, 205; cf ST III, 244)
The system's typology of autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy also helps to explain
the intention ofTillich's philosophical approach to a self-critical theology. Autonomy
is obedience to a "self-asserted, essential structure", or the conceptual independence
of reason most associated with Enlightenment philosophy. However, Tillich suggests
that, although it "provides the structure ofmind and reality", reason is nonetheless a
finite human capacity "made actual in the processes ofbeing, existence and life." (ST
I, 81) Though it never loses its essential structure in principle, autonomy is always
limited by the conditions of existence. On its own, autonomy is insufficient as a
grounding principle because it can only give account of itself, not the conditions
under which it is manifest.
The assertion of the autonomy of reason, however, is a reaction against another
insufficient principle: the heteronomy of religion. Tillich describes heteronomy as
obedience to an "externally-asserted, reasoned structure", or the imposition of a
"strange law". It is an authority which claims to speak in the name of the ground of
being and is, therefore, able to account for reason and existence in an unconditional
and ultimate way. (ST I, 83) As concern primarily for the depth of reason,
heteronomy is historically expressed in religion and systems of law. However, even in
its claim to issue commands as to how reason should grasp and shape reality, on
behalf of that depth which reason requires, the imposition of law is inherently finite.
The denial of the autonomy of reason, by an externally imposed law, is just as
destructive as the assertion of autonomy from within reason itself.
As a response to both the autonomy of reason and the heteronomy of religion, Tillich
suggests that revelation, which Christianity takes as authoritative, is theonomous.
Theonomy is not, as the name seems to imply, "the acceptance of a divine law
imposed on autonomy by a highest authority; it means autonomous reason united with
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its own depth." (ST I, 85) Theonomy expresses the reunion of the structural laws of
reason with their inexhaustible ground, or "depth". God is the law for both the
structure and the ground of reason, thus reason and depth are properly united in God.
What is united in God, however, is incomplete under the conditions of existence.
Even a religion living according to divine law and making every effort to secure the
freedom of reason is limited, finite, disrupted and incomplete. For Tillich, then,
theonomy is not properly ascribed to a religion or culture, but to the free and original
ground out ofwhich they arise. All thinking must struggle against the hubris that sees
any human question or answer as autonomous, or any culture or religion as
heteronomous.
The abstract notion of theonomous self-critique is made more concrete in Tillich's
Christology, whereby Jesus is described as "the Christ, as the one who sacrifices what
is merely 'Jesus' in him." (STI, 134) Tillich bases his argument that Jesus liberates
belief from the heteronomy of a finite being by appealing to the account in John's
Gospel of Jesus saying that, "He who believes in me does not believe in me".13
Reverence for Jesus as the Christ is not reverence merely for the authority of a finite
being, but for divine authority. In turn, for Tillich this suggests that a Church which is
critical of the potential idolatry of secular life must also be critical of its own tendency
of self-elevation by means of tradition. This self-critical principle, and its basis in the
scriptural Christ, suggests that Tillich is not interested in a synthesis of theology and
philosophy, but rather in the critical power of revelation and its implications for
theology.
However, the problem of tautology raised by Hamilton's critique that Tillich simply
defines theology and philosophy similarly, is echoed by others. Thomas argues that
the relation of both theology and philosophy to the common "question" of being
creates a tautology, where, "the truth of the statement follows from the definition of
the terms", such that "X=Y and Z=Y so that X=Z".14 To say that philosophy and
theology are both concerned with the question of being implies a consistent definition
13 John 12:44. Emphasis is Tillich's. A more detailed discussion ofTillich's doctrine of Christ, and his
concept of revelation as self-negation, can be found below.
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of "being" for both. As suggested above, however, what "being" indicates may be
different among theologians, among philosophers, and between the two disciplines.15
Ian Thompson also points to instances where Tillich appeals to concepts equivocally.
As a noun, the term unbedingte can indicate "the ultimate", "the absolute", and "the
infinite", while in the adjectival form it indicates what is "unconditional",
"necessary", and "imperative".16 According to Thompson, the logical, metaphysical
and moral connotations of the term unbedingte create an ambiguity which Tillich then
exploits. It is only through this ambiguity that Tillich can connect the abyss and
"depth" ofmeaning with the inherent ground and structure ofmeaning. Though the
tactic follows Kant's example of "implying the logically necessary and
metaphysically founded character of the unconditional imperative", says Thompson, it
does not make its use legitimate. The problem of equivocation can even be extended
to Tillich's use of absolute terms like "being-itself", "truth", "logic", and "God".17
In Tillich's defence, Kenneth Hamilton suggests that Tillich demands that readers
must interpret the theologian's terminology in light of the whole system. For
Hamilton, this is a weakness.18 For Tillich, however, it is simply the nature of
Systematic Theology that the solution to the problem of apparently divergent
philosophical and theological interpretations of truth is observable only by means of
the entire system. (STI, 30) With this in mind, here we consider the effect of Tillich's
philosophical approach to theology in terms of the concept of dialectic.
B. Clarifying Concepts in Tillich's System
It is Tillich's occasional equivocation on significant terms and concepts in the
Systematic Theology, and his interest in a philosophical approach to theology, that
occasion this investigation into the concepts of dialectic and Trinity. The challenge,
however, is that Tillich does not clearly distinguish what he means by dialectic in
15 See also Alistair M. Macleod, Tillich: An Essay on the Role ofOntology in his Philosophical
Theology, pp. 123-130 on Tillich's ambiguous use of the word "Love;" Ross, The Non-Existence of
God, p. 29, on the semantics of the "existence of God," p. 29; and Clayton, The Concept of
Correlation, pp. 180-181 on the similarity of the terms "quest" and "question."
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Thompson, Being andMeaning, p. 95.
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Thomas, "Some Notes on the Theology ofPaul Tillich," Hibhert Journal 57/3 (Apr 1959) pp. 253
ff; see also Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 34
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Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 17
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relation to the long and complex history of its use. When he does use the term
"dialectic" in his system it is to introduce dynamism into the concept of human
understanding. This can occur as the simultaneous affirmation ofYes and No both in
argumentation (STI, 25) and in logic (STI, 57), but it can also describe relationships
in which "one" cannot be understood without "the other", e.g. between human and
world, subject and object.
In the first volume of the Systematic Theology, dialectic first appears as polarity
within the category ofbeing. The infinite potential of "being" can only be understood
in terms of the dialectically related finitude of "non-being". The ontological category
ofbeing is fundamental to theology, for Tillich. His theological concept ofGod is
expressed as "ultimate concern", the transcendent "ground ofbeing" (ST I, 20-21),
and as that which "determines our being and non-being". (STI, 12-14) Theology itself
is characterized as the search for the truth of "being", though through the concept of
"new being," this search is a soteriological concern as well as a present one. (STI, 23-
24) Even the subject-object structure of reason can be attributed, he says, to the
ontological relationships of the individual and the world. (ST 1, 171)
Being and non-being, as a pair of ontological tenns, however, also define the
categories of essence and existence that Tillich employs throughout the Systematic
Theology. In God, or divine essence, being and non-being are in perfect unity. In
humanity, or in existence, the unity ofbeing and non-being is disrupted. Essence and
existence are, themselves, polar in nature: everything within them is constituted by the
two poles of being and non-being.
For Tillich, the disrupted polarity of being and non-being describes the primary
condition of existence, that in being and in thought, the human is finite. Tillich
describes this as human estrangement: of the individual, of society and of the world
from God. He also describes human existence as the result of a limitation imposed on
essence, making existence a mixture of an essential human nature with an existential
one. This mixture is the cause of the conflicts inherent to being and thought, of
personal, social and human estrangement, because it implies two things: that the
human condition is, in some way, limited, and that this limitation prevents it from
being whole in its essence.
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However, to the polarity of being and non-being, which is disrupted in existence,
comes undisrupted essence. From this revelatory moment on, human existence moves
toward a similar state of undisrupted, i.e. reconciled, essence. Tillich uses the term
"essentialization" to describe this reconciling process, which occurs in human life and
history, and to associate it with the presence of the Spirit and the telos of the Kingdom
ofGod. In sum, the first volume of Tillich's system establishes being and non-being
as the dialectically polar basis of both essence and existence. However, the
teleological nature ofTillich's description of the divine-human relationship points not
to a "static ontology" of being and non-being, or of essence and existence, but to a
"dynamic ontology" of essence, existence, and essentialization, which together form a
three-fold, or triadic, pattern. (ST I, 57)
Tillich's lack of clarity in reference to these different uses of dialectic is accompanied
by a lack of reference to the thinkers associated with these conceptual structures. For
example, the concept of the "abyss", which as an expression of non-being in the
Systematic Theology constitutes the polar opposition of being, is clearly a
Schellingian concept. However, Tillich neither acknowledges Schelling's use of the
tenn nor distinguishes his use from Schelling's, Schelling's use from Jakob Bohme's,
Bdhme's use from Plato's, and so forth. The result is that the reader is inclined to
relate Tillich's ontological concepts to a lineage of ideas traceable through 4000 years
of philosophy, but is never given an explicit articulation of Tillich's relation to that
tradition.
Tillich's failure to explicitly link his dialectical approach with that of any specific
philosophers, however, represents both the challenge and opportunity of this
investigation. While it is not possible to give a genealogical account ofTillich's
concepts of dialectic and Trinity, Tillich's early writings do provide clues as to how to
begin.19 Schelling's accounts of self-consciousness and mysticism are the subject of
19
For analysis ofTillich's earlier work, especially concerning philosophy and theology, and religion
and culture, see Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation, pp. 253-208. Appendices include the first
English translation ofTillich's brief and largely propositional 1913 Systematic Theology and a 1927-28
essay on religious epistemology, Die Gestalt der Religidsen Erkenntnis. See also James Luther Adams,
Paul Tillich's Philosophy ofCulture, Science and Religion (New York: Schocken Press, 1965), and
C.W. Kegley and R.W. Bretall (eds.), The Theology ofPaul Tillich (New York: Macmillan, 1952).
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Tillich's first and second student theses respectively.20 Schelling is also the subject of
a number of university courses Tillich taught during the time immediately following
the publication of the first volume of the Systematic Theology .21
Yet, Tillich clearly enlists the ideas and conceptual approaches of other philosophers.
Early publications, before Tillich's emigration to the United States, include essays on
Schleiennacher and Hegel22, as well as a concern for socialism and its interaction with
Christianity. Evidence of the continued relevance of Schleiennacher is evident
especially in Tillich's articulation ofhis "Protestant principle". This concept, which
appears in a number of his works, including the Systematic Theology, is clearly related
to the dialectical and discursive characteristics of Schleiermacher's dogmatic
methodology present in The Christian Faith.27, Writings after Tillich's emigration to
the United States, though mostly published posthumously, confirm his continued
interest in the various approaches ofGerman Idealism.24
In the Systematic Theology, however, references to philosophers range from Plato to
Heidegger, and references to theologians range from Origen to Calvin. Additionally,
this investigation implicitly argues that "German Idealism" is not monolithic, but
rather covers a wide range of thinkers and an even wider range of thought. Tillich
does not place any one figure at the centre of his system, nor does he make any
explicit commitments in this regard. He leaves to the reader the task of distilling the
various concepts employed in his "apologetic theology". (ST J, 4) Even where specific
thinkers are named, there remains a consistent thinness in his description.
20 Paul Tillich, The Construction ofthe Histoiy ofReligion in Schelling's Positive Philosophy: Its
Presuppositions and Principles, Victor Nuovo, trans. (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press,
1981); and Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development (Lewisburg,
PA: Associated University Presses, 1975). Tillich's interest in Hegel and Schelling is apparent in other
writings, especially Tillich, "Existential Philosophy," Main Works Volume One: Philosophical
Writings, Gunther Wenz, ed., pp. 353-375
21
Tillich, Lectures on Schelling (1955) (Harvard Archives Box 405A, 405:020); Tillich, Schelling
Lectures (1955) (Harvard Archives Box 405A, 405:019)
~
Tillich, Der Begriffdes Ubernaturlichen, sein dialektischer Charakter und das Prinzip der Identitdt,
dargestellt an der supranaturalistischen Theologie von Schleiermacher (Konigsberg: Neumark Verlag,
1915); and Hegel und Goethe, Zwei Gedenkreden (Basel: Verlag SGV, 1932). Clayton has indicated
the relevance of the connection between Schleiermacher and Tillich. See Clayton, The Concept of
Correlation, p. 42
23 Friedrich Schleiennacher, The Christian Faith, pp. 112-125 §28-29
24
Tillich, The Interpretation ofHistory (London: C. Scribner's Sons, 1936); My Search for Absolutes,
Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1967); and On the Boundaiy: An
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Those who comment on Tillich's philosophical approach to theology often agree that
he is greatly indebted to Schellingian philosophy; many fewer, however, point out
Tillich's debt to Hegelian philosophy.25 Moreover, these accounts are frequently
descriptive, not critical or comprehensive, and attempt to give little definition to this
vast and complex era of philosophy. Future studies might compare the conceptual
approach of each thinker named by Tillich with his own theological approach.
However, my investigation more narrowly broaches Tillich's lack of clarity, and the
corresponding lack of philosophical analysis in Tillich scholarship, by focusing on
two significant figures in German Idealism.
The approaches ofHegel and Schelling to post-Kantian idealism are more similar,
even in their great differences, and more frequently referred to than any other two
philosophers in evidence in the Systematic Theology. For both Hegel and Schelling, as
for Tillich, dialectic in one form or another guides systematic structures. As well, for
both Hegel and Schelling, as for Tillich, the Trinity, or at least a concept of the
Trinity, is one of the central interpretive symbols of systematic structures.
This thesis also takes account of two current trends in scholarship. Firstly, Tillich
scholarship is widely varied, even if the literature considered is limited to the period
beginning with the publication of the first volume of the Systematic Theology. The
English-speaking theological context of the 1950s and 1960s lauded Tillich as one of
the two most prominent theologians of the twentieth century along with Karl Barth,
and willingly grappled with Tillich's seemingly alien conceptual approach and
philosophical language. The 1970s saw substantial Tillich scholarship with an
emphasis on the implications of Tillich's notion of the correlation of religion and
culture, of his frequent discussion of art and aesthetics for theology, and of the
psychological and esoteric nature of his approach. By the 1980s the number of
publications about Tillich decreased significantly.
25 See Bruce J.R. Cameron, "The Hegelian Christology ofPaul Tillich," Scottish Journal ofTheology
29 (1976) 27-48; Martin Repp, „Zum Hintergrund von Paul Tillichs Korrelations-Methode," Neue
Zeitschviftfur Systematische Theologie 24 (1982) pp. 206-215; Peter Slater, "Dynamic Religion,
Formative Culture, and the Demonic in History," Harvard Theological Review 92/1 (1999) pp. 95-110;
and Adrian Thatcher, The Ontology ofPaul Tillich, pp. 86-91
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By the turn of the twenty-first century, Tillich's rise and fall in theology was already
being chronicled. The theology of "post-modernity" characterizes Tillich as a product
of nineteenth century "liberal theology", whose focus is the universal nature of human
experience and its primacy as the foundation of theology.20 Rightly or wrongly, this
has placed Tillich on the sideline of current theological discussions. However, the
marginalization ofTillich over the past 30 years conveniently allows us to consider
his theology in isolation from the rest of twentieth century theology, which helps us to
focus on the relationship of Tillich's systematic approach to the vastly different
dialectical approaches ofHegel and Schelling. My intention is not to consider
Tillich's system as a species of twentieth century theology, but to consider the
function of dialectic and Trinity in his system and to determine his philosophical debts
in this regard.
Secondly, at roughly the same time that publications focused on Tillich began to
decline, English publications focused on figures like Kant and Hegel increased. Since
his death, Hegel has been the subject of continued study and interpretation; for
Schelling, this is less the case. However, beginning with Charles Taylor's book on
Hegel, published in the late 1970s, English publications detailing the complexity of
and shifts in eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophy has increased.27
Scholarship on Tillich written before this resurgent interest in German Idealism,
therefore, retains a distinct disadvantage. In the past few decades, not only have
critical editions of the major works ofHegel and Schelling been published, but
translations of lesser-known works have been produced, and works of philosophers
like J.G. Fichte and Bohme, previously unavailable, are available in translation. This
permits important challenges to undifferentiating assumptions regarding the
singularity of "German Idealism", or even "Hegelian" philosophy, the inadequacy of
which recent philosophical scholarship critically demonstrates.
One of the substantial accomplishments of this analysis is to demonstrate that Hegel
and Schelling mean different things by terms like "dialectic", "spirit", and "God" and,
26 See, for example, Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke (eds.) Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping
Theology in a Post-Modem Context, pp. 2-5
27 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)
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further, that these concepts perform different functions for each philosopher because
they are used to address different problems. Therefore, it is impossible to assume a
simple, consonant relationship between Tillich's use of these terms and concepts and
their use by various German idealists. The unprecedented availability of English texts
and analysis ofGerman Idealism, and the lack of revision where the interpretation of
Tillich is concerned, prompts this investigation to consider the function of concepts in
Tillich's systematic theology, and their similarity to and difference from the function
of the same concepts in Hegel and Schelling. Two examples demonstrate the necessity
of this task.
First, Tillich's metaphorical language of "symbol" is an example of a consonance
between his understanding of a philosophical concept and its original use. For Tillich,
as for Schelling, metaphor is not an alternative to truthful language; a symbol is the
expressive reference point for something that is not material. That is to say, the
condition ofmeaning is not itself available, only the symbol is. This places Tillich
within an idealistic linguistic framework very much like Schelling's, in which
metaphors cannot be exchanged for more truthful or more accurate language.28
Second, however, as we see in the next chapter, Tillich's use of the ontological
polarity of being and non-being, though similar to Schelling's, is different in at least
one critical respect: while Schelling roots his ontology in non-being, Tillich roots his
in being. We will discuss how Tillich's difference is partly the result of a semantic
argument. Nonetheless, this serves to demonstrate that the connection between
Tillich's use of a philosophical concept and its function within the German tradition
with which he connects it is not always clear. Although I cannot forcibly justify
Tillich's approach, I can clarify the intention of its concepts and structures, and
compare and contrast these with the Hegelian and Schellingian intention of them.
Despite his lifelong interest in and reference to German Idealism, however, this
investigation also reveals that in each section of the Systematic Theology Tillich
addresses substantial issues facing theology during his lifetime, including the
historical Jesus project, the apparently logically incongruent doctrine of the Trinity,
28 Andrew Bowie, Schelling andModern European Philosophy, p. 7
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and above all the truth of paradoxical grace and its profession by people and a Church
of obvious fallibility and sinfulness. Each volume of the system seeks to relate the
truth of the Christian kerygma with the historical and existential reality of the human
situation. Although this investigation cannot properly address the place of Tillich's
Systematic Theology in all of these discussions, it is clear that Tillich's methodology
is a problem-focused one that sees theology as the framer ofboth the questions and
answers of existence. (STI, 62, 64)
C. Negotiating Contemporaiy Interpretations ofHegel and Schelling
Though they employ the language of theology and claim to account for the function of
religion in cognition, Hegel and Schelling are not concerned with theological
problems in the same way as their theological contemporaries, like Schleiennacher,
nor in the same way as Tillich. Two basic contemporary and competing readings of
these two German idealists result. The first reads German Idealism from a theological
perspective and interprets metaphysical language, standing in the Aristotelian
tradition, as synonymous with theological language. Discussions of the philosophy
and history of religion that make direct appeal to Christian tenninology, concepts and
doctrine only intensify this inclination. The second reading, which arises out of an
expressly non-theologically oriented reading, divests the works of the idealists of all
theological tone, rendering any theological reference as a product of context.
Such a large dispute cannot be settled here, and because my reading of Hegel and
Schelling is ultimately focused on Tillich's conceptual inheritance, the subject of this
investigation is Tillich's interpretation of the work of Hegel and Schelling. However,
the dispute presents an opportunity to highlight one of the central themes ofGerman
Idealism that the competitive concern for metaphysical and non-metaphysical
readings often obscures: the changing nature of idealism from Kant to Hegel.
One dominant theme ofpost-Kantian idealism is a move away from the authority of
the in sich, the subject or object "in itself', toward the fiir sich, the subject or object
"for itself'. That is, after Kant, cognitive authority is no longer sought either in the
absolute claim of reason or in metaphysical claims, but is rather something decided
collectively by subjects who take things as authoritative for themselves. Though it
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initially results in the apparent distinction between metaphysical, or noumenal, and
non-metaphysical, or phenomenal, sources ofjudgment, Kant's transcendental
idealism also provides the basis for the post-Kantian identification of them in
transcendental self-consciousness. The idealists' focus on self-consciousness,
particularly that of Hegel, introduces a new element into Kantian idealism: the
authority of the community.
In what is sometimes called "conceptual realism", both the activity of judgment and
the criteria for judgment, the "act" and "fact" of cognition, reside in the self-reflective
development of the community.29 Although in Schelling religion is largely
mythological, and in Hegel it is less self-aware than conceptual thought, the focus on
the self-consciousness of the community makes religion an indispensable aspect of its
development. The practical identity of activity and cognition, however, dispenses with
the post-Enlightenment dichotomy between "reason" and "revelation" and subjects
the authority of both to the development of cognitive awareness in the ethical activity
of the community.30
To characterize post-Kantian idealism in this way suggests that it should neither be
read metaphysically, as though transcendence refers to something outside communal
self-consciousness, nor should they be read non-metaphysically, as though the
contribution of religion is of no significance to the development of the community.
Rather, emphasis on the metaphysical, whether biased in favour of it or against, is
unhelpful in determining the main concern ofGerman Idealism to root the account of
reality and thinking in self-consciousness.
With this in mind, great caution must be taken when approaching Hegel.
Contemporary theological discussions of Hegel frequently attempt to demonstrate his
lack of orthodoxy, and philosophical interest in the concept of religion in Hegel is of
limited interest to the commentary tradition that focuses on, for example, concepts of
29 See Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology ofSpirit (London: Routledge, 2002) Discussed
below.
30 See Terry Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality ofReason (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994)
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freedom, logic and right.31 However, contemporary theological suspicion of
"speculative philosophy", "metaphysics", and "idealism" should not mistakenly imply
that Hegel can be easily interpreted according to these labels. Nor should a lack of
contemporary philosophical interest in the theological undertones of nineteenth
century philosophy conceal useful accounts of the role of theology in German
Idealism.
Nevertheless, the difficulty of contemporary interpretation of Hegel cannot be
ignored. For example, current interpretations ofHegel's concept of Geist, or "Spirit",
range from "subjective idealism", to "conceptual realism", to "community practice".32
The difference is significant, for our purposes, especially in relation to Hegel's
concept of God. Spirit as predominantly subjective and associated with some form of
ideal is consistent with a concept ofGod that retains a sense of divine transcendence.
Where the concept of Spirit is primarily associated with realism, however, the relation
of the concept ofGod to the development of human self-consciousness is made much
more immanent, reducing God to a mental construct rather than a transcendent Being.
Spirit as the developing ethic of the human community makes any notion ofdivine
transcendence irrelevant, as the very notion of transcendence is associated with the
process of human cognition and activity alone.
The concept of Spirit is primarily found in Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpiritf while
the term God appears in many others. Discussion of the Trinity, though, arises
primarily in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion while the concept of
dialectic, although formally outlined in the Science ofLogicf appears in all his works
31 The clearest exception to this is Peter Hodgson, editor and translator of all three volumes of Hegel's
Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, which is the version of Hegel's text consulted here. G.W.F.
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, Volume I: Introduction and the Concept ofReligion,
Volume II: Determinate Religion, and Volume III: The Consummate Religion (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1996, 1998, 1998). Each of these volumes contains three versions of the
lectures: the original lecture manuscript, the 1824 version and the 1827 version. Hereafter, notations
are abbreviated as LPR I, LPRII and LPR III, with the version noted in brackets, e.g. LPR I
(Manuscript). See also Hodgson, GWFHegel: Theologian ofthe Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1997), and author ofHegel and Christian Theology: A Reading ofthe Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
32 These three interpretations ofHegel's concept of "Spirit" are discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
33 The version consulted here is G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, A.V. Miller, trans. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979)
34 The version consulted here is G.W.F. Hegel, Science ofLogic, trans. A.V. Miller (New York:
Humanity Books, 1998), translated from Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (ed. Lasson, 1923). Hegel
produced two works on "logic". The first, the Science ofLogic (SL), comprises three volumes: The
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and is fundamental to their interpretation. Because the aim of this investigation is not
Hegel but the presence of Hegel that can be discerned in Tillich's Systematic
Theology, however, engagement in the contemporary debates concerning the
interpretation of Hegel is avoided where anything other than dialectic and Trinity are
concerned. This still leaves a large field ofmaterial to consult with no lack of
divergence, but does help to narrow it.
Recovering Schelling's relevance to contemporary, English-speaking studies of
philosophy has, with a few exceptions, been a phenomenon of the past twenty years.
While literature on Schelling is significantly less than that devoted to Hegel, it is no
less complicated. For an English-speaking audience, the first impediment is
availability of the Philosophy ofRevelation^ in German only. This final series of
lectures, delivered at the very end of Schelling's life, was, like much of Schelling's
work, published posthumously, and has since received scant attention. Alongside The
Ages of the Worldf however, the Philosophy ofRevelation helps clarify the
relationship between Schelling's concept of dialectic and his concept of God in
general, and the Trinity specifically.
The second issue in Schelling scholarship, that bears only somewhat on this
investigation, is the disagreement that still exists over the interpretation of the phases
of Schelling's career. Some describe Schelling's philosophy in terms of "periods"
because of the significant shifts in focus that occur during his long career.37 For these
commentators, a distinction is made between the young Schelling's Naturphilosophie,
the predominant Identitatsphilosophie and Freiheitsphilosophie of the middle and
Doctrine ofBeing (1812), The Doctrine ofEssence (1813), and the Doctrine of the Notion (1816). The
second work is the Encyclopeadia ofthe Philosphical Sciences, ofwhich the first part of three is called
The Logic (1817, rev. 1831), commonly called the Encyclopaedia Logic (EL). See G.W.F. Hegel, The
Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusatze), Part I ofthe 'Encyclopaedia ofthe Philosophical Sciences
trans. Geraets, Suchting, and Harris (Hackett Publishing Co., Ltd., 1991). Both versions are consulted
in this thesis, and are hereafter noted as SL and EL.
35 The version consulted here is F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophic der Offenbarung: 1841/42, Manfred
Frank, ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977) All translations are mine. To aid the reading
of the thesis text, I refer to these lectures in English as the lectures on the Philosophy ofRevelation.
36 The version consulted here is F.W.J. Schelling, The Ages ofthe World, Jason M. Wirth, ed. (New
York: State University ofNew York Press, 2000), translated from the third version of 1815.
37 For example, Andrew Bowie divides Schelling's career into three periods: 1) the "early period" of
the Naturphilosophie; the "middle period" of the Freiheitsphilosphie; and 3) the "later period" of the
"positive philosophy." Bowie, FWJSchelling, online at http://nlato.stanford.edu/entries/schellinu
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most publicly prominent part of Schelling's career, and the less systematic focus on
mythology and religion characteristic of the final decades of Schelling's career.
Opinion concerning the significance of such shifts in focus, in general, and the
product of this latter period, in particular, is mixed. With Karl Jaspers' indictment of
Schelling in mind, Manfred Frank suggests that Schelling's later work in particular
has been equally revered and reviled, found to be both rich and mystical, and empty
and misleading.38 Frank also notes, however, that Jaspers' opposition to mysticism
and abstraction of the human condition contributes to one of the more serious
indictments of Schelling in modern philosophy: "The great sensation... 'proved itself
indeed as mere sensation, and passed away'."39
For others, however, the periods in Schelling's writing, while demonstrating shifts in
focus, do not present divergent philosophies. On this reading, Schelling's works
constitute a development in thought concerning the nature of human cognition and
freedom and their expression in philosophy, religion and art. Adjudicating this debate
is beyond the scope of the present study. Nonetheless, this disagreement is of interest
because Schelling's concern with revelation and its relationship to cognition and
existence, especially evident during the latter "period" ofhis writing, is consonant
with Tillich's express desire to articulate this relationship within his own system.
Despite the debate over the suitability of applying periods to Schelling's philosophy,
recent English-language advocates of Schelling's argue for his significance to current
discussions, a renewed interest ofwhich this study makes use.40 However, my primary
concern is Schelling's significance for the philosophical theology ofPaul Tillich, and
specifically Schelling's concept of dialectic and of the triune God. To this end, it is
sufficient to clearly note the continuing debates in Schelling scholarship, but not to
attempt to evaluate them here.
In sum, this investigation is primarily concerned with offering a new perspective on
the relative presence and function ofHegelian and Schellingian concepts of dialectic
38
Schelling, Philosophic der OJfenbarung, (editor's Introduction), p. 9
39 Karl Jaspers, Schelling. Grose und Verhangnis, pp. 12-38, in Schelling, Philosophic der Offenbarung
(editor's Introduction), p. 9
40
Bowie, Schelling, pp. 67-74
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in Tillich's Systematic Theology. In the next chapter, I show that a dialectical structure
resembling Schelling's account of dialectic is evident in the first volume of the
Systematic Theology and in Tillich's description of essence and existence as
constituting the polar elements of being and non-being. This "dialectic of polarity"
characterizes Tillich's description of human existence. Existence is both the result of
the polarity of being and non-being in divine essence, but is also a disrupted form of
this divine polarity. The cause of existential despair and anxiety is this disruption
manifest in existence and the inability to overcome it within existence.
In the subsequent chapter, I demonstrate that a dialectical structure resembling
Hegel's account of dialectic is evident in the overall structure ofTillich's system.
While essence and existence are polar, insofar as they are constituted by being and
non-being, the relationship of essence and existence is not polar. The three-fold
"dialectic of essentialization" - essence, existence and essentialization - characterizes
Tillich's description of the telos of human life and history, i.e. salvation history. The
appearance of the Christ, the subject of the second volume of the Systematic
Theology, is the appearance ofundisrupted essence that redeems human existence
from the anxiety ofpolarity. The activity of the Spiritual Presence, the subject of the
third volume of the system, is "essentialization", or the redemption ofhuman history.
In the final two chapters of this thesis I examine the role of the Trinity, for Schelling,
Hegel and Tillich, as the religious symbol of these dialectical processes.
28
Chapter One: Dialectic as Polar
Introduction
There are three central sections of the Systematic Theology. The first section of
volume one, "Reason and Revelation", deals with Tillich's preliminary understanding
of rationality in the face of revelation that seems to challenge rationality. The
discussion appears first, says Tillich, because all other parts of the system imply
cognition and revelation. The next section, "Being and God", describes human
existence as estranged from essential human nature, and from the divine in which it is
rooted. From the outset the system deals with the relationship of finite human being
and infinite being, which is God.
Volume two, "Existence and Christ", deals primarily with existential self-
estrangement, the resulting self-destructive aspects of existence generally, and their
solution which is "the Christ". In volume three, two sections consider human
existence after the event of the Christ, or what Tillich calls "under the dimension of
the Spirit". The section called "Life and the Spirit" discusses the continued activity of
God as the "Spiritual Presence". The continued, post-Resurrection estrangement of
existential humanity is described as "ambiguous life", the remedy for which is
unambiguous divine Spirit. The final section, "History and the Kingdom", concerns
the relationship between the history of salvation and human history, and appears last
because for Tillich history is both anamnetic and eschatological.
In this chapter and the next I demonstrate that the first volume of the Systematic
Theology has a different dialectical structure than does the system as a whole, i.e. all
three volumes together. There are two immediate challenges involved in this task. The
first is that, from the outset, Tillich makes no explicit statements that easily
demonstrate his use of a dialectical structure in his system. Tillich does occasionally
refer to the need for a "dialectical" approach in theology (STI, 25, 100, 135), but not
to the system itself. Therefore, my argument concerning the presence of dialectical
structures is the result ofmy analysis of the system, not Tillich's characterization of
his system.
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The second challenge is that, as with many of the terms and concepts he employs,
Tillich's "dialectical" approach is not univocal. This chapter and the next each
consider one of two types of dialectical structure guiding Tillich's system: dialectic as
polar, and dialectic as triadic. This distinction clarifies the connection between
Tillich's systematic approach and those ofHegel and Schelling. In this chapter, I
demonstrate that only the first volume of the Systematic Theology employs a
dialectical structure resembling Schelling's. In the next chapter, I argue that, when
Tillich's system is considered in its entirety, the dialectical structure that surfaces
much more closely resembles Hegel's.
The argument of this chapter is in accord with nearly all Tillich scholarship, which
universally accepts the influence of Schelling on Tillich.41 Yet, the need to
demonstrate the presence of Schelling's notion of dialectic in the Systematic Theology
arises for two reasons. Firstly, to date there are no published works in English that
consult Schelling's major works in order to compare and contrast Schelling's
philosophical concepts and Tillich's use of them. Thus, one major accomplishment of
this chapter is, for the first time, to explicitly connect Schelling's dialectical
philosophies of nature and freedom and Tillich's dialectical approach to some of the
same issues in the context of his Systematic Theology.
Secondly, this analysis of Schelling's philosophy in relation to Tillich is crucial to the
overall argument ofmy thesis: that dialectic in Tillich's system has a more Hegelian
structure than a Schellingian structure. The re-consideration of Schelling's philosophy
helps to make a clear distinction between the dialectical structure most in evidence in
the first volume of the system, which is indebted to Schelling, and that dialectical
structure that guides the whole system, which is indebted to Hegel. This chapter, then,
focuses on Schelling's notion of dialectic, and the evidence of this structure in
Tillich's Systematic Theology. This occurs in three parts.
41 For example, Jerome Arthur Stone, "Tillich and Schelling's Later Philosophy," Kairos and Logos:
Studies in the Roots and Implications ofTillich 's Theology (Atlanta, GA: Mercer University Press,
1978); and Reinhold Mokrosch, Theologische Freiheitsphilosophie: Metaphvsik, Freiheit und Ethik in
derphilosophischen Entwicklung Schellings und in den Anfdngen Tillichs, Studien zur Philosophic und
Literatur des neunzehuten Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976)
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In the first part of this chapter I examine how Tillich defines "dialectic" and how this
is related to the underlying dialectical structure of the first volume ofhis system.
Tillich describes the nature ofboth Being and God, existence and essence, in terms of
the polarity ofbeing and non-being. Where these ontological elements are balanced in
divine essence, they are imbalanced, or "disrupted", in existence. Thus, fmitude, for
Tillich, implies the inescapable opposition and conflict of being and non-being, in
reason and existence, which can only be transcended by "being-itself'.
In the next part of this chapter I examine Schelling's Naturphilosophie42 as it occurs in
some ofhis earliest writing, and his later discussion of the freedom and necessity of
God and of human activity, or the Freiheitsphilosophie, in Philosophical Inquiries
into the Nature ofHuman Freedomf In the final part of this chapter, I distinguish the
major points of consonance and dissonance between a Schellingian and Tillichian
notion of dialectic. I am not concerned to cover all of the terminological and
conceptual ways in which Schelling influences Tillich's theology. My primary
concern is the dialectical structure of the Systematic Theology and, in later chapters,
the significance of employing the Trinity as a symbol of that structure.
Section I. Dialectic in the Systematic Theology, Volume One
The first volume of the Systematic Theology has two parts: "Reason and Revelation"
and "Being and God". In the first, Tillich describes human reason and human
existence as dialectically structured; that is, as best described by two opposing, but
equally necessary elements. Reason is described in terms of three pairs of inclinations,
while existence is described according to the ontological pair ofbeing and non-being.
The following parts of this section outline Tillich's concepts of reason and ontology
as dialectical, discuss problems arising within these concepts, and highlight two
resulting doctrinal discussions that result: revelation as paradoxical, and the
relationship between Creation and the Fall.
42 The text consulted here is F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of System ofthe Philosophy ofNature,
Keith R. Peterson, trans. (New York: State University ofNew York Press, 2004)
43 The version consulted here is F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature ofHuman
Freedom, James Guttman, trans. (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1977) Hereafter, the title of this
work is abbreviated, as is common in Schelling scholarship, as OfHuman Freedom.
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A. Conflicted Reason
The Systematic Theology defines human existence and human reason as inherently
finite. Existence is "disrupted essence", or being and non-being in a state of conflict.
In the same way, human reason, which occurs "under the conditions of existence", is
also subject to polarity and, therefore, conflict. Tillich characterizes the primary
conflict of reason by distinguishing between two concepts of reason. (ST I, 71-75) The
first is "ontological reason", a "classical concept" which he associates largely with
Plato and which he characterizes as operative in cognitive, aesthetic, practical,
emotional and technical functions of the human mind. The second concept of reason
he calls the "technical concept", which he associates most closely with the English
empiricist reaction to German Idealism. This latter concept is over-simplified; reason
in this form becomes for Tillich merely the capacity for cognition, and is closely
aligned to logic. However, ontological reason is a term Tillich favours in order to
expand the definition of reason in two respects. First, for ontological reason all
aspects of existence, not just the cognitive, are informative. Second, the presence of
reason in everything suggests a common creative source ofboth cognition and being,
which Tillich calls "depth". (STI, 79)
Within existence, this depth, or "purity of reason", is fallen. (STI, 74) Humanity can
only refer to truth symbolically because, in its fallen state, the human experience of
truth is finite and limited. (STI, 241) What Tillich means by "symbol" is discussed
below.44 In theological terms, history stands between the fall from perfect "potential",
the Garden of Eden, and complete fulfilment or actualization ofpotential, called the
Kingdom ofGod. Between these moments, in the "flux of time", reason exists only
"fragmentarily" (ST1, 80) and is, therefore, subject to conflicts. Tillich describes the
conflicts in terms of three polarities: autonomy v. heteronomy, relativism v.
absolutism, and emotionalism v. formalism.
44 For Tillich on symbols see Tillich, Dynamics o/Taith, pp. 41-54; cf. Tillich, Theology o/Culture, pp.
53-67. For studies of Tillich's concept of symbol see Donald F. Dreisbach, Symbols & Salvation: Paul
Tillich's doctrine ofreligious symbols and his interpretation ofthe symbols ofthe Christian tradition
(London: University Press ofAmerica, 1993); William L. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God: A
Philosophical Study ofTillich 's Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and D.
MacKenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Flarper and Row, 1965), pp. 95-
99.
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These three polarities comprise principles or inclinations that Tillich describes with
various examples. They are meant, however, not to be absolute categories, but polar
spectra that characterize all human reason. According to Tillich, "theology must give
a description of cognitive reason under the conditions of existence." (ST I, 94) As a
description of a logical relationship, elements within each polarity are inseparable.
Yet, because they describe the conditions of "disrupted essence", or "existence", each
polarity also describes an intractable discord. For Tillich, the act of knowing is both
an act of union, in which the gap between subject and object is overcome, and an act
of detachment, in which subject and object acknowledge their difference. As
simultaneous acts of distinction and identity, however, cognition expresses an
inclination toward unity.
The capacity for cognitive union and disunion has implications for the relationship of
reason and revelation. Tillich describes two kinds of cognitive relationship with
revelation: "technical reason", by which control over the knowledge of revelation is
sought, resulting in discord; and "ecstatic reason", by which union with revelation is
sought, and transcendence of discord is made possible. (ST 7, 53) By means of the
first, an object is grasped by the subject and controlled. By means of the second, a
subject is grasped by its object, and compelled.
Because of the eternal division and conflict ofhuman cognition, represented by the
polar categories of reason and its finitude, human reason on its own is incapable of
achieving the unity it seeks. For Tillich, the answer to the existential quest for unity of
subject and object is the ecstatic, i.e. "grasping", experience of revelation. Revelation
is manifest as mystery, ecstasy and sign-event, or miracle. Mystery is a dimension
which precedes the subject-object relationship. (STI, 108) Ecstasy is a condition in
which the mind is grasped and transcends the experience of the threat of non-being.
(ST/, 111) Miracle is an astonishing sign which can be manifest within the rational
structure of reality, and yet preserve the structure and meaning of reality. (ST I, 115)
Revelation is capable of speaking through history, through individuals and groups.
(STI, 120) As Word, revelation is not like ordinary language, nor is it the
transmission of knowledge. Rather, revelation is the experience ofmystery (ST I, 122,
cf. 158-59) and the transmission of truth, which is expressed in Christian symbols.
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Despite the transcendent nature of revelation, Tillich emphasizes that revelation
occurs within history. Yet, in order to both grasp reason and convey a truth
transcendent of finite existence, revelation must be able to sacrifice the particularity of
its manifestation. Put another way, the conflicts of finite cognition and existence can
only be overcome by a revelation that is capable of transcending its finite form. As we
saw with Tillich's concept of theonomy and the Protestant principle, revelation is said
to judge religion, culture, history and reason, because it ultimately sacrifices its
conditioned manifestation to its unconditioned truth. (STI, 152-153)
In subsequent chapters we see that, for Tillich, the self-negation characteristic of
revelation is most enduringly present in Jesus as the Christ and the symbol of the
Cross. Revelation as the Christ both accomplishes and displays the unity characteristic
of divinity, but in human existence. In self-negation, revelation ultimately unifies
what is universal and concrete by sacrificing concrete form to universal meaning. For
now, Tillich describes revelation as "grasping" the conflicts of reason, in order to
make reason capable of expressing a meaning which, left to its own conflicted state, it
could not.
B. Being andNon-Being
In the first section of the Systematic Theology, "Reason and Revelation", Tillich
describes the conflicts of human reason in such a way that revelation can be described
as the source of their resolution. In the second section, "Being and God", Tillich
describes the conflicts endemic to human existence in order to do the same.45 At the
most basic level, Tillich defines being as the inclination to take form and non-being as
the inclination to resist taking form. In uncreated essence, these inclinations or forces
are equal, opposed and held in unity. In existence, they are no longer united, but
estranged, and are therefore the cause of conflict and ambiguity.
45 Tillich relates the polarity of reason and existence in an article on the ontology of cognition, the only
work in which he does so. He says that the "ego-self' is dialectically polar and that cognition is where
subjective and objective meet. Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge: Problems of an Ontology of
Cognition," (1955) Tillich, Main Works Volume One: Philosophical Writings, Gunther Wenz, ed.
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988) p. 382
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Non-being, says Tillich, is the "not-yet" and "no more" of being, by which he means
the limitation of otherwise unlimited being. (STI, 189) He calls this polarity
"dialectical", so that the non-being he defines as the dialectical counterpart of being is
different from the non-dialectical nihil, or ook ov, out ofwhich God created. (ST 1,
188) Tillich makes this distinction because historically, he says, a problem results
when Christianity conceives of non-being dialectically. The presence of evil in the
world raises the question of the origin of evil. If, however, there is no original source
of being other than God, who is good, there is no place to locate, even in principle, the
origin of evil or non-being, but in God. Tillich variously associates such a
compromise with Bohme's Ungrund, Schelling's first potency, and Hegel's notion of
antithesis.46 (STI, 188)
Against these notions of non-being, which maintain the logical priority of non-being,
Tillich asserts the ontological priority ofbeing. As support for this assertion he offers
a semantic argument: that, without being, a concept of non-being is meaningless.
However, Tillich also associates the relationship of non-being and being through an
historical account of sin. He says that, for Augustine, the idea that sin is non-being
does not suggest that sin has no reality, but that as non-being resists being, so sin is a
perversion of being. (ST 1, 188) Tillich's primary concern, however, is to show the
link between the divine balance ofbeing and non-being, and the human imbalance of
these elements. The limitation of potential being into actualized human form is
unintelligible without a concept of dialectical non-being. (STI, 189)
Being and non-being are essentially equal and opposing inclinations whose imbalance
in existence causes the conflicts ofhuman existence. For Tillich, however, there are
also three things endemic to all human existence: prescribed, finite limitations; an
inner telos that guides the process ofbecoming; and the creative capacity for
imaginative transcendence. (STI, 180) Humanity, relative to the animal kingdom, is
uniquely aware of its place within a self-world relationship. The designation "self',
for Tillich, is not just "ego", but "self-conscious ego". (STI, 170) Humanity is aware
of the reality of being and the possibility of not-being, and of finitude and the possible
transcendence of it, or infinity. As we have seen, this awareness is the result of the
46 The undifferentiated association of these ideas with dialectical non-being as Tillich intends it here
does, as we discuss in subsequent chapters, constitute a misrepresentation of all three.
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ontological connection between essence and existence. This awareness, because it
occurs within existence, is the source of anxiety, but also of the desire for
transcendence.
The ontological polarity ofbeing and non-being in this section of the system is related
to the subject-object structure of reason in the previous section. However, because
Tillich eventually uses the essential polarity of being and non-being to describe God,
he is careful to clarify what this polarity entails. Like the self-world awareness of
existence, the subject-object structure of cognition prevents either element from being
derived from the other. Of course, objectification is natural. "In the cognitive realm
everything toward which the cognitive act is directed is considered an object, be it
God or a stone, be it one's self or a mathematical definition." (STI, 172) Tillich
cautions that God cannot be included in the subject-object scheme in such a way as to
become an object alongside others. Otherwise, God ceases to be the "ground of
being", or the God who is really God, and becomes merely an object alongside other
objects.
The tension of existence, in both the self-world and subject-object structures, is
manifest in what Tillich calls the "ontological elements", or polarities:
individualization and participation (STI, 174-178), dynamics and form (STI, 178-
182), and freedom and destiny (ST1, 182-186). Each results from the mixture of being
and non-being under the conditions of existence (ST I, 186-189), and each has a
dialectical structure. In respect to the first polarity, the individual is both singular and
a participant in an environment. Individuals dialectically participate in a community
of other individuals through "union" and through "resistance" (ST I, 176) which are
expressive of a universal telos.
In respect to the second polarity, existence, or "being something", implies form. Yet,
"Every form forms something. The question is: What is this 'something'? We have
called it dynamics." (ST 1, 178) In contrast to the concretising inclination of form "to
be", dynamics appears as the power ofnon-being. Tillich associates dynamics
variously with Bohme's Urgrund, Schopenhauer's will, Freud's unconscious, and
with mythological concepts such as chaos, the tohu-va-bohu, the night, the emptiness
and the nihil which precedes creation. (ST/, 179)
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In respect to the third polarity, "Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision and
responsibility", that is, ofweighing, excluding and accounting for choices. (STI, 184)
Destiny, not the traditional "necessity", is the counterpart in this polarity. For Tillich,
destiny is not a Greek notion of fate, nor does it refer to something anticipated and yet
unchangeable. Destiny is "that out ofwhich our decisions arise... the concreteness of
our being which makes all our decisions our decisions." (ST I, 184) Destiny is the
basis for free decision making, which in turn further shapes one's destiny.
To these polarities under the conditions of existence, revelation comes in the form of
God as being-itself, or "the power of being-itself'. (STI, 187) In the same way that
Tillich describes a general notion of revelation as the power of reconciliation for
conflicted reason, the revelation of God as "being-itself' provides reconciliation of
conflicted existence. As being-itself, God is the source of all dynamic substance and
form, yet is beyond both essence and existence, beyond mere potential and everything
actual. (STI, 204) God is the name given to the source of dynamics, yet God is also
actual only through that which is concrete. Though transcendent of the division of
subject and object, God participates, fulfilling the quest of individuals and
communities. At once, God sets and transcends the limits of existence, providing
finite freedom and destiny by originating, sustaining and directing all creativity and
life. (STI, 241 ff.)
In this section of the Systematic Theology, Tillich describes human existence as rooted
in divine essence. As being-itself, God constitutes the power of being and non-being
for human existence as well as for Godself. What is balanced in God, however, is
unbalanced in humanity. Under the "conditions of existence", the polarity ofbeing
and non-being creates conflict in human existence. Because being and non-being are
constitutive of both divine essence and human existence, and because of the unique
human capacity for self-consciousness that Tillich takes as given, human existence,
though conflicted, is aware of the possibility of transcending that conflict. However,
because of its finitude, humanity is ultimately incapable of transcendence on its own.
The only possible hope of reconciliation of conflicted existence resides in being-itself,
or the source ofpolarity: God. This does not mean that revelation as being-itself is a
merely logical answer to the conflicts of existence caused by the polarity of being and
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non-being. Rather, the human experience of polarity, knowledge ofbeing and non-
being, and awareness of the absence of their reconciliation, causes anxiety. As the
only answer to this anxiety, Tillich suggests that revelation does not merely happen to
humanity, but that humanity desires revelation. However, Tillich does not make clear
the extent to which humanity knows precisely what it desires. Anxiety merely forms
the "question of existence". (ST I, 168)
C. The Need for Dialectic: Revelation and Paradox
The dialectic ofpolarity, evident in the structure of the first volume of the Systematic
Theology, presents revelation as that which resolves the conflict and opposition
inherent in cognition and existence, as the power of undisrupted "being-itself' grasps
existent being and reason. A question arises, however, about what Tillich hopes to
gain in describing the power of revelation in a dialectical and ontological way. The
answer lies in Tillich's career-long debate with Barth over the nature of revelation and
humanity's participation in it. Though this subject cannot be treated in a substantial
way here, Tillich's rejection of a Barthian definition of "dialectical theology" helps to
explain the intentions ofTillich's ontological system.
In an article on dialectical theology, Tillich criticizes Barth for using the term
"dialectical" to describe the latter's theology. ("Dialectic", 127) Tillich argues that
Barth's description of God's simultaneous "yes" of salvation and "no" to sin do not
form a dialectical relationship. Because both yes and no come from God, Tillich
contends that revelation, for Barth, is a one-sided pronouncement uttered against an
entirely fallen humanity. The fallenness ofhumanity makes a human question about
God impossible. In the Systematic Theology, Tillich likens such an understanding of
revelation to a stone "thrown at" the human experience. (STI, 7) The question of
whether Barth's use of 'dialectic' is the same throughout his career is the subject of
continued discussion,47 and whether Tillich's interpretation of Barth's use of dialectic
is correct or not is not the focus of this thesis. However, Tillich's definition of
dialectical theology in contrast with others is significant to our task.
47 See John Webster (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, pp. 13-14
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For Tillich, dialectics entails an argument of "yes" and "no" in order to move closer to
the truth. This is a consistent definition for Tillich, from his article on Barth through
to the Systematic Theology. In the introduction to The Protestant Era, Tillich says
that,
dialectics is the way of seeking for truth by talking with others from different
points of view, through "Yes" and "No," until a "Yes" has been reached which
is hardened in the fire ofmany "No's" and which united the elements of truth
promoted in the discussion. (PE, ix)
In Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Tillich says,
Through "Yes" and "No," errors are overcome and reality discloses itself to
the mind... [one] transcends even them and tries to reach being-itself, the
ultimate aim of thought. He does this, not in order to define it- which is
impossible, since it is the presupposition of every definition- but to point to
that which is always present and always escaping. (BR, 18-19)
In the Systematic Theology, Tillich suggests that dialectical opposition is rational, not
paradoxical. "One element drives another", in dialectic, even if they appear to contrast
each other initially. (STII, 90) Dialectical opposition is more like a discussion that is
never finished, and it is this dynamism that maintains the rationality of dialectic.
Paradoxes are not, of necessity, irrational, says Tillich, but they do represent
assertions, either of single or opposed concepts, that do not permit discussion. (STII,
93) A paradox must be accepted or rejected, while dialectic is pursued.
Tillich sees Barth's use of "dialectic" as an exclusively divine activity, a
pronouncement at humanity. For Tillich, however, dialectics includes human
participation in a discussion in which revealed truth can be understood and
misunderstood, interpretations proposed and countered. Human participation in the
event of revelation does not imply that the truth of revelation can be derived, or that
knowledge ofGod can ever be conclusive. ("Dialectic", 140) Tillich is clear in his
article about Barth and in the Systematic Theology that humanity's question about
God presupposes an answer: revelation. This means that revelation is not immanently
attainable through reason. The human experience of revelation can only occur because
what is transcendent "has already dragged us out beyond ourselves". The problem for
Tillich is that, "Barth leaves unexplained how revelation can communicate anything
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to man if there is nothing in him permitting him to raise questions about it, impelling
him toward it, and enabling him to understand it." ("Dialectic", 142)
By what criteria does humanity know to take revelation as authoritative? For Tillich
the criteria reside within the shared essential nature of divinity and humanity. Tillich
objects to what he perceives as Barth's devaluation ofboth human knowledge and the
human pursuit of understanding. He agrees that human knowledge is fallen and often
quite faulty, especially when it comes to knowledge of God. However, he does not
agree that finite knowledge ofGod implies complete ignorance; even errant
knowledge has a dialectical value, otherwise the whole history of religion is thus
transfonned into a "Witches' Sabbath of ghostly fantasies, idolatry and superstition".
("Dialectic ", 139) Tillich's fundamental objection to what he sees as a Barthian
definition of dialectic is its characterization of the impossibility ofhuman knowledge
ofGod, when "dialectic" should imply participation and the possibility of knowledge,
even if finitely and errantly.
Tillich, therefore, prefers to refer to Barth's "yes" and "no" of revelation as
"paradox". In the Systematic Theology, Tillich defines paradox as that which
"contradicts the doxa, the opinion which is based on the whole of ordinary human
experience, including the empirical and the rational." (STII, 92) Specifically,
The Christian paradox contradicts the opinion derived from man's existential
predicament and all expectations imaginable on the basis of this
predicament... The appearance of the New Being under the conditions of
existence, yet judging and conquering them, is the paradox of the Christian
message. (ST 11, 92)
God's choice to reveal Godself to fallen humanity is an act of grace. God's salvation
of sinful humanity is not consequential or necessary, but is the result of God's
paradoxical grace toward humanity.48 Tillich suggests that the strength ofBarth's
theology is the grace inherent in his concept ofGod's "dialectical yes and no".
Salvation through revelation is, as Barth says, an "impossible possibility", one that
humanity cannot predict or account for of its own merit. On this, Tillich agrees with
48 In an earlier work, Tillich defines God's judgment, the "justification of the sinner," as the paradox of
faith. Tillich, The Interpretation ofHistory, p. 32.
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Barth. Tillich's objection is that grace, the appearance of the Christ who conquers
existence under the conditions of existence, is a paradox, but not a dialectical process.
(STI, 64; cf. STII, 90-93, 106, 108) Paradox has a central and logical place in
Christian theology because it simultaneously asserts the particular manifestation, or
"fact", ofGod in the human person of Jesus, and the unknowability of God, or
transcendent origin of the "act" of revelation. ("Dialectic", 127; c.f ST /, 57)
The Christian paradox subverts the standard "opinion" (doxa) that a thing or event can
be either particular or transcendent but not both at the same time. (STI, 56-57, 150-
152) A theology of the paradox of grace ensures that the conflicts of existence
produce no new knowledge which could be said to lead human thought to God. Yet, a
truly dialectical theology, as Tillich conceives of it, also ensures that errant human
knowledge is not entirely devalued and remains related to the existential experience of
God's revelation.
In the first volume of the system, then, polarity is tempered by a concept of paradox.
Conflicted reason is resolved by revelation, which implies a relationship between
reason and revelation. However, to ensure that polarized human reason cannot be seen
as deriving or anticipating revelation, a concept of free and unprompted grace is
required, which Tillich calls paradox. The human experience of paradox ensures
divine transcendence while maintaining the certainty that revelation is for humanity.49
Paradox does not describe, however, the event of revelation, i.e. the human experience
of and participation in undisrupted essence, which is a dialectical experience.
D. Problems with Polarity
Tillich's description ofparadox has met with some objection, though in some cases
this is due to assumptions regarding Tillich's definition and use of the term. The main
problem is that Tillich claims to "observe" paradox and, thereby, understand and
transcend it. In trying to "have it both ways: the paradoxes of faith and the solutions
of dialectical reason", Ian Thompson suggests that Tillich ends up explaining paradox
49
Uwe Carsten Scharf links Tillich's use ofparadox with his use of divine "breakthrough," arguing that
the latter secures the freedom ofGod's action. Uwe Carsten Scharf, The Paradoxical Breakthrough of
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away.50 Kenneth Hamilton says that, because of this, Tillich is guilty ofKierkegaard's
"unpardonable offence", ofwhich speculative philosophy is also guilty: abrogating
paradox.51 Hamilton insists that paradox is the faith of the individual who does not
know and therefore believes. The rational demonstration of the need for paradox
diminishes its power of breaking into ordinary experience from above.
Two responses are in order. First, the assertion that Tillich's demonstration of paradox
is guilty of abrogation overstates the concern that matters of faith not be "explained
away". Tillich explicitly says that it is upon that paradox that all other doctrine rests.
("Dialectic 127) That it is described in order to secure the transcendence of
revelation, indicates Tillich's intention not to qualify what must remain absolute.
Second, the paradox to which Kierkegaard refers, and to which Thompson and
Hamilton also refer, is the paradox of faith; that is, the faithful response of the
individual is paradoxical: to believe "though he has not seen". We have seen that, in
Tillich's system, the notion of paradox is meant to secure the transcendence ofGod
during the otherwise dialectical participation of humanity in the event of revelation. It
is a description of the incomprehensibility of the divine, not the cognition of the
believer. If anything, Tillich's notion of the paradox of grace reinforces the
simultaneous reality of human sinfulness and divine salvation. Tillich is clear that the
human situation demands something that is beyond its experience, but that, because of
its finitude, reason cannot imagine for itself what form this might take.52 Furthermore,
the kind of reason associated with the experience of revelation is ecstatic reason,
which "grasps" humanity in the experience ofmystery. Thus, even that reason which
is associated with faith is something for which neither human reason nor logic are
responsible; it, like paradoxical grace, is received.
Another substantial problem with Tillich's description of paradox is linguistic
ambiguity. Robert Ross contends that Tillich's statements that, "God does not exist"
and that, "God is being-itself' represent a linguistic paradox. Ross has two major
50 Ian E. Thompson, Being andMeaning: Paul Tillich's Theory ofMeaning, Truth and Logic, pp. 206-
207
51
Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 209
52 See John P. Dourley, "Jacob Boehme and Paul Tillich on Trinity and God: Similarities and
Differences," Religious Studies 31/4 (Dec 1995) p. 440
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complaints: that Tillich does not make an adequate distinction between paradox and
contradiction; and that Tillich inexplicably chooses to use the language ofparadox
instead of describing God in some other way. Ross suggests that there are many ways
to describe God, and that theologians always have a choice as to what language or
concepts they employ. Put succinctly, for Ross, paradox is not a necessary theological
category. His central argument, however, is the fact that, "the statement 'God does not
exist' is inconsistent with the position of one who clearly affirms there is a God."53
The confusion in Ross' criticism is Tillich's use of the term "existence," which Ross
decides is a univocal term, even when talking about God. Tillich says that God is not
"a being," but Being, or being-itself, or the power of being. (ST I, 205) "God does not
exist", for Tillich, means that God is not one worldly object among many. He clearly
says that there is a God, but that "God" does not exist in the same way that "cat" or
"unicorn" or "a person" are all variously said to exist.54
Furthermore, Tillich's statement that "God does not exist" has a more specific context
which Ross ignores. Tillich says that, "the concept of existence and the method of
arguing to a conclusion are inadequate for the idea ofGod." (ST I, 204) The issue he
is addressing, however, is not a linguistic one; he is criticizing the "So-Called
Ontological Argument". Tillich says,
The scholastics were right when they asserted that in God there is no
difference between essence and existence. But they perverted their insight
when in spite of this assertion they spoke of the existence of God and tried to
argue in favor of it. Actually, they did not mean "existence." They meant the
reality, the validity, the truth of the idea of God, an idea which did not carry
the connotation of something or someone who might or might not exist. (ST I,
205)
Tillich's characterization of "the scholastics", by which he means certain medieval
theologians and their arguments for the existence of God, reveals his concern for the
53 Robert R. N. Ross, The Non-Existence ofGod: Linguistic Paradox in Tillich's Thought, pp. 108 ff.
54 Frederick J. Parrella draws a connection between Tillich's rejection of speaking ofGod as "a being,"
with his rejection of speaking ofGod as "a person." (ST1244-246) Frederick J. Parrella, "Paul Tillich
and the Doctrine of the Trinity: A Catholic Perspective," Trinity and/or Quaternity: Tillich 's
Reopening ofthe Trinitarian Problem, 2002 Proceedings of the IX. International Paul-Tillich-
Symposium (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2004) p. 295. See also James Luther Adams, Paul Tillich's
Philosophy ofCulture, Science and Religion, p. 270
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problems of naturalism and dualism, addressed above: arguments in which the world
is given and God is sought. "This does not mean that God is dependent on the
world... But, ifwe derive God from the world, he cannot be that which transcends the
world infinitely. He is the 'missing link,' discovered by correct conclusions." (STI,
205)
In the end, according to Tillich, arguments demonstrating the existence of God are not
actually proofs or answers, but expressions of the human question or quest for God
implied in human finitude. Tillich is not suggesting that God has no "being". For
Tillich, God is being-itself, a tenn expressive of the sheer possibility to exist.
However, Tillich is making a clear distinction between the things and ideas of human
finitude which "exist"; i.e. are disrupted by the mixture ofbeing and non-being, and
God, which is the perfect unity ofbeing and non-being. The concern is theological
and methodological: that the concept ofGod should not be derived from existence,
either by negation or by argumentation. God is revealed to the disrupted human
situation and this cannot be grasped by cognition. Rather, paradoxical grace "grasps"
the human mind and situation, where the concept ofbeing "grasped" destabilizes any
cognitive certainty regarding the human relationship with God.
E. Creation and the Fall
Tillich's insistence on the polarity of human existence, and its root in divine essence,
leads to a significant theological problem: the act of Creation and the existential
reality of estrangement and sin are synonymous. Although his discussion of existence
occurs in the second volume of the Systematic Theology, we consider it here, briefly,
in order to demonstrate one of the central problems of the dialectic ofpolarity.
The second volume of the Systematic Theology concerns the relationship between
existence and the Kairos of Christ.55 Existence is characterized, in theological terms,
by "sin," whose origin is said to be in "the Fall". For Tillich, the biblical account of
The Fall is a symbol of estrangement from God (STII, 29); "The Fall is not a break
551 have left a more detailed discussion of the concept of Christ as Kairos, and its difference from
Christ as New Being, to the chapter on the Trinity in Tillich. My concern here is Tillich's description of
the Christ in relation to existence and essence.
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[from ideality], but an imperfect fulfilment." (STII, 30) However, it is not merely a
symbol of the movement from ideality to reality, as it is for many moments in
Western philosophy; the Fall cannot be fully demythologized, says Tillich, but only
"half-way demythologized". He notes, for example, that even when Plato replaces
specific, mythological terms with the abstract terms of "essence" and "existence", he
still uses the metaphor of "the fall of the soul". (ST II, 29) The state ofperfection prior
to the Fall suggested in Genesis refers not to perfect existence, but to an analogical
"dreaming innocence" which is logically prior to the decision for self-actualization.
(STII, 33) Tillich suggests "dreaming innocence" for two reasons: first, to ensure that
only God is perfect; and, second, to account for a state in which humanity is finitely
free, but prior to the decision to become self-actualized, which Tillich also calls
"temptation". (STII, 33)
The marks of human estrangement resulting from the Fall are collectively called
"sin". In the individual the marks of sin are manifest as unbelief, hubris and
concupiscence. Unbelief, says Tillich, is not denial of God as such, since he who asks
for God is already estranged from God. Rather, unbelief is the conscious separation of
human will from God's will. (STII, 47) Hubris is the result of the self-elevation of
humanity to the realm of infinity, by the identification of partial truth as ultimate
truth. (ST II, 49) Concupiscence is the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality
into oneself; it is a never-satisfied desire for self-fulfilment, and results in self-
destruction and self-negation. (ST//. 51 ff.)
Estrangement is described in terms of the ontological polarities of freedom and
destiny, dynamics and form, and individualization and participation which disrupt
existence. With the separation of freedom and destiny, humanity places the individual
at the centre of the universe; freedom turns to objects, persons, and things contingent
upon the subject. The lack of relationship between subject and object makes existence
arbitrary, not free; without union to the will of God, human will is compelled by
mechanical necessity, not destiny, which Tillich calls the "bondage of the will".56 (ST
II, 62-64) Separated from fonn, dynamics becomes chaos; separated from dynamics,
form becomes law. (ST II, 64-65) The separation of the inclinations toward
56 Tillich later attributes this concept to Martin Luther. (ST II, 78)
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individualization and participation can lead both to "depersonalization," the
objectification of subjects, and to the abstraction of the cognitive subject to the point
of its estrangement from the world. (ST II, 65-66)
For Tillich, however, this implies that sin is not merely the result of turning away
from a law, or from God. Rather, sin is inherent in human existence. Tillich is not
intentionally assigning the blame for sin to God's act of creation, but broadening its
definition. He wants to challenge the notion of sin as a numeric tabulation ofwrong
deeds according to a set of criteria. For Tillich, individual responsibility for sinful
behaviour is the result of the much more fundamental human condition of
estrangement from God. Thus, he defines estrangement as both fact (Tatsache) and
act (Tathandlung):
Sin is a universal fact before it becomes an individual act, or more precisely,
sin as an individual act actualizes the universal fact of estrangement. As an
individual act, sin is a matter of freedom, responsibility, and personal guilt.
But this freedom is imbedded in the universal destiny of estrangement in such
a way that in every free act the destiny of estrangement is involved and, vice
versa, that the destiny of estrangement is actualized by all free acts. (STII, 56)
The doctrine of the universality of estrangement is not meant to be deterministic, nor
is it meant to "make [the human] consciousness of guilt unreal". (STII, 57) It is meant
to "liberate" the individual from the unreal expectation of choice, of undetermined
and unlimited freedom, for good or bad, for God or against God.
The acceptance of human freedom as finite is essential for Tillich's account of
revelation. Tillich is describing the sinfulness of humanity in a way which maintains it
both as an "original fact" and as a condition of "spatial and temporal existence"; the
transition from dreaming innocence to existence did not "happen" at some point in
time. (STII, 41-42) The aim is to see estrangement, i.e. disrupted essence, or
existence, as an ontological condition. Once this is established, Tillich can then
describe God's revelation in the person of Christ as the New Being, the power of
reconciliation within conflicted existence.
This account of estrangement and sin is not without problems. The "leap" from
essence to existence that Tillich calls a condition of existence is inaccessible to
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thought; Tillich even calls it "irrational". (ST II, 14) However, the irrationality of the
Fall, or of sin and estrangement, is not the problem. The problem, as Thatcher argues,
is that Tillich simultaneously defines the Fall as a "transition from essence to
existence," and as a condition of existence which has no spatial or temporal
particularity.57 We will see in the next section how Schelling's positive philosophy
results in a similar problem. The effort to ground reason of itself, without relying on
negation, caused Schelling to describe the transition from essence to existence as a
necessary "leap". Tillich's conflation of creation and the Fall may be the result of a
similar goal: to retain the positive status of existence, even as disrupted essence, or
"not-God".
In making the Fall an ontological condition, however, Tillich has made creation and
the Fall coincide, such that sin is interpreted in terms of fate rather than
responsibility.58 In Tillich's defence, Thomas reminds that, for Tillich, there is a
distinction between the transcendent Fall and the immanent Fall, saying, "Both are
necessary because the individual act of estrangement is not an isolated phenomenon
but part of the universal tragedy ofhuman existence."59 Thomas reads this distinction
as Tillich's effort to remain critical of the historically uncritical emphasis on original
sin and its negative evaluation of humanity.
Yet, the proximity of creation and the Fall remains problematic, especially with
regard to the apparent necessity of the Fall for Tillich's concept of the reconciliation
of estrangement in the New Being.60 It may be that Tillich's ontology is an effort to
place the truth of Christ, or of revelation, beyond the reaches ofmediating cognition.
In the first volume of the Systematic Theology, as we have seen, Tillich describes
revelation variously as "grasping" the human situation, and as an event whose
occurrence and necessity cannot be logically deduced. Even his description of the
57
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subservience ofphilosophy to theology can be seen as an effort to place revelation
beyond the grasp of cognitive mediation.
Of course, all symbols, language and metaphor are mediatory. The concepts of
essence and existence, of estrangement and reconciliation, especially as Tillich
describes them, depend on large cognitive edifices. If it is Tillich's intention to place
revelation beyond cognition by describing it ontologically, then the system fails on its
own terms. For one example, in order for the experience of "being grasped" by
revelation to hold any meaning for the subject experiencing it, he must be able to
recognize the experience as one of revelation, and not of something else. For another,
as we see below, the Spiritual Community is a collective response to the revealed
Spiritual Presence (ofGod). The formation and fostering of a community around a
single principle or presence, however, requires recognition, by each of its members, of
the operation of the same principle, which is also an act ofmediation.
In sum, the opposition of being and non-being is undisrupted in God, but disrupted in
existence. That is, in God being and non-being are balanced, while in humanity they
are not. Dialectic, in the first volume of the Systematic Theology, then, is used to
describe the polarity ofbeing and non-being. The task of the next section of this
chapter is to consider the major philosophical texts of Schelling that deal with polarity
and dialectic. This will allow me to demonstrate the connection between Schelling's
dialectical approach and Tillich's polar description of being and non-being as the
constitutive elements of essence and existence. In subsequent chapters, the analysis of
this chapter will imply that the resemblance of Tillich's use of dialectic to Schelling's
concept of dialectic is limited to the first volume of the Systematic Theology.
Section II. Dialectic in Schelling
The aim of this section is to give an account of the major philosophical issues
Schelling addresses in order to form a picture of the structure and function of dialectic
in his philosophy. In consulting Schelling's major works on nature, self-
consciousness, and freedom and identity, I outline a basic understanding of how
Schelling employs a dialectical approach. Subsequently, I demonstrate the parallels
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between the dialectical nature of the first volume ofTillich's Systematic Theology and
the various descriptions of dialectic arising from Schelling's major works.
A. Naturphilosophie
The primary concern of Schelling's First Outline ofa System of the Philosophy of
Nature of 1799 is to describe the relationship between humanity and nature, or mind
and matter, without fixing nature as the controlled object of the human subject. For
Schelling, the subject-object distinction of Enlightenment philosophy does not do
enough to account for the organic reality of the subject: that thought and activity are
situated in and are somehow the product of the natural world. Andrew Bowie argues
that the Kantian division between the world-as-it-appears and the thing-in-itself is
symptomatic of the objectification of nature, and that Schelling's Naturphilosophie is
a response to it.61 In response, Schelling conceptualizes nature as a dynamic, infinite
process, whose "real" manifestations are the result of different "ideal" forces.
In the first part of the system of nature, Schelling begins with the question of "to what
extent unconditionedness might be ascribed in nature."62 Schelling's concern is not
simply to observe and then describe nature, but to account for how nature is both
diverse and conceptually unified. His initial assumptions, which he says are "assumed
as well known from transcendental philosophy", reveal his philosophical training. As
a student ofKant and Fichte, Schelling is steeped in the transcendental tradition, but is
attempting something new: to identify the manifest and manifold world with the ideal
world, the practical with the theoretical, in a single systematic account. The
unconditioned (das Unbedingte) is not manifest in any one being, but is "being-itself;"
and, everything that exists is only a "particular form" of this unconditioned.
Philosophy, however, knows of no "originary being", according to Schelling. The
unconditioned, being-itself, is only activity, and as such must be described as free, or
else conditioned by another that would be the true unconditioned. Ontologically,
61 Andrew Bowie, FWJSchelling, online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/schelling. Bowie identifies
this objectification with the search in post-Enlightenment natural sciences to find fixed laws and
theories of nature by which cognitive judgments can be made.
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being-itself is the "continually operative natural activity that is extinguished in (results
in) its product", nature.63
The question that Schelling faces next is a Fichtean one because it concerns the reality
of the limitations facing an otherwise unlimited, or unconditioned, ideal.64 "The
problem arises: to specify how nature could inhibit its product at particular stages of
development, without ceasing to be active itself."65 How is it that the product of
infinite activity, i.e. the unconditioned, results in the diversity of nature, and not in a
completely exhaustive singularity? Schelling's answer is that nature is an infinite
process of formation, a configuration of various stages, each of which has a "peculiar
character". Each of the "forms" that nature takes is a "misbegotten attempt" to
achieve its desired shape. Each "product" of nature is inclined toward, but ultimately
incapable of expression of, the unconditioned. For Schelling, nature is free
"productivity", or the activity of producing, but is also the product of this free
activity.66
In the second part of the system, Schelling considers inorganic nature. He suggests
that as much as organic nature is diverse in its manifestation, and therefore dynamic,
inorganic nature is fixed in its manifestation. In the third part of the system, Schelling
says that,
Nature is organic in its most original products, but the functions of the
organism cannot be deduced otherwise than in opposition to an anorganic
world... Moreover, if the productive product or the organism in general is
possible only under the condition of an anorganic world, then all grounds of
explanation of the organism must already lie in inorganic nature... Organic
and inorganic nature must reciprocally explain and detennine one another.67
Schelling concludes from this that, because of their interpenetration and
interdependence, organic and inorganic nature must share some sort of "pre-
established harmony". "[T]here must be a third which binds organic and inorganic
63
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nature together again, a medium that sustains continuity between both."68 Schelling
names this medium of continuity "excitability", which is the essence of the organism
that causes it to develop, to "become". Excitability indicates that there is a bond
between the organic and the inorganic, while the condition that this bond is a "pre-
established harmony" indicates that their unity is a priori. Given that nature is the
product of the unconditioned, which itself only exists as manifest activity, the
difference and unity that characterizes nature must be the result of difference and
unity within the unconditioned.
At the end of the nature system, Schelling says that the two "forces" of the
"evolution" of nature are "the expansive and the retarding".69 The life of nature is not
the result of a single "life force", but results from the interplay of forces that
constitute the unconditioned. These forces are an infinite, creative potential that resists
limitation, and a finite, limiting force that results in the products of the natural world.
In its unseen essence, nature is infinitely potential, it is "no thing", i.e. not yet a thing,
or the possibility of everything. In its observable manifestation, however, nature
comprises the objects of the visible world. Together, the inclinations to remain infinite
and to become finite form the non-material drive of nature, which is the ground of its
becoming. Nature is not a mere collection of objects, but is the embodiment of
productive opposition and unity.
The concept of "productivity" is an early articulation of the basic fonn of Schelling's
dialectic: that the difference of dialectical opposition, or polarity, is underwritten by
an initial unity. As a result, the ideal and natural worlds are related in a way that is
accessible to human cognition. Nature, and by extension human cognition, is the
activity, or productivity, of infinite possibility. That the natural world can be
simultaneously described as manifold and unified implies that the ideal world, of
which nature is a manifestation, can also be described as manifold and unified. The
unconditioned, then, does not contain the ground of difference and unity; rather it is
the ground of difference and unity.
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B. The System ofTranscendental Idealism
In the System ofTranscendental Idealism of 1800,70 Schelling describes the
emergence of the thinking subject in terms of a productivity similar to that of the
Naturphilosophie of 1799. Self-consciousness, like productivity, is a process
comprising stages of the emergence of forces. In his discussion of consciousness,
Schelling again distinguishes himself from Fichte. The System locates the origin of
self-consciousness not in the spontaneous act of the "I" positing itself to itself, but in a
logically prior ground that contains distinction and unity, as in the Naturphilosophie.
Although only a few years after the publication of the System ofTranscendental
Idealism he and Hegel would part ideological ways, in this volume Schelling
foreshadows many of Hegel's inclinations. For one, the third-person perspective of
Schelling's description of the history of self-consciousness also makes each of the
epochs a logical condition of all cognition. For another, Schelling's description of the
history of self-consciousness inspires that of Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, in
which each stage is found insufficient and presses forward to a higher concept; though
it is perhaps Schelling's notion of intuition that Hegel has in mind when he rejects
intuition as an insufficient basis for self-consciousness.71 Finally, the next chapter
considers Hegel's project of identifying the "objective world" of the Concept with the
"subjective" experience of it, which, according to Schelling, is the goal of
transcendental philosophy.72
The use of a dialectic of forces in the System ofTranscendental Idealism, as in the
Naturphilosophie, stems from a concern that if "the subjective is the first and only
ground of reality, it casts doubt on the reality of the objective."73 Schelling describes
the history of consciousness and the emergence of self-consciousness through three
"epochs" of distinction: internal, posited, and reflected.
70 The version consulted here is F.W.J. Schelling, System ofTranscendental Idealism, Peter Heath,
trans. (Charlottesville, VA: University ofVirginia Press, 1993)
71 At the time of the publication of Schelling's System, he and Hegel were close collaborators. During
1802 & 1803, Schelling and Hegel edited a journal together, the Kritisches Journal der Philosophic
(Hildesheim: Olms, 1967)
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The first epoch describes the intuitive subject, not yet conscious of itself "as" subject,
and its progress from "original sensation" to "productive intuition". Here Schelling
explains "how the Self comes to intuit itself as limited" and as "sensing", i.e. material
and cognitive.74 In this epoch the Self is only a principle, an ideal, or a logical
distinction between what the Self is and what it is not. At this stage, the reality of such
a division is one about which the self is not yet aware. The subject is not yet
interacting with a physical environment, but is only the location of opposed forces:
infinite potential and finite limitation. Schelling calls this an "identical proposition",
i.e. A=A.
In the second epoch, the self comes to understand what only the philosopher and his
readers understand about the first epoch. Here the subject becomes aware of
distinction, of what it is and is not. It is aware of that which is other than itself, and of
its particular and physical relationship to it. The subject, predicated by anything other
than itself, is identified in this epoch by a "synthetic proposition". The subject moves
from pure self-identity to relative identity; the self is therefore not described as A=A,
but A=B.75 The predicate to which Schelling says the subject refers is not another
social subject, as it is in Hegel, but is the Self s awareness of and cognitive relation to
its environment. Thus, the logically differentiated, internal forces that constitute the
Selfwere only "ideal" in the first epoch, because the subject was unaware of them. In
the second epoch, however, differentiation is "real", as well as "ideal", because the
Self is aware of its difference from its object.76
The third epoch describes self-consciousness itself, i.e. transcendental reflection, in
which the subject is capable of reflecting on its relation to its object, thereby
transcending the limitations of the subject-object distinction.77 To find a point at
which identical and synthetic propositions are one is to find a point where objective
and subjective knowledge are one. Schelling says that this point only exists where the
presenter of knowledge and the knowledge presented are one: in self-consciousness.78
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Schelling summarizes his "theoretical philosophy" as a description of the "possibility,
actuality and necessity" by which self-consciousness is a determined result of
subjectivity. For Schelling, self-consciousness is natural and empirical. "All our
knowledge is empirical, precisely because concept and object arise for us unseparated
and simultaneously."7'' As an embodiment of natural forces, self-consciousness is
itself a necessarily embodied process. Like nature, the subject is a product of forces.
However, there is a difference between the a priori necessity of simple subjectivity
and the a posteriori necessity of self-consciousness. The origin of the a priori subject
is "beyond consciousness" and is located in a manner similar to the "origin of the
objective world". The essentially dialectical nature of the subject, in the opposed
inclinations of the ground to become and to not become, in the resulting
externalization of it in consciousness, and in the reflected unity of self-consciousness,
is manifest in the subject, but is something to which the subject has no cognitive
access. The a posteriori self-consciousness, however, is reflective, and rooted in the
empirical reality of the material, organic subject. Self-consciousness is an activity, an
instantiated subjectivity that is the result of a conceptual development to which the
human mind has access because development is located in the cognitive organism.
This means that there is no difference, in the process of self-consciousness, between
the subject and the concept of its charted cognitive development. The subject is
constituted by its development. Yet even in fulfilled self-consciousness, the subject
has no cognitive access to the ground of its nature, because this is only manifest in the
activity of the self itself. The Self s being is the coming-to-be of a world for it.80 Self-
consciousness, therefore, is an ongoing translation from unconscious over to
conscious activity, which Schelling defines as "productivity", that includes subjective
awareness and worldly objectivity. The activity of the self-constituting Self is
essentially unconscious, i.e. immediately intuitive. Rather than Fichte's spontaneously
self-posited and self-limiting subject, however, Schelling assumes a pre-temporal,
infinite and absolutely potential subjectivity whose nature it is to become self-
conscious, and which therefore requires limitation. This makes limitation, or
objectivity, a pre-temporal force within subjectivity; both subject and object are
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presupposed in a pre-rational ground. The pre-rational account of limitation is
significant to this investigation in relation to three concepts: finitude as the self-
limitation of infinite essence; polarity as ideal and real; and, therefore, finitude and
infinitude as distinct but related.
Firstly, while the activity of thought is unlimited, the Self is the limitation of
something infinite. The subject is infinitely potential before its manifestation as an
object and only becomes limited when it becomes an object. However, Schelling has
defined self-consciousness not as the subject finding an object, but as the subject
becoming its own object. As in nature, in the self a force of infinite potential becomes
objective through its own productive self-limitation: "In that the self limits itself as
producing, it becomes something to itself, that is, it posits itself."81 Both nature and
self-consciousness are the result of the self-limitation of an essence whose potential is
infinite.
Schelling argues that the limitation of the selfmust be an activity of the self, and not
something external to it, because the self has knowledge of its limitation. "The
dogmatist explains finitude of the self as an immediate consequence of its restriction
by an objective... as one would that of an object, that is, he explains limitation in and
for itself, but not, however, the knowledge of that fact."*2 According to Frederick
Beiser, the problem Schelling has in mind here is the debate between Kant and the
rationalist metaphysics typical of Leibniz and Wolff, for whom knowledge of God,
providence, and immortality are innate and a priori,83 Like Kant, Schelling wants to
avoid this latter kind of dogmatism, and so suggests that it is not concepts that are
innate in the primordial subject, but "our own nature and the whole of its
mechanism".84 This suggests that the teleology of self-consciousness, while ideally
provided for within the ground of self-consciousness, is still manifest in subjectivity.
Secondly, the polar forces that constitute the basis of all natural and subjective
activity are ideal as well as real. As with the Naturphilosophie, Schelling sees the self
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as the result of forces, or opposition. Owing partly to a philosophy which tries to
account for the dynamism of life, and partly to the law of contradiction, Schelling
assumes that the Self cannot limit its infinite producing capacity, or "posit itself',
without opposing something to itself. In Fichtean terminology, the positing of an I
assumes a Not-I. In Schelling's words:
.. .in the concept of positing we also necessarily think the concept of a
counterpositing, and thus in the action of self-positing we likewise have a
positing of something opposed to the self; and only for this reason is the act of
self-positing at once both identical and synthetic.85
In sum, Schelling's system assumes that there is an original "productivity" of
consciousness out ofwhich the self arises, and that within this infinite productivity
reside two inclinations: one seeking manifestation in a self-limiting I, and another
wishing to remain a Not-I. In this way, Schelling argues that he has dialectically
related the ideal capacity of nature and thought, and the reality of their particular
manifestations.
Thirdly, at least in this early period ofhis writing, Schelling's notion of the
relationship between the finite and the infinite is best understood through his concept
of art, the "universal organ of philosophy".86 Essentially, where philosophy is
constrained by the limitations of propositional language, art is not. Over and above the
limited rationalism of "intellectual intuition", "aesthetic intuition" provides access to
an ultimately "hidden identity" of consciousness and nature.87 As in the ground of
consciousness, during the act of artistic creation there reside within the artist two
inclinations. First, there is an unconscious, creative motivation, or infinite
productivity, which Schelling calls "genius". Second, there is a conscious control of
artistic materials and movements, i.e. self-limitation. Artistic endeavor is like
consciousness in that it is an act of becoming, or an "ongoing translation from
unconscious over to conscious activity".88 Andrew Bowie notes that this is a radical
departure from the pervasive view of nature from the Enlightenment onward, by
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which content and meaning are objectified by the esteem of science over art.89
Schelling's aesthetic intuition suggests that "the object", a work of art, a work of
nature, or a work of human thought, is never absolute; there is always something non-
objective, and ultimately inaccessible within every objective expression.
In conclusion, two final points must be made here. Firstly, the intuition of the subject
is not a faculty of the subject, but rather is the subject. Self-consciousness is a process;
the self s being is the "coming-to-be of a world for it".90 As a process, self-
consciousness is the "enduring juxtaposition" of unconscious "producing" and
conscious limitation in the act of self-consciousness. The self is defined as activity,
whose origin is unconscious, but whose objectivity unfolds in the subjectivity of
history. In art and religion, and ethical activity, the goal of nature and consciousness is
the reunion of the objective concept and its subjective expression.
Secondly, then, the dialectical forces that ground nature and thought also describe
selfhood and its teleology. Subjectivity is an instantiation of the polarity of being-
itself, and this is crucial to this investigation for two reasons. First, for Schelling it is
polarity, not tri-unity, which describes the reality of human nature and thought,
because it describes their essential ground. Second, what is "ideal" for Schelling is
merely the conceptual representation of what is real; human life is the incomplete and
ongoing activity of an essentially polarized nature. But this essence, the
"unconscious" ground of existence, is not transcendent in that it is somehow beyond
existence; it is only transcendent inasmuch as its necessity is reflected in self-
consciousness, or is "ideal".
As we discuss below and in subsequent chapters, this poses significant problems for
Schelling's description of God and his invocation of a Christian doctrine of the
Trinity. The basic problem is that ifbeing itself is only the activity of nature and
cognition, then God and revelation are consigned to human history and self-
consciousness. Furthermore, this poses a problem to the Schellingian interpretation of
Tillich's Systematic Theology. As discussed above, for Tillich, conflicted human
existence cannot be resolved through human history or cognition, but only by
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revelation of the New Being that redefines human nature and thought in relation to
God.
That Schelling sees art as the highest expression of essential polarity is also
significant for our investigation. This aesthetic notion differs significantly from
Hegel's notion that conceptual thinking transcends "picture thinking", or
representation; and is especially important for understanding Tillich's theological
notion of the symbolic expressions of religion. As we will see, especially in relation to
the doctrine of the Trinity, religious expression is, for both Hegel and Tillich, not the
ultimate expression ofwhat is ideal.
We put these questions to one side, however, in order to move on to the next major
concept in Schelling's philosophy: the "identity" of subject and object. Schelling's
primary argument in his earlier work, discussed above, was that if the identity of
subject and object exists in the outward manifestations of nature and consciousness,
then the ground that unites them must already contain within it the possibility of
differentiation and identity. The question Schelling asks as a result, in his philosophy
of identity, is why such a ground would make the transition from ideal identity (unity)
and potential differentiation, to actual differentiation in nature and self-consciousness.
For Schelling, this is a question of freedom.
C. OfHuman Freedom
For Schelling's early work on Naturphilosophic and transcendental idealism,
existence and cognition are the result of a productive process ofbecoming. In nature
and art, the infinite is continually made manifest in what is finite; unconscious
potential is made manifest in finite, conscious reality. The second general period of
Schelling's philosophical writing extends roughly from 1801 until the publication of
Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature ofHuman Freedom in 1809, and concerns the
origin of conscious self-limitation and the reason for it. These concerns are expressed
in the philosophical concepts of identity and freedom, and ultimately in Schelling's
doctrine ofGod.
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OfHuman Freedom locates the discussion of the possibility of real difference, and not
merely logical opposition, within the ground of all existence. In this volume, the
discussion centers on the relationship between the infinitely potential and indissoluble
"Absolute", in which distinct inclinations are unified, and the manifest disunity
characteristic ofhuman existence.91 Additionally, the concept of the productivity of
nature and self-consciousness is focused into discussions of Creation and human
freedom, while the absolute is discussed in terms of God and the basis of good and
evil.
i. Distinction and Identity
In Schelling's System ofTranscendental Idealism, the conscious activity of nature, the
self-conscious subject, and the process ofbecoming, are all the result of an
unconscious, unconditioned ground. The productivity of this ground is described as
the result of the opposition of two forces: potential, infinite not-becoming and finite
becoming. In this way, subject and object are identified as both necessarily distinct
and united, though unconsciously, prior to becoming actually distinct. With this
theory of productivity, Schelling hoped to ground the subject and object of thought
together without relying on a one-sided Fichtean self-positing subject, or Spinozistic
self-differentiating object.
The assertion of identity, however, is actually the composite of two unique assertions.
The first is that two things cannot be "identical" unless they are truly two separate
things. This is most clearly expressed in the System ofthe Whole ofPhilosophy and of
Naturphilosophic in Particular, or the "Wiirzburg System" of 1804, in which
Schelling says, "It is clear that in every explanation of truth as an agreement of
subjectivity and objectivity in knowledge, both, subject and object, are already
presupposed as separate, for only what is separate can agree, what is not different is in
itself one."92 In OfHuman Freedom, Schelling calls this the Law of Identity, by which
he means that to predicate something of a subject is not to say they are the same, but
that the copula "is" implies both their distinction and their relationship. For example,
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to say that "a body is blue" is not to say that "body" and "blue" are indistinguishable,
but that in the instance of this subject, blue can be predicated of its body.93 So far, this
is not significantly different from Schelling's earlier work.
The second assertion Schelling makes concerning distinction and identity clarifies
their relationship and describes their ideal ground. In order for distinct entities, or
even subject and predicate, to be identified, the possibility of their unity must already
exist. Just as productive distinction is possible because of distinction within the
unconditioned, the identity that arises out of distinction implies that identity and
distinction exist ideally before they occur in reality. Schelling draws the implication
of this theory of identity into his work on the nature of human freedom. For
Schelling, the possibility of real human activity, the polarity of good and evil, must be
accounted for by an ideal pattern of polarity.
In the Identitatsphilosophie, or "identity philosophy" of OfHuman Freedom,
Schelling locates the ideal pattern ofpolarity in the logically prior concept of the
absolute. The "forces" of Schelling's earlier work on nature, i.e. the polar inclinations
to be and not to be that constitute the productivity of nature and self-consciousness,
are identified with the absolute. That the "unconditioned" of earlier work gives way to
the absolute in OfHuman Freedom suggests that the absolute is a conceptual totality
and the affirming ground of all identifications. Much has been made of Schelling's
absolute; especially famous is Hegel's reproach that "the Absolute, the A=A," is "the
night in which, as the saying goes, all cow's are black..."94 However, like Hegel's
provisional "Idea" of the Logic, which is only complete at the end of the cognitive
process, Schelling says that, "The Absolute need not be thought of as some strange,
mystical entity: it is initially just the necessary correlate of the relative status of
anything that can be explained causally."95
At this point, Schelling's notion of the absolute is propositional, and at the outset
cannot be abstractly described, or ascribed any predicates. Bowie suggests that the
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absolute is the link, the Band of subject and object, and does not identify with only
one or the other.96 In this way, says Schelling, "The T think, I am', is, since Descartes,
the basic mistake of all knowledge; thinking is not my thinking, and being is not my
being, for everything is only of God or the totality."97
Schelling's concept of the absolute addresses two issues. The first is a question of
causality: how does the possibility of distinction, and therefore identity, arise in the
first place? Schelling is trying to account for limitation of the infinite, i.e. finitude, or
productivity, without relying on a dogmatic, Fichtean concept of the self-limiting "I",
or a Spinozistic concept ofmaterial determinism. The source of all possible difference
and subsequent identity is the absolute, in which opposed forces maintain the logical
possibility of all things, infinite and finite. Everything possible is ideally accounted
for in the concept of the absolute.
The second issue Schelling is addressing actually has to do with Hegel himself, and
anticipates Schelling's later concern to provide a positive account of productive
human nature and thought. Schelling characterizes Hegel's philosophy ofmutual
recognition of subjects as "negative philosophy", because in it the definition of the
subject relies on a negation of the object. Schelling's eventual aim is to construct a
"positive philosophy" in which subject and object are identified not by negation, but
by a positive statement ofwhat they are: products of dialectical forces. This is why
Schelling insists that the distinction and unity of the absolute be thought of as duality,
or polarity, not antithesis.
For Schelling, polarity overcomes the weaknesses he finds in the concept of logical
negation. He states that, "though we may have used the two as meaning the same
thing up to the present", duality and antithesis mean different things.98 The polar
inclinations to be and not to be are not antithetical. That is, they are different
inclinations that are, nonetheless, both essential to the process ofbecoming. Without
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distinction, there is only complete indifference, and no impetus to become." As in the
Naturphilosophie, where being and non-being are equal and opposed forces, in the
ldentita.tsphilosoph.ie the absolute comprises these equal and opposed inclinations.100
This concept of identity is consistent with Schelling's earlier philosophy. As a result,
the notion ofpolarity is imputed to the absolute, which we will see has a substantial
impact on Schelling's doctrine of God.
Schelling's discussion of evil and freedom in OfHuman Freedom is driven primarily
by the theoretical concern of how to account for "God's relation as a moral being to
evil, the possibility and reality ofwhich depend upon his self-revelation.'"01 The
discussion of evil arises because it must be accounted for within a system where
everything is the result of and included within an infinite absolute. Yet Schelling is
concerned not to describe God as "mere logical abstraction... without personality and
consciousness thereof," lest God cease to be understood as a "living unity of
forces".102 The root of evil is, therefore, accounted for within a description of the
polarity ofGod's very nature.
ii. The Doctrine ofGod
Schelling approaches the question of the origins ofhuman freedom through the
actuality of evil. Evil, for Schelling, has a positive status; it is more than just a "less
good" action or decision.103 Following his tendency to account for all reality in what is
ideal, Schelling locates the positive status of both good and evil in the absolute, that
is, in God. However, he does not want to attribute evil to the will of God. Therefore,
Schelling makes a distinction between God's nature and God's freedom, and locates
the polar capacity for good and evil in the essential polarity ofbeing and non-being of
God's nature, not in God's free, benevolent will. This occurs in a number of steps.
Schelling's first task is to consider and reject some theories concerning evil,
especially what he calls pantheism. As the differentiated products of a single
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substance, the natural world in pantheism is considered as the evidence of the
character ofGod. Thus, privation is simply a determined consequence ofbecoming.
When trying to reconcile such a system with the tradition of recognizing God as either
benevolent or at least benign, argues Schelling, evil either clouds an all-perfect being,
or the reality ofevil ends up being denied.104 The latter obfuscates a real concept of
freedom, and the former, at the very least, makes God a co-author, with humans, of
evil, neither ofwhich is consistent with an infinite and free God. Schelling rejects, as
deficient, other positions familiar in his day, including: evil as an unintended
consequence; the possibility of a dualism of sources for good and evil; good and evil
as a mere plus or minus in front of ambiguous action; evil as an action which is "less
perfect" than a good action; and even evil as at least having a positive essence.105
These explanations only avoid the reality of evil and its polar relationship with good.
Furthermore, they invite fatalism, as evil becomes the determined result of creation.106
Having dispensed with pantheistic and reductionist accounts of God, Schelling seeks
to define the relation between creation and God in a way that maintains the positive
status of the principles of distinction and identity shared by both, but that still
accounts for the reality of evil. To ensure positive definition Schelling proposes that
things, people and the world be defined in terms of "dependence" upon the creator;
that all things "are in God". As dependent upon a God that remains the uncaused
Creator, or "that which is in itself and is conceived solely through itself',107 creation is
also relegated to a negative definition as "that which is not God", but is positively
defined as "that which is created", infinite productivity given parameters. In this way,
God is completely free, and as the source of freedom produces a creation that is free,
but free within the limits of its manifestation. This is Schelling's Freiheitsphilosophie,
or "philosophy of freedom".
When grounded and unified in the absolute, human freedom remains both dependent
upon the absolute for its possibility, yet independent in its capacity to will and act.108
The possibility of evil is the result of an essential polarity, but actual evil is the result
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of existential polarity. Both the inclination to be and the inclination not to be are real
possibilities before the existence of the world, in the logically prior distinction and
unity of the absolute. Likewise, the choice between good and evil, in human
existence, is a real choice between two possibilities that both have positive status,
because the polarity of human existence is rooted in the absolute, i.e. in God.
Schelling's next task is to give an account ofhow or even why what is ideal becomes
real; that is, an account ofhow the polar forces of the absolute, or God's nature,
constitute human existence and make it possible. However, Schelling maintains the
absolute freedom ofGod by distinguishing between God's polar nature, as being and
non-being, and God's freedom. The decision to manifest is not the result of the polar
forces ofGod's nature, therefore, but the result of a free divine "leap", the reason for
which is inaccessible to human knowledge.109 This leap is not from nothing, i.e. ex
nihilo, but is from a point that is not yet any-thing; that is, it is posited against the
Abgrund that is God's nature.110
The grounding principle in God is called the dark principle, the infinite night in which
there are no "things"per se.U] The ground in God resists the inclination to become,
otherwise all of God would become in a completely exhaustive instant. The Abgrund
longs and wills to become, but as infinite possibility it cannot become anything of its
own accord. Against this dark ground of un-becoming, or infinite potential, the
principle of light and being - the dark principle's inseparable opposite - is posited. For
Schelling, what is positive can only be posited if its opposite is also somehow present.
The dark principle is the principle of the "first creation", as Schelling calls it, God's
creation of the "conditions for the possibility of revelation". The darkness is prior to
self-manifestation, prior to light, and is that against which revelation can be posited.
Without this "preceding gloom", this "heritage" of depth, creation would have no
reality.112 Everything would remain infinite possibility and unfathomable unity.
As the absolute, God encompasses both Abgrund and "leap", neither ofwhich is the
whole ofGod, but only part ofGod. The reason for this division is that in order for the
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world to exist as distinct from God, and yet as toto genere, or "entirely becoming", it
must be said to have its basis in something which is in God, but which is not God
himself.113 Schelling insists that these two principles, the dark Abgrund and the light
freedom to be, do not represent a dualism in God, or a dualism of gods, i.e. a
progenitor of completeness and a progenitor of privation. Rather, like the polarity that
constitutes nature, existence and cognition, the two principles require each other."4
The light of self-limiting creation requires the dark canvas of unlimited potential in
order to posit itself. Similarly, the dark principle can never become anything without
the creative, delimiting principle of light. God contains the ground for both, yet
remains a monism. Light is born from darkness; revelation and creation are posited
against universal no-thing-ness; and all of this occurs within God. The result of polar
nature and freedom within God is the second, or lasting, creation in which God wills
the world in self-revelation. Creation is the realization of the divine essence, of the
original principle of depth, through the elevation of light from within it."5 God is
properly revealed in that which is similar to God: free human beings.
For Schelling, this doctrine ofGod explains the origin of evil. The distinction made
between God and the ground that he posits in himself is where Schelling locates the
basis of human freedom, free will, and ultimately, selfhood. The dark ground that
longs for, but refrains from becoming, and the light that imposes form and thus
propels becoming, also appear in humans. The difference is that in God these
principles are indissoluble, while in humans they are dissoluble and cause an
imbalance that is the source ofpreoccupied selfhood."6 The elevation of selfhood
above unity, which occurs only in creation, is a breaking of and fall away from the
original unity of the absolute. For Schelling real evil "arises from one's heart" not
from the depth that is God's essence."7 Only the conditions for the possibility of evil
come from these depths. In God, they are eternally united, but in becoming, in the
human, the conditions can be torn apart and can become evil.
113
Schelling, OfHuman Freedom, p. 33
114
Schelling, OfHuman Freedom, pp. 88-89
115
Marx, Schelling, p. 72
116
Schelling, OfHuman Freedom, p. 39
117
Schelling, OfHuman Freedom, p. 82
65
Although the separation of principles, i.e. selfhood and the real possibility of evil,
represents an ontological condition and not a moral decision, human freedom, even
when it chooses evil, maintains a relationship to the divine condition, which is the
absolute condition."8 This gives rise to what Bowie calls the "problem of transition",
or, the question ofwhy a unified and balanced infinite would choose to become
unbalanced and differentiated.119 If all cognition, including the cognitive choice of
evil, is ontologically rooted,120 then evil is a privation ofwhat was once absolute, the
division ofwhat was once unity. This implies two things. First, all creation, or
finitude, is not only a fall away from the absolute, but a necessary fall, because of the
duality, or polarity, of inclinations that characterizes the ground of existence itself.
Second, however, since it is ontological, the division between absolute and finitude
must always have existed, for Schelling, even if only potentially. Crucially, the
question as to why an absolute entails privation remains unanswered.
It may be the influence of the mystical approaches of Bohme and Friedrich Oetinger
that directs Schelling toward questions of the nature of human freedom, the demonic,
and undisclosed evil.121 However, the question of freedom for Schelling is both a
matter of the individual and a matter of systematic philosophy.
... the philosopher maintains the existence of [divine] knowledge, because he
alone comprehends the god outside himself through the god within himself by
keeping his mind pure and unclouded by evil. But, alas, those who are
unsympathetic towards science, traditionally regard it as a kind of knowledge
which is quite external and lifeless like a conventional geometry.122
In his desire to reunite the "science" ofphilosophy with its significance for the
concrete individual, we hear again Schelling's concern regarding the Kantian
formalization of nature in a worldview that is abstracted from human subjectivity. In
response, Schelling explains human freedom as the result of divine freedom, while
still avoiding the problems ofpantheism and determinism.
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The determination of the absolute as "being" has its roots in F.H. Jacobi. Before
Schelling, Jacobi had called God the unconditioned (Unbedingte), or absolute, being
(sein).123 This raises some question, however, as to what Schelling means by
"divinity" and "God", which is not always clear. James Gutmann suggests that
Schelling considered his work to be "scientific", i.e. objective, or, independent of the
content ofmythology and religion.124 Though it could be argued that he assumes
ethical characteristics ofGod that are religious and even Christian, God remains, at
this point, simply "totality".125 Bowie argues that, as totality, the philosopher admits
that God can only be defined in terms of God alone, otherwise God could not be said
to encompass all things. He also contends that the concept ofGod popular in
Schelling's day functions mainly as a logical proposition.126 However, in OfHuman
Freedom Schelling also makes references to Scripture, and is at great pains to define
God and the absolute ground such that evil is not a determination of a free and
creative God.127
The description ofGod as life, "event", or an "emerging" - in the world, the
individual, and in history - is the result of a prior "emerging into being" of an absolute
ground. However, while this provides an ideal construct by which to understand the
real possibility of human freedom, it does not answer the question ofwhy an infinite
totality, an unconscious ground, or God, would choose to "become". Why would
absolute unity choose differentiation, when that choice pennits the possibility of the
freely choosing human subject to choose evil? This is the question that dominates the
rest of Schelling's writings.
At this stage, Schelling ensures two things in his description of God. First, human
freedom remains grounded in divine freedom, so that the two are not dualistically
opposed.128 Second, the radical difference between good and evil remains, so that evil
does not become merely a "less perfect" activity.129 Schelling roots the basis of real
human freedom in the ideal of absolute freedom. He constructs a doctrine of God
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made up of two polar elements: God's nature and God's freedom. How this polar
description of God is analogous to and divergent from a Christian notion of the triune
God is the subject of a later chapter.
With respect to the overall argument of this thesis the main conclusion of this chapter
is that, throughout the various stages ofhis philosophy, Schelling's concept of
dialectic is distinctly polar. The difference between object and subject and their
eventual identity, as this occurs in existence, must be accounted for "in principle".
Yet, difference for Schelling, must be positive and binary. Dynamic opposition, both
ideal and real, is not merely the result of implied negation inherent in a single
principle. The underlying unity out ofwhich all difference arises is composed of
equally positive and substantive "forces". The inclinations toward finitude and the
inclination toward infinity, or the inclinations to become and not to become, are two
sides of a coin, not the result of inherent negation within a single principle.
Though they are distinct, Schelling insists that, because of the necessity of each for
the other, the polar forces of God are not antithetical. This is distinct from Hegel's
concept of the sublimating dialectic ofAufhebung, which is described in the next
chapter. At this point, it is enough simply to highlight that, for Schelling, the polarity
in God is a dialectical opposition that will not eventually be resolved. "The divine
Being is not sublimated (aufgehoben) in this tension. It is only suspended. But the
intention of this suspension is no other than to posit as actual, actu, what is otherwise
not possible",130 i.e. the self-generated inclination, within God, to remain infinite. This
polarity also dominates his later concept of dialectic in The Ages ofthe World. God, in
this volume, contains within himself two different sources of activity: God's nature,
and God's freedom. The polar opposition ofprinciples that are equally substantial and
positive in God, is what determines the difference between Schelling's and Hegel's
use of the concept of the Trinity, and is the subject of a subsequent chapter.
Section III. Tillich and the Schellingian Dialectic
130
Schelling, Werke, II/2, 91; c.f. Schelling, The Ages ofthe World (translator's Introduction), p. xxiii
68
The list of Schellingian concepts that Tillich employs throughout his theology is
extensive. The concept of the abyss - what in earlier writings Tillich called the
"Unconditioned" (IH) - has echoes of Schelling's Abgrund. The notion of a "primal
harmony" that describes pre-existent essence and the anxiety of conflicted existence
are present in Tillich's distinction between undisrupted essence and disrupted
existence. The underlying unity and perfect freedom of God, as opposed to the finite
freedom of humanity, also appears in Tillich's Systematic Theology. The task of this
section, however, is to outline the main points of similarity and difference between
Schelling and Tillich only where dialectical structure is concerned, in order to discern
in what ways Tillich has adopted, adapted or avoided Schelling's polar and positive
dialectical approach.
A. Similarity: Being and non-being, essence and existence, Creation and the Fall
Schelling's concept ofdialectic is distinctly polar. Real difference and identity arise
out of an ideal unity that itself comprises opposed and equally positive and
substantive "forces". In the Naturphilosophie, the concept of identity is only nascent,
but the polarity of being and non-being constitutes the productivity of nature. In the
Identitatsphilosophie, the possibility of difference and identity, of object and subject
in existence, or self-consciousness, is provided for in principle in Schelling's account
of the ideal, self-constituting "I". In the Freiheitsphilosophie, this pattern of ideal
possibility and real actualization leads to Schelling's doctrine of God, in which
polarity is expressed as God's nature and freedom, and is the root of the human
capacity for good and evil. The key to Schelling's dialectical polarity is that
difference must be positively stated. Identity is never the result of implied negation
inherent in a single principle; as we see in the next chapter, it is for Hegel.
Polarity, however expressed, is of two elemental forces present in everything, which
Schelling identifies as being and non-being. It is this pair of terms that Tillich uses to
define his concepts of essence and existence, and that serve as their inherent
connection. For Schelling, the opposing forces of being and non-being constitute a
dynamic productivity that gives shape to all things: finite form restricting infinite
content. The ideal opposition ofpositive forces is described as natural and free.
Nature, the identity of self-consciousness, and human freedom, are all the result of the
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productive dynamism of being and non-being. Existence, therefore, is the natural and
manifest result of essence. What is real is the product ofwhat is ideal - a connection
only realized in the conscious product, the human mind, which develops through
historical stages to reveal this connection.
For Tillich, also, being and non-being are as equally at work in human existence as in
divine essence. Human anxiety and a sense of the holy are, respectively, the result of
the polarity of being and non-being, and of encounters with being-itself. The two
experiences represent the polar extremities of all human experience, and relative
proximity to one or the other is also fundamentally determinative of all activity and
cognition. Being-itself is polar. Non-being belongs to being because non-being, for
Tillich, makes God a living God, rather than a dualism. The charge of dualism, when
laid against Tillich,131 fails to take account of the influence of Schelling. Essential,
balanced polarity is the basis of existential, unbalanced polarity. Hamilton suggests
that, "The presence of non-being in God means that there is fmitude in God, and
anxiety as well - though, in the divine being, finitude is eternally conquered by the
divine infinity.'"32 Tillich relates existence and essence by stating that the former is
the disrupted form of the latter; their connection, however, is based in the primary
relationship of being and non-being.
The fundamentally polar structure ofbeing and non-being, for Tillich expressed as
essence and existence, for Schelling expressed as ideal and real, causes them to fall
prey to at least one common problem. For both, the problem of evil is the result of
essential, or ideal, polarity. For Schelling, the possibility of distinguishing good and
evil in reality implies that their distinction and identity must also have an ideal basis.
Thus, the possibility of evil, the result of human freedom, is the result of the ideal
polarity of being and non-being, the freedom ofGod. Though Schelling is clear that
God does not will evil, nonetheless, its possibility is underwritten by God's freedom,
and begins when essence "falls", or "leaps", into existence.
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Although freedom and the problem of evil are not central issues for Tillich, the
problem of evil arises in his discussion of the doctrines of Creation and the Fall.
Because existence is "disrupted essence", by implication Creation is necessarily
fallen. The act ofGod's self-differentiation in Creation necessarily results in
disruption for Tillich, making the Fall an ontological fate, not an historical one.133 The
placement of the Fall before human existence, or at least before conscious human
decision-making, in a period called "dreaming innocence" (STII, 33 ff), seems to
absolve humanity of responsibility for original sin. Moreover, Tillich does not
introduce any resources that would help avoid the implication that Creation and the
Fall coincide.134
Like all other theological concepts, the Fall is symbolic for Tillich. Usually, an appeal
to a doctrine of symbols helps to militate against theological implications of taking
Tillich's doctrinal descriptions literally. However, in the case ofCreation and the Fall,
even this does not remove him from theological difficulty, for the transition from
essence to existence has a "moral and tragic element", of actualization and guilt.
While mythologically the Fall happens in the past, ontologically it is original fact, for
Tillich, and a condition of all finite existence. (STII, 36) In this instance, the presence
of a positive polarity ofbeing and non-being, similar to Schelling's, creates a
significant theological problem for Tillich's description of the relationship of essence
and existence.
B. Difference: Productivity and Revelation
There is a crucial difference between Tillich and Schelling on the nature of revelation.
For Tillich, revelation is the completely new - that which comes to redeem the vain
human struggle to reconcile being and non-being in existence. Thus, the polarity of
being and non-being is reconciled not by historical development, either of religion or
of consciousness, as in Schelling, but by something entirely new; not by a real
productivity that matches an ideal, but by an in-breaking and indwelling manifestation
of "undisrupted essence under the conditions of existence". This difference is
133 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation," The Theology ofPaul Tillich, p.
219.
134 R. Allen Killen, The Ontological Theology ofPaul Tillich, p. 266
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discussed in more detail below. My concern here is to outline Tillich's major points of
departure from Schelling's dialectical approach. These differences include the
centrality of self-negation in Tillich's concept of revelation and Tillich's description
of God's transcendence beyond polarity.
Firstly, in Schelling's transcendental philosophy, ideal polarity frames reality as
teleological, which is expressed as productivity, identity in self-consciousness, and
finally, as human freedom. In each, Schelling describes an increasing proximity of
what is real to its ideal by means of expressive epochs, or stages. In theory, the result
is a description of reality whose goal, fulfillment, or telos, is predictable based on the
stages that precede it. In practice, Schelling interprets history according to ideal
polarity and its presence in all aspects of reality.
For example, the goal of transcendental philosophy is to give a singular account of
both cognitive and practical activity in order to overcome the mind-world dichotomy.
Schelling's early Naturphilosophie of productivity recovers a sense of dynamism not
only for the organic world, but also for human existence and cognition. This helps
him to describe the development of self-consciousness in the System of
Transcendental Idealism according to an ideal polarity like that of nature. Schelling
argues that, as an extension of dynamic and historical nature, human consciousness
overcomes the distinction between itself and the natural world it perceives. The result
is an internally-compelled development of nature for which self-consciousness is the
predictable telos ofwhat it means to be human. When this pattern is extended to myth
and the history of religion, the telos of human purpose becomes just as predictable.
For Tillich, however, human nature actually makes the goal of existential unity
impossible to achieve within dialectical human history and cognition. Tillich does
employ Schelling's polarity of being and non-being as constitutive of essence and
existence. For Tillich, also, human existence is characterized as a quest toward the
unity of objective and subjective, ofwhat is intuited and what is observed. But for
Tillich, the existential disunity that gives rise to this quest is not only an insufficient
reality, as Schelling's "epochs" suggest, but an undesirable state. The polarity of
existence is not just present as "stages", for Tillich, but as anxiety and conflict that
cannot be resolved by anxious humanity and conflicted reason. The reunion sought by
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humanity is not within the reach of ordinary self-consciousness. Thus, Schelling's
transcendental goal of the "identity of subjective and objective" is only possible, for
Tillich, through the revelation of the New Being, which is the undisrupted essence
that overcomes the disunity of being and non-being in existence. This New Being is
not an expression ofpolarity, for Tillich, but of the paradox of grace that heals
polarity.
Furthermore, the critical mark ofNew Being, and of all revelation, is self-sacrifice.
Only the finite expression that sacrifices its own particularity can be "final", or
ultimate, for Tillich. This means that the history of revelation does not occur in stages,
but as the self-sacrificial nature most enduringly present in Jesus as the Christ, in the
symbol and reality of the Cross, which together he conceptualizes as the New Being.
In the Christ, the object of all reason becomes subject to the conditions of existence
and sacrifices itself under them. Through this event, revelation judges religion,
culture, history and reason, because it alone is able to sacrifice its conditioned
manifestation to unconditioned truth. A more specific description ofTillich's
description of the Christ and self-negation is the subject of subsequent chapters.
Here, the point to be made is that this concept of self-negation does not appear in
Schelling's system or thought. For Schelling, essence and existence are always
constituted as positive polarity, as equal, opposed, but never self-negating forces or
principles. We will see that his final lectures, on the philosophy of revelation, do refer
to Jesus Christ as the focal point of revelation and of the reunion of essence and
existence. But even in these lectures, the notion of sacrifice is noticeably faint. For
Schelling, Christ serves as more of an abstract model, the culmination ofmythological
thinking and the embodiment of a philosophical truth. The primary definition of
Christ, for Schelling, is as logos, as word, and as embodied principle. Christ as
sacrifice, as self-negation, as agape, does not figure into Schelling's dialectic.
Secondly, the problem of evil is an impediment to Schelling's system because it
accounts for the possibility of evil through the polar essence of nature, making evil a
necessary theoretical and practical result of existence. As we have seen, Tillich's own
ontology makes this a problem for his system as well; the polarity ofbeing and non-
being in divine essence pennits an unbalanced polarity of the same elements in
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existence. Our interest in this problem, however, is not to consider or argue in favor of
any repairs of it. Rather, it is to point out where a difference between Schelling and
Tillich occurs in relation to this issue.
For Schelling, the polarity of being and non-being constitutes the whole of essence.
"Transcendence" only refers to the capability of the human subject to think of itself as
subject and object, removing the barrier between material and cognitive worlds in the
act of reflection. For Tillich, however, transcendence implies something more. When
he refers to the ground of being, or to "being-itself', he is referring to something other
than simply the equally positive and opposed elements ofbeing and non-being. Tillich
refers to God as beyond "the subject-object distinction", beyond "both essence and
existence", and as beyond mere potential and everything actual. (STI, 204) When
Tillich suggests that the statement "God is being-itself' is the only non-symbolic
statement of theology, he implies two things. First, he suggests that God is beyond the
human disruption that occurs as a result of polarity, and has the power to impose the
limits of finitude upon Godself, and the power to transcend those limits. Second, he
suggests that the concept ofGod retains a mystery that transcends systematic
description. (STI, 114-116; STII, 112)
Ultimately, the ontology of the first volume ofTillich's Systematic Theology bears
significant resemblance to Schelling's notion of polarity as constitutive of the ideal
and the real. For Tillich, being and non-being are constitutive of essence and
existence, and form the basic dialectical structure that connects the two. The
ontological connection between essence and existence leads Tillich, like Schelling, to
conflate Creation and the Fall. However, Tillich's notion of revelation is primarily of
the self-negation of the New Being, which constitutes the completely new revelation
of undisrupted essence in existence. This is a significant departure from Schelling's
notion of the organic development of cognition and existence according to a polar
ideal of equal and opposed inclinations.
For Tillich, polarity describes a deficient state, not a positive statement, or stage, of
development. The development of nature, self-consciousness, and history and
religion, cannot result in an ultimately transcendent goal. The telos that guides
humanity beyond the conflict and anxiety of polarized existence must be revealed, and
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completely new. In short, for Tillich the dialectic of polarity only describes the
existential conditions of anxiety and sin, not the possibility of their resolution.
Whether Schelling's transcendental perspective is an adequate solution to the Kantian
problem of the mind-world divide is the subject of continuous debate and
reinterpretation. Whether Tillich's notion of God as "beyond," or as "mysterious"
stands in the same tradition as Schelling's systematic idealism is also questionable. It
is clear that the philosopher and the theologian have two very different things in mind
when they refer to God, revelation and transcendence. The subject of the next chapter
is the possible origin ofTillich's distance from Schelling, i.e. a conceptual proximity
to Hegel, with respect to these topics.
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Chapter Two: Dialectic as Triadic
Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated two things. First, Tillich's use of dialectic in the
first volume of the Systematic Theology describes both unified essence, which is God,
and a disrupted essence, which is his account of existence, as polarized by being and
non-being. Second, this shows a distinct similarity to Schelling's polar account of the
dialectical and organic development of the real from the ideal. However, Tillich's
description of God and human participation in revelation, as presented in the full text
of the Systematic Theology, is not characterized by this polarity.
In this chapter, I outline the presence of a very different kind of dialectic. A three¬
fold, or triadic, structure becomes apparent only when the integrity of all three
volumes of the Systematic Theology is maintained. The position of the first volume,
that the polarity of being and non-being constitutes, and is disrupted in, human
existence, is maintained in the later volumes. However, in subsequent volumes the
symbols of Jesus the Christ and the Spiritual Presence, revealed in history, describe
the capacity for human finitude to be transcended. Revelation tells humanity about the
elevation of its existence and experience out of polarity. The polar dialectic describes,
for Tillich, the conflicts of existence and the human need for revelation. The triadic
dialectic describes the effect of revelation on the human situation, which Tillich calls
the "history of salvation" (ST I, 144-147; STIII, 362-364), or "essentialization". (ST
II, 167; ST III, 406,ff.)
The focus of this chapter is to demonstrate the use of this triadic structure, evident in
all three volumes of the Systematic Theology, and Tillich's indebtedness to Hegel for
this structure. This occurs in three sections. Firstly, I identify the dialectical structure
that guides the whole system as, simply: essence, existence, and essentialization. For
ease of reference, I call this the "dialectic of essentialization". Secondly, I turn to two
of the primary works of Hegel - the Phenomenology ofSpirit and the Science ofLogic
- to outline the basic Hegelian concept of dialectic. Peter C. Hodgson, in his analysis
ofHegel's concept of religion, has suggested that these two works, above all others,
represent the phenomenological and logical "entrees" into the dialectic of Hegel's
76
"system".135 There are obvious problems of interpretation where Hegel is concerned,
as outlined in my Introduction. This is especially true where the dialectic of self-
consciousness in the Phenomenology ofSpirit and the dialectic of the "Concept"
(Begriff) in the Science ofLogic are concerned. However, my aim is not to adjudicate
the conflicting interpretations within Hegel scholarship on this matter. Instead, I offer
a basic account ofwhat the concept of dialectic accomplishes in the works ofHegel
where the dialectical method is most apparent and, therefore, most significant to this
investigation.
Finally, I demonstrate the proximity of Tillich's concept of essentialization to Hegel's
concept of dialectic. There are obvious differences in context and intention between
Hegel and Tillich, as already discussed. There are also more fundamental differences.
Revelation, for Hegel, does not adjudicate the problem with which he is concerned:
the reconciliation of the objective concept and subjective reality through the category
of history. For Tillich, though, revelation is the answer to the problem of disrupted
human existence because it makes the reconciliation of human existence and divine
essence possible.
The differences between Hegel and Tillich notwithstanding, the value of this chapter
is to demonstrate that scholars writing on Tillich have not fully appreciated the
Hegelian nature and complexity of the underlying structure of Tillich's most
systematic work. In drawing attention to this structural complexity, I hope to be able,
in subsequent chapters, to show how this affects the interpretation ofTillich's
statements concerning the Trinity, and the place of the symbol in his system.
Section I. Dialectic in the Systematic Theology, Volumes One, Two and Three
We have seen that the first volume of the Systematic Theology describes the category
of being, and God as being-itself, in terms of the polarity of being and non-being, and
that the second volume of the system describes this polarity as constitutive ofboth
divine essence and human existence. We have also seen that this dialectic of polarity
causes problems in Tillich's system that are similar to problems Schelling faces,
135 Peter C. Hodgson, "Hegel's Approach to Religion: The Dialectic of Speculation and
Phenomenology," Journal ofReligion 65/2 (Apr 1984) p. 158
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namely the coincidence ofCreation and the Fall, but that Tillich also differs from
Schelling substantially in his assertion that the telos of existence is revealed by
something completely new, not from within existence or cognition itself.
This picture of the system, however, only draws on the first volume and part of the
second volume. When the Systematic Theology is considered in its entirety, the
predominant categories of dialectic shift from being and non-being, as descriptions of
essence and existence, to essence and existence themselves. In the second volume,
existence is described "disrupted essence", where the Christ reveals "undisrupted
essence". In the third volume, because of the manifestation of undisrupted essence,
existence has a teleological drive toward reunification with essence. The combined
history of the Christ event and of human life after the Christ but "under the dimension
of the Spirit" is, for Tillich, "salvation history". The process of salvation, including
creation from divine essence and human existence, culminates in the "reunion" of
essence and existence through a process Tillich calls "essentialization". (STIII, 400
If.)
In the first section of this chapter, therefore, I briefly outline Tillich's system in terms
of this dialectic of essentialization. This occurs in three parts: the revelation of divine
essence and the catalyst of essentialization, expressed as "Jesus the Christ", the New
Being; the goal of essentialization as it occurs in human cognition and activity, or
"life", expressed as "Spirit"; and the goal of essentialization as it occurs in history,
expressed as the "Kingdom ofGod" and "Eternal Life". This latter pair of symbols is
crucial to the alignment of the dialectic of essentialization with Hegel's dialectical
interpretation of the history of self-consciousness and cognition. As in the previous
chapter, the focus in this chapter is not theological content as much as it is an
explanation of how Tillich's system is dialectical. Thus, Tillich's interpretations of
doctrine are held until the chapter concerning Tillich's concept of the Trinity.
A. Essence, Existence and the New Being
Tillich's description of essence and existence, in the second volume of the Systematic
Theology, resembles the polarity ofbeing and non-being of the first volume.
However, in the second volume ontological polarities are not the focus of analysis as
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they were in the first volume. Tillich's focus here is the broader category of
"estrangement" because it suggests both the human inability to achieve salvation and,
therefore, the necessity of revelation. Salvation is sought through religion, legalism,
asceticism, mysticism, and sacramentalism (STII, 80-86), but humanity is incapable
of salvation because all of these efforts only elevate or repress what is finite. This
limitation is the "bondage of the will": the inability to break through estrangement.
(STII, 79) Existence which is estranged and only finitely free cannot, by its own
efforts, reconcile itself to or reunite itself with its essential or true nature. Only a
"New Being" can produce a new action. (STII, 80) For Tillich, this completely new,
revealed "power ofbeing" is expressed in the Christ, who is the intimate, divine
answer to estrangement.
As the appearance of essence under the conditions of existence, the New Being is the
means of reunification for disrupted essence, or existence, and original essence. (ST
II, 80) Prior to the symbol of the Christ, humanity has only ever appeared as
existential being; that is, essential humanity conquered by the existential conflict
resulting from the polarity of being and non-being. The desire for reunion with its
essential nature drives humanity to sin (STII, 44-59), to elevate that which is finite,
especially itself. (ST II, 80-86) Incapable of rectifying its estrangement, and driving
itself ever closer to self-negation and self-destruction (ST II, 59-62), humanity can
only be saved by the revelation of its essence in a conditioned, but undisrupted way.
Christ incarnate is, according to Tillich, the appearance of essential humanity under
the conditions of existence, which remains unconquered by those conditions. (STII,
88ff.) The New Being is both transcendent, divine essence and immanent, human
existence. The Christ lives under and shares in the conditions of existence, suffers as a
result, and finally conquers the polarity of existence. The New Being thus reveals true
human nature and transforms history, past and future, redeeming the estranging
polarity of being and non-being that otherwise dominates human existence. The event
of the New Being, however, is only the beginning of the process of salvation; a
process in which human life and history, i.e. existence, move closer, through
experience and reflection, to reunion with original essence. In the concrete revelation
ofNew Being the direction ofhistory is revealed, as is God's intention for the
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salvation of humanity. For Tillich, in the New Being history becomes the "history of
salvation". (ST II, 167)
The revelation of the New Being is crucial to perceiving the shift from a dialectic of
polarity to a dialectic of essentialization. Up to this point, dialectic has only expressed
the balance ofbeing and non-being in God and the imbalance of them in humanity
that is the cause of conflicted oscillation between inclinations in every sphere of
existence and thought. With the event of the New Being as the Christ, polarity is
redeemed, as the possibility of transcendence through salvation becomes a real
possibility in history itself. The process of salvation gives life and history meaning
and direction, as their telos is revealed. The reunion of existence with its essence is a
goal revealed in the paradoxical grace expressed in the Christ, but is a continual
historical process that occurs under the guidance of the Spirit.
B. Life, History and the Spirit
The Kairos of the Christ guarantees the meaningfulness of the kairoi ofhuman
history. Yet life and history continue; the process of essentialization, the reunion of
existence with its essence, is incomplete. "Life" is the term Tillich gives to the
continued actualization ofpotential (ST I, 69; ST II, 80, 146; ST III, 11 ff.), the
"mixture" (ST II, 35) of existence and essence in the movement toward
essentialization. As a mixture, life is ambiguous. The change of terminology, from
"disrupted essence" to "ambiguous" life, indicates not only the Christ's power to
reveal an alternative to disruption and polar conflict, but the continuation of the
history of salvation and process of essentialization.
The on-going history of salvation is a "spiritual process" and, for Tillich, human life
occurs "under the dimension of the Spirit". The human spirit is a "dimension" of the
divine life, where dimension is a metaphor to describe the finite spirit as an element of
the divine life in a way that suggests a connection, but which does not suggest that by
its relationship it can compel the divine life. (STIII, 21, cf 113) Spirit implies
concepts like "soul", "mind", and "reason", which in isolation distort the essence of
being human, but which together have the effect of distinguishing humanity from
other organic life. (STIII, 17 ff.)
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Human life "under the dimension of Spirit" occurs by means ofwhat Tillich calls
three "functions": self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence. Each
function contains its own dialectical movement within finite limitations, and each
requires the Spiritual Presence of God to transcend those limits. The movement of
self-integration is circular: knowledge of oneself, which Tillich calls self-identity;
acting upon oneself, or self-alteration; and renewed knowledge of oneself, called
"return to oneself'. (ST III, 30) The results of this movement, of "going out" and
"return", are ambiguous because they involve risk.
The response of the self-integrating individual to his own self-alteration is to alter that
which is around him, to create new "centres" (STIII, 31-32), to move horizontally.
(STII, 31) Individuals are creative and encounter one another through a universe of
shared meaning, which occurs by the functions of language and technology. (STIII,
57) Self-creativity, in words and technology, is also ambiguous. Words enable
transcendence of environment, but also distance meaning from the reality to which
they refer. Technology liberates, but also leads to the objectification of environment
and persons. Self-transcendence is the function of life which does not embrace its
limitation, but which seeks that which is beyond it, in a vertical movement. (STIII,
32) Even self-transcendence, however, is ambiguous, because it is both the greatness
and the tragedy of life: the great aspiration to that which is tragically unattainable. (ST
III, 88)
The functions of life may first appear polar in their alternating experience of the
posited subject and its environment.136 However, they are actually sequential, and their
movement away from what is initially posited results in something new upon return.
This indicates the prevalence not of polarity, but of a three-fold dialectical movement.
In the first volume of the system, the inclinations of individualization and
participation comprise a conflict of ontological elements within existence. Revelation
is required to repair the deadlocked oppositions of disrupted existence. However, life
"under the dimension of the Spirit" is not deadlocked in this way. For example, in
self-integration, the opposition of an other outside the individual results in the
136 L. Gordon Tait. The Promise ofPaul Tillich, p. 73
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inclination to use the experience of encounter to alter oneself. The opposition of self
and other, under the new rubric of dialectic, results in a starting point and two
logically coherent, sequential steps: posited self, posited other, new understanding of
self.
The non-polarity of the functions of life is demonstrated in the fact that the dialectical
movement of self-integration results in something new. Tillich qualifies what "new"
means. The "new" individual who results from self-integration is not entirely new;
only the New Being is entirely new. The altered self, like the creative community, still
relies on the grounding creative force from which it receives its power and limitation.
(ST III, 32) However, the dialectic of "going out" and "return" is capable of altering
the original subject. The dialectical structure in operation here is not polar, but triadic.
The "Spiritual Presence" is that manifestation of divine essence that "elevates the
human spirit into the transcendent union of unambiguous life and gives the immediate
certainty of reunion with God." (ST III, 128) The Spiritual Presence is the presence of
God, by which the individual experiences surrender to and reunion with divine
essence. Experienced corporately, the "Spiritual Community" is also transformed, as
the estranging effect of autonomous self-elevation is repaired by the theonomous
power of the Spiritual Presence. Finite expressions of community, including religion,
are surrendered to the determination and direction of the Spiritual Community. (ST
III, 149ff.) The Spirit ofGod fulfils self-transcendence, which is the aspiration of life,
by maintaining the integrity of the individual and the community while liberating it
from the contingencies of finitude.
In the final section of the third volume of the Systematic Theology, Tillich emphasizes
the teleological nature of essentialization. Like life, history is also both ambiguous
and capable of transcendence once viewed under the dimension of Spirit. The process
of essentialization - that is of dialectical movement outward, return, and the new unity
that results - implies a direction, a telos, for history. For Tillich, the union of disrupted
existence and divine essence revealed in Christ changes the goal and therefore nature
of events not only within the dialectical functions of life, but within the dialectical
movement of history. The symbol of the revealed direction of history is the Kingdom
ofGod. The Kingdom of God is a symbol of an "inner-historical" telos, a goal
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implicit in each act and moment ofhistory. (ST III, 359ff.) Yet, it is also the symbol
of a "trans-historical" telos: Eternal Life, which represents the meaning of all life and
history finally fulfilled and complete unity with the divine. (STIII, 356-359)
Firstly, Tillich describes what he means by the "inner-historical" Kingdom in four
ways.
1) The Kingdom is political:
In the Old Testament, it symbolizes victory over the enemies of Israel. In later
Judaism and in the New Testament, it is the transformed heaven and earth - a
new reality, a new period. The political symbol is gradually understood as a
cosmic symbol, without losing its political connotation. Tillich notes that
Christ as "King" retains a double connotation - a title both for saviour and
"victor". (ST II, 136)
2) The Kingdom is social:
It seeks holiness with the moral imperative ofjustice. It is not a Utopia,
because the justice it seeks is God's, not humanity's. "Man actualizes himself
as a person in the encounter with other persons within a community." (STIII,
308)
3) The Kingdom is Personal:
It heralds the fulfilment of humanity in every human individual, not an escape
from or denial of identity.
4) The Kingdom is Universal:
The ultimate meaning of the Kingdom is the telos of all life.
According to Tillich, the promise ofhistory is the eventual reunification of essence
and existence, according to the process of essentialization. (STIII, 400ff.) Insofar as
this promise has been revealed in the New Being, in Christ, the goal of the Kingdom
is revealed within history. "There is no other event ofwhich this could be asserted
[though] the actual assertion is and remains a matter of daring faith."(ST III, 369)
The intimate connection between Christ and Kingdom is not unique to the Systematic
Theology. Elsewhere Tillich says that Christology "periodizes" history into pre- and
post-Epiphany periods. Before Christ's appearance, history is a period of preparation.
After his appearance, there is no more preparation required because the kairos, the
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"right moment", has arrived. "In this moment, the reality of the Kingdom of God
appears in a personal life and creates a new group with a new historical
consciousness, the church. According to the feeling of this group, the end has arrived
in principle.'''' ("Victory", 25)
The significance of this definition of kairos for the Systematic Theology is that the
Christ, the embodiment of the Kingdom's telos, is not the temporal end ofhistory;
rather, life, time and history continue. However, in God's personal manifestation, the
goal ofhistory and the meaning ofhistorical events are revealed. Christ is the central
manifestation ofGod's promise; he is the kairos which gives previous and future
kairoi their meaning. (STIII, 369) The Kingdom is understood as that enduring
symbol of promise, of continuing participation of the eternal in the temporal realm, in
the post-Epiphany period of history; or in the words of the Systematic Theology, of
"inner-historical" essentialization.
The structure of life, and now history, is dialectical insofar as it drives toward
something new, something better. Thus, it is the telos of life and history that
distinguishes dialectic in the third volume of the Systematic Theology as
essentialization, and not polarity. This is supported by Tillich's terminology; terms
like "drive", "striving", "direction" are used to describe the process of life, and history
is described as "running", or "driving" toward the new. (STIII, 326-31) For Tillich,
anytime life comes into conflict with itself and drives to a new stage beyond conflict,
"dialectics takes place".137 (ST III, 329) However, most central to a notion of history
as teleological is Tillich's insistence that history happens to a meaning-bearing group,
that is, to a community.
The Kingdom is the telos within all history, a symbol expressing the resolution of
ambiguity. It submits the "self-integrating" desire for control under the authority of
the divine life and the principle of self-sacrifice. The ambiguities of "self-creativity"
in history appear within social growth, as the inclinations of revolution and tradition,
while the ambiguities of "self-transcendence" appear as the tension between the
137 Tillich's use of the term "dialectics" here implies an activity, not a logical pattern. Used this way the
term is not synonymous with the types of "dialectic", outlined in this thesis, that provide the structure
of the Systematic Theology.
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Kingdom of God as expected and as it appears. (ST III, 385-391) Within history, the
Kingdom is "already" and "not yet"- a symbol of historical change and of
eschatological hope. The events of the Cross and the Resurrection and their impact on
human existence are historical; but they also reveal and symbolize a meaning greater
than their historical reality: the salvation, or essentialization, of all humanity.
Secondly, the symbol of Eternal Life is the "trans-historical" symbol of
essentialization. (ST III, 400) While the Kingdom symbolizes the unity of essence and
existence experienced within human life and history, as a result of the Kairos, Eternal
Life symbolizes the unity of human history and the divine life itself. The difference is
simple. The "inner-historical" symbol relates an on-going process; ambiguities still
require resolution, and this state of affairs is represented in the Kingdom as foretaste.
The "trans-historical" symbol, however, represents the end of the process, the state in
which ambiguities are forever resolved; this is the Kingdom as arrived.
Embodied in the two symbols of the Kingdom and Eternal Life is the telos of history,
however, not its terminus. The promise of life's fulfilment affects the past meaning of
life and historical events, and present life and history. As L. Gordon Tait notes, "The
fulfilment of history does not happen on the last day of recorded time; it is always
with us, breaking into our temporal order and elevating it to the eternal.'"38 In such a
process, Tillich says that nothing which was created is lost, but what is positive about
existence is disentangled from and elevated above what is negative. Nothing is lost
because "in the ground, the 'aim' is present". (STIII, 398) Essentialization is not a
return to an original, completely potential state. (STIII, 400) Rather, it is a process of
return to and of "adding something to". Participation in the eternal life, says Tillich,
"depends on a creative synthesis of a being's essential nature and what it has made of
it in its temporal existence". (ST III, 401)
Together, all three volumes of the Systematic Theology reveal a dialectical structure
based on the concept of essentialization. The polarity ofbeing and non-being that
dominates the first volume is merely a part of a much larger description of life, history
and salvation. In the end, polarity helps Tillich describe undisrupted essence and
138 L. Gordon Tait, The Promise ofPaul Tillich, p. 93
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existence, their relationship and difference, and the existential need for revealed
essence. Polarity is only a description ofwhat human nature is without Christ and
without the Spirit. The bulk ofTillich's system, however, describes how the Christ is
capable of redeeming existence and how the Spiritual Presence guides existence
toward reunion with essence. Thus, the overall structure of the Systematic Theology is
best described according to the teleological dialectic of essence, existence and
essentialization.
C. Problems ofTransition
Considering the need for a reconstruction of the use of dialectic in the system, it is not
surprising that the transition from the dialectic ofpolarity to the dialectic of
essentialization is unclear. According to Adrian Thatcher, this is symptomatic of a
much larger problem. It is not clear whether, for Tillich, existence is best defined
positively or as the antithesis of essence. In the second volume of the system,
existence is equated with the "actuality of being." In the third volume, however, the
more encompassing term, "life", is used to represent the "actuality ofbeing." Thatcher
argues that between the second and third volumes of the Systematic Theology,
existence becomes the mere antithesis of essence, and that both contribute to and are
absorbed into the synthetic concept of "life." For Thatcher, the term "life" is the result
ofTillich's need for a dialectical third term to complement essence and existence:
What happens is that existence sacrifices the actuality which it has in the two-
term Platonic distinction, essence-existence. It becomes the antithesis of a
Hegelian triad, and in doing so, it loses all its concreteness. Like essence, it
becomes a set of abstractions drawn from the one actuality "life."139
Thatcher responds that both existence and life are actual, and that the term existence
implies "life." His proposed solution is to dispense with the Hegelian triad of essence-
existence-life, which he asserts is Tillich's dialectic.
There are two problems with Thatcher's critique ofwhat forms the triad, Hegelian or
not, in Tillich's dialectic of essence and existence. Firstly, Thatcher's analysis
includes little reference to the third volume of the Systematic Theology. As a result, he
139
Thatcher, The Ontology ofPaul Tillich. p. 156
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incorrectly positions "life" as the final term in the triad of the system, instead of
essentialization.140 For Tillich, however, "life" simply refers to the "mixture" of
essence and existence, which is the cause of all the ambiguity of life. (STIII, 12, 114)
In terms of the structure ofTillich's system, then, "life" is not a concept that suggests
resolution of a dialectical opposition, but merely the second stage of the triadic
process of essentialization. Eternal Life, not "life," is the term given to the state in
which existence has been "essentialized," and in which dialectical opposition is
resolved.
Secondly, Thatcher attributes his characterization ofTillich's triad to Hegel. In doing
so, Thatcher demonstrates his acceptance of a common misconception concerning the
basic structure ofHegelian dialectics: that it can be summarized as thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis. This terminology, however, is Fichte's, and its application in studying
Hegel was shown to be inaccurate, and was discredited in Hegel studies, before
Thatcher's reference to it.141
If the whole system is analyzed according to essentialization, and not a dialectic of
polarity, then Thatcher's criticism is answered. However, Tillich's lack of clarity,
about how dialectic functions in each section ofhis system, remains. The reader is left
to make the distinction between the two - a task Tillich complicates with new
terminology in each volume. In fact, "life" is the prime example of this lack of clarity.
As a "mixture" of essence and existence, life is described in a way very similar to the
"mixture" ofbeing and non-being that describes existence. It is only when the
structure of the system is seen as having two different uses of dialectic that this
confusion can be more concretely specified and disambiguation attempted.
Another problem faces Tillich's description of essentialization, however, when
existence is described not only as the result of "fallen" or disrupted essence, but also
as teleologically directed toward essence. By such a description, existence becomes a
mere intermediary step, or the negative term implied by essence. This diminishes the
140 As we will see in the next chapter, Thatcher has also misunderstood Hegel's concept ofAufhebung.
141
See Walter A. Kaufman, "The Hegel Myth and its Method," Philosophical Review LX (1951) 459-
486; and Gustav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'," Journal of the
History ofIdeas 19/3 (Jun 1958)411-414
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value of human participation in revelation and salvation that, as we saw earlier, Tillich
is so anxious to retain. Martin Repp says that,
It now becomes clear why no reciprocal effect of two correlates is possible:
because dialectic is always a one-sided operation of thesis "over" anti-thesis,
to achieve synthesis. Also, the method does not maintain the independence
which two correlates demand, because the antithetical relationship already
anticipates the synthetic abolition of correlation.142
The result of essentialization is not a dialectical reconciliation of essence and
existence, but the domination of essence over existence. Thus, the "higher concept" of
Eternal Life is not really a reunion of essence and existence, according to Repp, but
the victory of essence over existence. Although Jack Boozer finds no ethical or
pastoral concerns accounted for within the concept of essentialization, he defends it
against critiques like Repp's by suggesting that the contribution of existence is crucial
to the concept.
Tillich takes existence and history too seriously to suggest either a 'return to
essence' or a synthesis in history... Actualization in time and space adds
something to essential being, but it is only the "positive" created in every
decision and action in time that is retained in the eternal.143
For Tillich, Eternal Life "depends on a creative synthesis of a being's essential nature
and what it has made of it in its temporal existence." (ST III, 401) Tillich does assume
that the telos-providing process of essentialization shares the same essence as the
perfectly united, a priori essence. The difference between the original essence and the
essence of Eternal Life is that the latter has taken up into itself everything good about
existence. As the symbol of repaired, or redeemed, existence, Eternal Life is a concept
that retains the reality of existence. What was once imperfect and finite returns to its
origin, to its source, and is made whole again. That existence participates in an
essential process ensures that the encounter of divine and human experience is mutual,
and also that the result is fundamentally different from the original.
142 Martin Repp, „Zum Hintergrund von Paul Tillichs Korrelations-Methode," Neue Zeitschrift fur
Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 24/2 (1982) p. 210
143 Jack Boozer, "Being and History in Paul Tillich's Theology," God and Being: The Problem of
Ontology in the Philosophical Theology ofPaul Tillich, 1988 Proceedings of the II International Paul
Tillich Symposium (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1989), pp. 143-144
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These discussions notwithstanding, the dialectical structure ofTillich's Systematic
Theology is triadic and, therefore, not as indebted to a Schellingian dialectic as many
assume. The task remaining is to discern to what extent Tillich's dialectic of
essentialization is indebted to Hegel's concept of dialectic. The next section of this
chapter focuses on Hegel's use of dialectic in the Phenomenology ofSpirit and the
Science ofLogic. The final section of this chapter considers the similarities and
differences between the function of dialectic for Hegel and for Tillich.
Section II. Dialectic in Hegel
This section has two parts. The first part is a brief outline of Hegel's systematic
description of dialectic as it occurs in the early Science ofLogic and the later
Encyclopedia Logic. The Science ofLogic is consulted here because it is the more
exhaustive of the two, and is the standard reference work in Hegel scholarship. The
Encyclopedia Logic is also consulted here because of its emphasis on, and succinct
discussion of, the concept of dialectic itself. Although they are not Hegel's first
works, I begin with the volumes on logic because they contain Hegel's most complete
discussion of the logical principle of dialectic itself.144 By considering Hegel's explicit
discussions ofwhat he means by dialectic, we will be better able to recognize its
presence and function in the two works ofHegel's that have the most to do with
religion and theology: in this chapter, the Phenomenology ofSpirit, and in the final
chapter on the Trinity, the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion.
Secondly, then, having described Hegel's dialectic in principle, 1 consider it as the
structure underlying the Phenomenology ofSpirit, which is Hegel's description of the
historical unfolding of Spirit and the movement of thought toward the final standpoint
of self-consciousness: absolute knowing. It is important to reiterate that there is much
disagreement within current scholarship about how to interpret Hegel's dialectic.
Therefore, throughout this chapter, the main problems arising out of critical literature
on the subject are also considered, not to adjudicate between them, but to highlight
some of the challenges still facing the field.
144 Michael Forster claims that the dialectic of the Science ofLogic has priority over that of the
Phenomenology ofSpirit, because the latter is simply the dialectic of the Science ofLogic as it appears
in spiritual phenomena. Michael Forster, "Hegel's dialectical method," in The Cambridge Companion
to Hegel, p. 131
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A. Dialectic as Life: The Method and Content ofLogic
Hegel's first definition of dialectic is a response to Kant's approach to both the
"unconditioned aspect of the world", or the noumenal, and the antinomies of reason.'45
Antinomies are opposed propositions about the same object, which, because of
evidence or argument in support ofboth, must both be affirmed with equal validity.
Kant identifies four such oppositions, between infinity and finitude, especially of time
and space; between the infinite divisibility and unity ofmatter; between freedom and
necessity; and between infinite possibility and causation.
According to Hegel, Kant's solution to opposition is to locate it in the subject, as a
contradiction of appearance or misapplication of reason, rather than to suggest that the
object, the thing-in-itself, has any inherent contradiction. For Hegel, however, logical
opposition is neither a static situation nor logically problematical, because it is only
one moment in thinking:
.. .antinomy is found not only in the four particular objects taken from
cosmology, but rather in all objects of all kinds, in all representations,
concepts and ideas. To know this, and to be cognizant of this property of
objects... determine[s] itself in due course as the dialectical moment of logical
thinking.146
Antinomy expresses opposition as a dilemma. Dialectic, however, expresses
opposition in two ways. First, dialectic is a formal moment in all thinking - the
implied negative of all propositions and statements. To think "light" implies "dark,"
or to think "living" implies "dying". When the subject thinks of something, there is a
first moment of "abstract understanding", in which the essential character of a thing is
given initial, though unfinished shape in the subject's mind. From this initial thought,
however, there follows a realization of the opposite of this abstraction, which Hegel
5
Hegel, SL, pp. 103-105
146
Hegel, EL, pp. 92-93, §48 Zusatze Emphasis is translator's. (Reference is to English edition page
number and paragraph number of original edition.)
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calls the "dialectical negation".147 Second, however, "dialectic" is a term that refers
not only to the "moment of negation", but to the mutual relationship of abstraction
and negation itself - the relationship that constitutes the structure of all thought and
reason.
For Hegel, dialectical thinking is always inclined toward unity - abstraction and
negation are mutually dependent. Because of this unity, dialectical opposition implies
a possibility of union between the two elements already dependent on each other, the
formal expression ofwhich Hegel calls "speculative positivity".148 Dialectical thinking
therefore comprises three moments: an original thought, an inherent or implied
contradiction, and a concept that can express both.149 The aim of good thinking is
syllogistic: to find a term that can encompass, but also express, both terms of an
opposition. An example might be to say that a person who is "living" is also in a sense
"dying", and that the two very different concepts can be accommodated by the single
concept of "life," which includes both vibrancy and decay.
In the Science ofLogic and its summary edition, the Encyclopedia Logic, dialectic
falls into three parts, or doctrines - "Being", "Essence", and the "Concept" - which
together describe the ascent of thought to the position of the "absolute idea", or
thinking fulfilled.150 We briefly summarize these doctrines here to observe how even
Hegel's most formal expression of dialectic is concerned to demonstrate thinking as
connected to purpose and life.
Firstly, being is the concept (Begriff) only as it is "in-itself', i.e. as it simply is,
indeterminate, unreflective and unaware. It is a definition of the absolute, and of God,
but it is just "the first simple determination" or starting point for thought; it is
therefore identified with the first stage of the dialectic, the stage of the abstract
Hegel, EL, p. 125, §79
148
Hegel, EL, p. 131, §82
149 In the SL: "quality," "negation," and the "negation of negation," i.e. identity. In the EL: essential
unity, or "undifferentiated identity," non-identity, or difference, and "the identity of identity and non-
identity.
150 In the SL, this division occurs as Volume I: Objective Logic, which is divided into Book 1: The
Doctrine of Being, Book 2: The Doctrine of Essence; and Volume II: Subjective Logic, or The
Doctrine of the Notion (or Concept). The EL, however, is divided into three sections: Being, Essence,
and the Concept.
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understanding.151 As such, being is a concept meant to encompass everything. But, to
say that "the Absolute is being" is "the most abstract and the poorest" definition
possible, because it is unreflective, indeterminate, and immediate. Being is an empty
concept, nothing at all. So in its emptiness, the concept ofbeing and the concept of
nothing share a similar, negligible significance.152 Being and nothing collapse into
each other not because they are the same in some metaphysical sense, but because in
their initial positing there is no mediating consciousness for whom their difference
can be taken as such.
This is the heart ofHegel's dialectic: negation, the notion ofwhat is logically
opposite, is present in all "universals", i.e. concepts or propositions. Hegel says that
"pure being is pure abstraction, and hence it is the absolutely negative, which when
taken immediately, is nothing.'"53 As an initial starting point, the tenn or concept of
being has no content. As such, the universals "being" and "nothing" are equally
indetenninate as initial and isolated assertions, despite the difference intended in their
use. The similarity and distinction that characterizes their relationship, however,
implies two things. First, it implies that these two terms will acquire fuller definition
in relation to each other, i.e. dialectically. Second, it suggests that their acquisition of
definition is an unfolding process and that the terms cannot be assumed as given, for
the thinking subject, from the outset.
Hegel calls the process by which these tenns, and eventually all other pairs of terms
and their inherently logical opposites, acquire their identity: aufheben. This term is
notorious for its multiple transliterations into English, but for Hegel it is one of
philosophy's most important concepts. According to the Science ofLogic, Aufhebung,
or "sublation", has two meanings: to "preserve", or "maintain", and to "cause to
cease", or "put an end to". However, the term is used not as a definition only; rather, it
refers to a process by which concepts like being and nothing are mediated through
cognition, and are thereby shown to be differentiated moments of an essential unity.154
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According to the Encyclopedia Logic, Aufhebung is a process of "immanent
transcending",155 ofmovement beyond the empty abstraction of universals like
"being", but not by means of external reflection or relation to something else.
Aufhebung is transcendence that occurs as a result of the nature of the concept itself,
or the internal dialectic of the concept and its implied, logical negation. An
indeterminate concept, e.g. "being", becomes more determinate for the thinking
subject in relation to its negation, "nothing". The realization that the initial term and
its opposite require each other for their determinacy, leads to the "negation of
negation", or the realization that opposition on its own, or "in-itself', does not
increase understanding within or of the concept. Simple negation is rejected in favour
of a concept that includes both initial positing and its opposite, which lifts
indeterminate being into determinate being, or "being-for-itself;" a concept that seeks
greater determinacy, or definition.156
Because the two terms are immanent within the single universal, the nature of a
universal also includes the inclination toward a higher term that can unite both poles
in a single concept. In the case ofbeing and nothing, Hegel says that they are
aufgehoben in the concept of "becoming". The concept ofbecoming embraces both
the positive potential of being and the negative limitation ofbeing. Thus, "becoming"
is a fuller concept than either being or nothing, because it includes them both within
itself.
This is the process by which the subject's concept ofbeing moves from an
unreflective state to a reflective, or aware, state. The concept ofbecoming leads to the
first determinate statement of being: being-there, or being-in-itself. What Fichte calls
the "I," or the first subject, which is as yet immediate and unaware, Hegel calls being
"in-itself' {an sich). The negation of this is the being-which-is-not-there, or being-
somewhere-else, what Fichte simply calls the "not-I", Hegel calls "an Other". Once
the "I" recognizes the opposition of the "not-I", it is no longer in a state of immediate
being-in-itself, but in a state of awareness, ofbeing "for-itself' (fur sich). This
happens in an ideal sense in the stage of essence and in a real sense in the stage of the
concept.
155
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Reference to Fichte here helps distinguish Hegel's dialectic from Schelling's. As we
have seen, the polarity of Schelling's positive philosophy describes the opposed
concepts ofwilling to become and willing not to become as distinct and self-
generating. The productivity of nature and cognition is the result of this relationship
and tension which, despite the logical presence of a unifying third term, remains
polarized.
For Hegel, however, the opposition of a concept and its inherent negation is sublated
as a result of the nature of the concept itself, not by its relation to another principle
outside of it. For Schelling, the principle of light is posited against the principle of
dark, which lies outside of it. For Hegel, the principle of light contains the principle of
dark within itself, and moves toward an understanding of light that includes darkness.
Thus, Hegel's understanding of dialectic is not the opposition of exclusive and
opposed principles, but the discovery of opposition inherent within a single principle,
and its subsequent increased understanding of itself. The progression from an initially
unreflective state to a more reflective state owes to the inherent, logical negation that
is implied within a single term. This means that, for Hegel, progress does not begin
with an ideal polarity of logically and constituted terms, as it does for Schelling. For
Hegel, the ideal is the result of progress.
Secondly, the dialectical method that moves the doctrine ofbeing through to the
concept ofbecoming also moves the doctrine ofbeing onto the doctrine of "essence".
The opposition posited within the doctrine of being is only implied, says Hegel. Being
and nothing are "pure" concepts; they are not "mediated" or "further determined". In
essence, however, this immanent dialectic becomes a posited dialectic. Essence is
"Being that mediates itself with itself through its own negativity", but this occurs as
"relation to another.'"57 The dialectical moment that produces transcendence of empty
abstraction and merely implied opposition also produces conceptual identity in the
immediacy of being: inward reflection, or relationship.
157
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With essence, then, comes the "identity of identity and non-identity". According to
Frederick Beiser, this is the main problem facing all philosophers after Kant.158 Hegel
describes identity, by which the "I" recognizes the "Other" as a subject just like it, and
non-identity, or difference, by which the "I" recognizes the "Other" as the "not-I," as
a subject distinct from itself.159 A concept acquires greater definition by positing
outside of itself the negation or opposition that until now has been merely logically
implied within itself. This more social process of difference and identity comprises
three moments: the "One", a plurality of ones, and the alternating sense of attraction
and repulsion that this social reality creates.160
However, though the doctrine of essence has moved beyond undifferentiated and
immediate being to posit an "other", and even multiple "others", the negativity by
which it has received its clarity is only a posited other. In other words, the mutual and
social "otherness" by which being-itself is further determined is only ideal, or
cognitively posited. The reflection back into the initial One that results from posited
otherness is only illusory; it has the appearance of genuine reflection (Schein), but is
not yet realized, or, is not actual reflection.161 For the progress of the determinate
concept to continue, otherness and reflection back to the initial selfmust be
experienced in reality. Ultimately, for the progress to be completed, "real" experience
must match "ideal".
The identity and difference that were only posited and logically opposed in essence
receive concrete expression in the concept of "existence". Together they form the
basis, or Ground, of existence:
As relating itself to itself, essential distinction is already expressed equally as
what is identical with itself; and what is opposed is precisely that which
contains the One and its Other, both itself and its opposite within itself. The
being-within-selfof essence, determined in this way, is ground... Ground is
the unity of identity and distinction.162
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Reflection into another, the activity of identity and difference, while conceptually
posited in essence, is embodied in existence. Thought precedes reality as the absolute
moves from a more abstract to a more concrete expression. This is consistent with
Hegel's idealism, where the concept is logically prior but still "in development"
through existence, or cognition.
Finally, each of these moments, as part of the progressive unfolding of the absolute,
have unity with the concept that governs the whole process. Real comes to match
ideal and existential matches cognitive. In Hegel's terminology, the subjective
experience of the concept increasingly matches the already objectively determined
concept. In both the Science ofLogic and the Encyclopaedia Logic, the "absolute
idea" is the culmination of the development of the concept - the unity of objective and
subjective concept.163 As distinct moments, objects conform to the concept
immediately; they are dialectically compelled to the next stage. When thought reaches
a point where it recognizes each of these stages as stages, it is no longer "in-itself',
but "for-itself', what Hegel calls the "idea", the "absolute unity of concept and
objectivity".
This logical process, however, is not speculative in an unmediated way. Hegel says
that, "The immediate idea is life", that is, "The concept is realized as soul, in a body."
As with the transition from essence to existence, in which posited identity and
difference become embodied identity and difference, the objectivity of the idea is
made manifest in subjectivity.
The Idea is the [process] in which the Concept (as universality that is
singularity) determines itself both to objectivity and to the antithesis against it,
and in which this externality, which the Concept has with regard to its
substance, leads itselfback again, through its immanent dialectic, into
subjectivity.164
Not when the idea is logically described, but only when the objectivity of the idea is
identified with its subjective expression, is the "absolute idea" articulated. Only then,
says Hegel, "Things and the thinking of them are in hannony in and for themselves."
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Each point of the dialectical process leads to a manifest reality: from simple being to
"being-there"; from essential identity to existential identity; and from objective
identity to subjective identity. "In this way, the method is not an external form, but the
soul and the Concept of the content.'"65
This is the basic structure of dialectic as presented in the most formal ofHegel's
works, those concerning logic. However, according to most philosophical
commentators, and in keeping with the sense of the content, the formal presentation of
dialectic cannot be extrapolated as a method. Jean Hyppolite suggests that, "The
dialectic is the life of the object and dialectical thought is in no way an abstract
categorization.'"66 The inexorability of dialectic could represent a positive effort to re¬
establish language and philosophy as "living", instead of formal.167 Yet the
inseparability ofmethod from content can also be a problem, especially when it
comes to the relation of dialectic to history, as the latter becomes understood as a
progression in tenns of the former.
The chief problem with Hegel's description of dialectic as the universal structure of
everything is whether immanent negation is adequate to describe genuine opposition.
For example, Robert Pippin suggests that "how Hegel understands the speculative
sublation of the most important reflective opposition, freedom and necessity", reveals
his logical account of dialectic to be "tremendously abstract".168 Whereas, in Of
Human Freedom, freedom is the result of immediately and positively articulated will
outside ofpolarity and dialectic, the freedom of Hegel's logically immanent dialectic
is, for Pippin, not as clear.
The logic of immanent determination is also problematic when applied to the
relationship between dialectic and historical development. For instance, Terry Pinkard
suggests that, initially, Hegel's dialectic "gives the appearance of ascribing the
movement ofhistory to a metaphysical ground (usually taken to be God) that is
causing the movement of history to go in a particular direction.'"69 Yet Pinkard argues
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against this perception by saying that Hegel's philosophical history is not concerned
with the causes ofhistory. Rather, he suggests that Hegel is concerned to understand
the ways in which various eras of history detennine what is authoritative for
themselves, which includes judgment of previous eras as insufficient. The point is that
Hegel's dialectical structure is not detenninistic or predictive, but retrospective.170
Other commentators emphasize the retrospective nature ofHegel's dialectic to offer
charitable readings of it. Stephen Houlgate emphasizes the innovation of Hegel's
dialectic, suggesting that its immanent structure "clearly runs counter to what Western
philosophy has held to be true since Plato", that individual things cannot change their
form, let alone "turn into their opposites".171 The presuppositionless thinking of
Hegel's dialectic does not deny the difference between being and nothing, or between
fmitude and infinity. Rather, it argues that this difference is not "absolute" in itself by
positing that "being... invests things with nonbeing", and does so according to its own
nature. Thus,
the initial category of being is actually transformed as it comes to be
understood. Each new category or determination of being casts the thought of
being in a new light and reveals it to be somewhat different from the way it
was previously thought.172
Hans Georg Gadamer offers a slightly different, but just as positive reading of
dialectic. He argues that the development of thought, especially as "life", is not about
perfect knowledge, or correspondence of concept and reality, but about the knowledge
of knowing, or the inseparability of concept and reality, and of the subject and the act
of knowing.173 The benefit of Hegel's immanent dialectic is that it stresses the
possibility ofunity without presupposing it at the beginning, lending the development
of the concept a greater freedom. Alan White agrees, suggesting that
presuppositionless thinking does not detennine where the thinker is heading; it is
radically non-teleological.174
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Our primary concern with Hegel's dialectic, however, is its implication for his
perspective on religion and theology. The Science ofLogic was written after the
Phenomenology ofSpirit, but considering the formal statement of dialectic in the work
on logic first enables us to recognize the presence and function of dialectic in the two
works ofHegel's that have the most to do with religion and theology: the
Phenomenology ofSpirit and the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion. In the works
on logic, dialectical thought proceeds by abstraction, opposition and sublation
(Aufhebung) toward a greater determinacy of thought. In the next section, we see that
in the Phenomenology ofSpirit, dialectic provides the structure of the self-conscious
development of the absolute through cultural and religious history, or "Spirit".175
B. Dialectic as Spirit: Self-Consciousness in the Phenomenology ofSpirit
In Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, every age of culture and religion epitomizes a
stage in the development of the increasing self-awareness of the absolute. These
stages are collectively referred to as "Spirit", a term which sums up the conceptual
progress of thought toward a position of "absolute knowledge", in which human
purpose is fulfilled when transcendence is reunited with immanence. In each of the
four stages in the process of the unfolding of the absolute the dialectical structure of
the volumes on logic can be perceived.
The first stage of Spirit is "abstract self-consciousness", that is, the subject's
recognition of itself as the object of thought. This occurs once the subject discovers
that attempting to affirm external truth by means of sense-certainty is an empty
exercise. Certain observation of an object is shown to be the result of a false unity of
multiple, different observations of an object through time. This places the burden of
sense-certainty on the subject, not the object. Only the subject that is aware of this
situation can realize the impossibility of so-called "certain" observation. The only
place where objects of thought and their concepts are brought together is in the
"conscious ego", or the "I" that thinks itself, i.e. self-consciousness.
1751 employ the capitalized term "Spirit" in accordance with its usage in scholarship on Hegel.
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The second stage of Spirit is marked by self-consciousness that moves outside of the
limits of self-recognition. The subject, aware of itself, seeks criteria by which to
confirm its status as the location of the cognitive unity of object and subject. This is
not something it can find within itself, however, except by making a dogmatic
assertion. Therefore, the subject seeks another subject whose existence can confirm its
status, without which self-consciousness is posited, but not confirmed. Fichte had
suggested that self-consciousness was the result of a self-manifesting "absolute ego",
or absolute "I", making self-limitation (Anstofi) the basis of the subject's affirmed
agency.176
With the concept of social, or mutual, recognition, Hegel distinguishes his concept of
self-consciousness from Fichte's. For Fichte, self-consciousness is the result of a self-
imposed limitation (Anstofi) of infinite potential. In Fichtean terms, Hegel's concept
of self-limitation is an "other-imposed" limitation. The bounds of the self are drawn
through relationship. This prefigures the dialectic of the Science ofLogic, by which
formal or posited identity and difference within a subject, self-consciousness "in-
itself', becomes embodied identity and difference between subjects, i.e. actual
awareness, or self-consciousness "for-itself." Spirit is this process ofmutual
affirmation, "this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent
self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and
independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is T'.'"77
Hegel's "social" concept of self-consciousness distinguishes it from all others in
German Idealism, and is described more fully in a briefpassage in the
Phenomenology ofSpirit entitled "Independence and dependence of self-
consciousness: Lordship and Bondage", within the section on the Truth of Self-
Certainty.178 In this famous account of the struggle for selfhood, Hegel concludes that
the life and death struggle for confirmation of the individual can only occur through
the mutual recognition of another individual. Domination of the individual will is
found insufficient as the basis of self-certainty because the power of the "lord" is
always dependent on the presence of the "bondsman" and his subjugation. The world
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is thereby "inverted", and power itself is seen as dialectical, as positions of dominance
and servitude require each other for full definition. Hegel calls the inability of
consciousness to overcome this struggle for power within finitude the situation of the
"Unhappy Consciousness".179
The third stage of Spirit's development transposes the speculatively posited sociality
of self-consciousness to an enacted sociality, through ethical engagement and activity.
For Hegel, reason propels the unhappy consciousness to ethical activity. The subject
turns the fact (Tatsache) ofposited mutual recognition into an act (Tathandlung), a
deed perfonned. Thus, self-consciousness achieves more than immediate recognition,
it achieves external reality in the work of doing and being.180 In its embodied
immediacy, Spirit is the ethical life of a people, and is the objective truth and goal
uniting all self-conscious subjects.181
However, ethical activity is not the final stage of Spirit. Eventually morality is
objectified, made abstract, codified, and elevated to universal status. Ethics becomes
the province of "culture", says Hegel, and language the means both of transcendence
and of alienation.182 In such an objectifying state, ethical substance sees its ethical
impulse as outside of itself, making Spirit merely subject to social norms and laws.
Self-consciousness, in such an environment, is alienated from itself. The problem is
that Spirit has not yet developed to the point where it recognizes itself as Spirit; what
is transcendent has been abstracted from the world and applied to it as something
outside of it. For Hegel, the reunion of transcendent Spirit with the world, or human
activity, occurs in religion.
The reunion of transcendence and immanence, like self-consciousness itself, occurs in
stages: first, in immediate form as natural religions; second, in the art and mystery
religions ofGreece; and third, through the Roman formalization of the spiritual in the
state. Finally, however, reunion occurs in the Christian religion of the revealed,
human God. Hegel describes God as manifest firstly as essence (Father), secondly as
being-for-self in existence (Son), and thirdly as the being-for-selfwhich knows itself
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in the other (Spirit). Self-consciousness is expressed in terms common to the Science
ofLogic, where life is identified with self-negation, and the unity of life and death
becomes the basis of unity between transcendence and immanence in the God that
dies.183
Christianity, however, is still primarily a "pictorial religion" which "turns necessary
relations of essential moments within the Absolute into external generative relations
of paternity and sonship.'"84 The true fulfillment of Spirit occurs after religion, in
philosophy. "Geist is reason - being itself - become self-conscious.'"85 Once Spirit is
able to conceive of its own outward manifestation without the use ofpictorial
representations then Absolute Knowing is achieved, which is the goal of "Systematic
Science" (Wissenschaft).186 To accomplish this, philosophy must be able to step
"outside of itself', outside of time and space, and conceptually consider what religion
only considers in representations.
The interpretation of Hegel's concept ofGeist, or Spirit, is the subject of ongoing
debate. It is impossible, for reasons of space, to discuss these interpretations in depth.
However, a brief description of the four predominant, contemporary understandings
of the phenomenology ofHegel's Spirit will help to bring focus to what is significant
about it for this investigation into Tillich. Spirit, for Hegel, is immanent and
teleological, but this is variously interpreted as subjective idealism, absolute idealism,
critical idealism, and conceptual realism.
The first interpretation of Spirit emphasizes its transcendence and subjectivity.
Representative of this reading, Charles Taylor interprets Hegel's concept of the
absolute as "self-positing Geisf, "cosmic Spirit", which is God.187 Taylor argues that
Hegel's Spirit is subjectivity itself, an "expressivist", Herderian response to the
Enlightenment's dichotomy ofmeaning and being, by which the subject is defined as
both realization and clarification. As self-conscious self-realization, Spirit necessitates
embodiment, which Taylor relates both to the formal, Aristotelian definition of life as
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the hylomorphism ofmatter and form, and the idealist notion that life is an expression
of thought, which requires a medium.188 He further suggests that, in the human
subject, the formal and ideal notions are evident, but are divisible. God, however, is
expressed in his very manifestation, thus, in God, the formal and ideal are perfectly
united.
By this reading, Spirit is identified with God and as an ontological necessity by which
the philosophical work of reconciliation occurs: between subject and object, or world
and mind; between and among subjects; and between the subject and society.189 For
Hegel, everything turned on "grasping the True, not only as Substance, but equally as
Subject.'"90 Such a reading is supported, says Taylor, both by Hegel's obvious
concern for a non-dualistic rendering of the question of human freedom inherited
from Kant, and by his early concern for Christianity and issues of doctrine. However,
as the process of self-realization, the concept of Spirit insists on two things. First, it
makes the freedom of the expressive subject compatible with the structure in which it
occurs. Second, it establishes the goals of realization, clarity and unity, as discernable
only in retrospect, thus making the teleology of Spirit internal, not externally applied.
Though he does not name him, Beiser makes the case that, on the surface, a reading
like Taylor's is possible.191 However, Beiser argues that this is an "inflationary"
reading, which incorrectly aligns Hegel's notion of Spirit with the traditional concept
and language ofGod. The problem is the confusion of "logical priority with
ontological priority". Beiser follows Taylor's description of Spirit as internally
teleological and expressively embodied. However, to identify this with the Christian
God, by way of Hegel's early training, gives the process of realization and
clarification a sense ofbeing ordained from the beginning. Beiser may also have Peter
Hodgson in mind, who suggests that, "The telos ofboth logical idea and finite spirit is
the actuality ofGod as an absolute spirit. As absolute Idea, God is the beginning of all
things; as absolute spirit, the end of all things."192
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Beiser's critique is supported by Hans Georg Gadamer, who reinforces the difference
between Kant's dogmatic "thing-in-itself' and the equally dogmatic Fichtean Anstofi,
and Hegel's Spirit as the "uncovering" of self-consciousness.193 Gadamer points out
that, initially, Hegel describes the concept as an analytical premise not yet possessing
full content. This is supported by Hegel's statement that the object of philosophy is
discovered in the act ofphilosophizing itself.194 That the concept "develops" militates
against a highly transcendent reading of Spirit in the Phenomenology ofSpirit and the
Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion. The beginning of thought is a general
presupposition that must be filled out and demonstrated. This suggests that the
Absolute is neither a clear ground upon which cognition is based, nor a fulfilled entity
from which philosophy begins; it is a result, not a cause. As Findlay notes, the
Hegelian absolute is not realized in a supramundane (entirely transcendent)
consciousness, nor in a timeless comprehensive vision, but in the creative activities
and products of the artist, the faith and worship of the religious person, and the
systematic insights of a philosopher.195
The second interpretation follows from this and brings the transcendent Spirit much
nearer, and clearly distinguishes Hegel's absolute idealism from Kant's critical
idealism. Beiser argues that while Hegel is Kantian in the sense that he seeks to gain
knowledge of the unconditioned through pure reason, he is not Kantian because
"Hegel's own concept of the infinite or unconditioned is entirely immanent: the
infinite does not exist beyond the finite world but only within it."196 This interpretation
is consistent with Hegel's self-distancing from Kant in the Science ofLogic, where he
states that everything ofwhich we have immediate knowledge is mere appearance,
"not only for us, but also in-[themselves]". Hegel calls the Kantian "critical
philosophy" subjective, because it locates knowledge of things in the subject.
Hegel calls his own philosophical approach "absolute idealism," because it locates
proper knowledge at the end of the cognitive process, in the absolute.197 However, that
the Infinite is uncovered in finite history and cognition, not lorded over the finite as
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inaccessible, indicates that direction toward the absolute is discovered by philosophy,
not externally applied to it. The proximity of the infinite to history and cognition is
the root ofHegel's teleology of Spirit.
The third interpretation ofHegel's idealism agrees to an immanent and teleological
concept of Spirit, but aligns it more closely to Kant's critical idealism and
transcendental apperception. Robert Pippin argues that the essential focus of both
Kantian and Hegelian idealism is to discover the concepts that are essential for
thought, and by which the thinking subject can know that the world it represents to
itself, in thought, is the same as the world that is.198 He suggests that, through Fichte,
the Kantian problem of dualism becomes a problem of identity and opposition, or, the
unity and difference of the observing subject and the object observed.
For Hegel, the problem is Kant's distinction between humanity and divinity. With
such a divide, there is no way of establishing a genuine identity of object and subject,
which places knowledge of things-in-themselves beyond human finitude. By the
critical idealist's account, objective knowledge of self-consciousness, and therefore a
full experience of self-consciousness, remains impossible. For Pippin, Hegel's
solution is partly Kantian. The self-knowledge of Spirit, in which the separation of
knowledge and truth is overcome, closely resembles the apperceptive link between the
"sensible manifold" and the concepts of "pure thought" in the understanding.
However, the criteria by which self-knowledge occurs is a uniquely Hegelian
innovation. The ratification of the subject's consciousness arises not within a singular
Kantian subject, but from social recognition between two subjects.199
In contradiction to Pippin's Kantian reading, Beiser argues that, for Kant,
transcendental apperception is too formal and subjective: "formal, since it is mere
self-awareness of representations, regardless of the content... and subjective, since the
identity [of subject and object] only takes place in the subject, amounting to nothing
more than its self-awareness."200 For Beiser, Hegel's approach is too different from
Kant's to represent a completion of the Kantian project. Instead, he argues that
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Hegel's reading of the identity problem comes, through Schelling, from the monism
of Spinoza, in which subjectivity and objectivity are different aspects of a single
(infinite) substance, not through the dualism ofKant and Fichte. This, and Hegel's
departure from Schelling, is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Finally, three different interpretations ofHegel's idealism share a move away from
the subjectivity and transcendence of Spirit completely. For brevity, I associate each
with one author. For Robert Stern, Hegel's idealism is interpreted as a conceptual
realism, in which the rational structure of the world is reflected in and by human
consciousness.201 Stern reads the dialectical method of the Phenomenology ofSpirit as
a diagnostic of arguments and therapeutic repair of one-sided, monistic, and irrational
fonns of reasoning. The path from abstract understanding, to negation, through to
their positive unity, reconciles the mind with reality through increasingly reflective
and "holistic", i.e. immanent, reasoning.202 Stern's interpretation makes the
Phenomenology ofSpirit the instantiation of a method, employed by Hegel, to move
philosophy beyond art and religion and the "shapes of consciousness" toward the
more "specific Notions" of the Science ofLogic. Thus, in Stern's view, Spirit is not an
endorsement of any one source of authority, but a process by which authority can be
established experimentally and mutually.
For Terry Pinkard, Spirit describes the development of ethical practice, of self-
consciousness in social space. As a kind of social epistemology, Spirit represents life
and knowledge concerned with the development of social norms and an account of
how and why they are taken to be authoritative. As an "historicized theory of
knowledge, which takes itself as simply an 'appearance', [Spirit] is thus self-
referential", and cannot appeal to transcendent entities or essences to underwrite it.203
Pinkard interprets the Phenomenology ofSpirit as an account of candidates for self-
sufficient knowledge. He argues that this account of agency ultimately fails because it
ends fulfilled only in '"absolute reflection' - that is, what Hegel calls absolute spirit: a
given community's reflection on its essential self-identity and its highest interests
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through the historical practices and institutions of art, religion and philosophy."204 By
this interpretation, Spirit is merely the development of ethical and cognitive practice,
not a self-sufficient account of agency.
For Paul Redding, the inter-subjectivity of Spirit is a hermeneutic; reciprocal
recognition is merely the condition necessary for thought. Because recognition is not
just an act of a subject, but the act that constitutes the subject, it is fundamental to all
aspects of Hegel's system. Redding argues that this is especially true of the
connection between the philosophy of objective spirit and social institutions of life,
family, society and the state, established in the Philosophy ofRight?05 The centrality
of reciprocal recognition in Hegel is what distances him from Kant's "empirical and
transcendental poles", and replaces them with "a complex pattern of interactive
recognition involving two conscious subjects" in a "'circular' intersubjective
structure." Thus, says Redding, "There are no 'spiritual' (geistig) beings apart from
their relation to one another within a spiritual system, that is, within spirit."206
The obvious benefit of therapeutic, social and henneneutical interpretations of Spirit
is the rehabilitation ofHegel's ethical concern for philosophy. However, there are two
limitations common to these readings. The first is that they almost exclusively refer to
the Phenomenology ofSpirit and not to any ofHegel's other work. This has the
disadvantage of limiting the description of Spirit to the starting point of a much larger
system. The arrival of fully and mutually reflective self-consciousness at the end of
the Phenomenology ofSpirit has to be balanced against Hegel's comments, noted
above from the Introduction to the Science ofLogic, regarding the emptiness of such
starting points.
The second limitation, as Beiser argues, is that "deflationary" or non-metaphysical
interpretations of Hegel's concept of Spirit depend on too narrow a definition of
metaphysics as "speculation about transcendent entities". Hegel is thus made a
"Platonist who thinks that universals exist beyond the historical and natural world."207
Beiser prefers to read Hegel as an Aristotelian, for whom "universals exist only in
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things, even though their meaning is not reducible to them."208 This is supported, he
says, by the fact that the Absolute is uncovered within the processes ofhistory and
cognition, not just "by them".
Problems of interpretation cannot be solved here. Yet we can see that what the
Science ofLogic does through the dialectical approach to the absolute idea as a chain
of cognition that necessarily includes humanity, the Phenomenology ofSpirit does by
way of the concrete development of human consciousness, through history and
culture, in a process called Spirit.209 In both of these works, a three-fold dialectical
structure determines two things about thought and self-consciousness: that they have
an internal purpose or goal, i.e. they are teleological; and, that this teleology is
gradually, socially and cognitively uncovered, not fully or even ideally present from
the beginning.
C. Problems ofRecognition
It is not possible, for reasons of space and intention, to discuss, in detail, the issues
arising from Hegel's account of dialectic. The focus of this chapter is to reveal the
essential structure ofHegel's concept of dialectic in order to compare it with the
structure uncovered in Tillich's Systematic Theology. However, before doing so, I
address some of the problems associated with Hegel's concept of dialectic in order to
demonstrate later how some of these same problems remain in Tillich's use of
dialectic. Ultimately, the significance of this section is not to repair the problems
arising in either Hegel or Tillich's dialectic, but to highlight their similarity, even in
error.
There are at least two problems with Hegel's description of dialectic, which can be
called problems of "recognition". The first concerns the concept of identity. As we
saw in the Phenomenology ofSpirit and the Science ofLogic, development of the
absolute idea and Spirit occurs when what is posited, immediate, or "in-itself,"
becomes actual, or "for-itself," through logical and phenomenological mediation. The
standpoint of absolute knowing, or fulfillment of Spirit, occurs when the subject
208
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identifies itself with the process of development; that is, when it recognizes its
developmental past as part of its developmental goal. For Andrew Bowie, however,
there is a problem,
... that in moving from (1), the initial immediacy ofbeing, to (2), the stage of
reflection, Hegel fails to deal with the difficulty of how what is mediated can know
itself to be identical with what is immediate without simply presupposing this
identity... The problem... is simply this: how can something re-cognise itself without
already knowing itself before ceasing to be itself?210
The problem is that the unfolding self-consciousness or concept includes within it the
ability to recognize and confirm each stage of its development as its own, at each
stage. This means that, for Hegel, "what is apparently immediate is actually mediated,
or 'reflected in itself." Even "the statement of identity, 'A is A,' itself involves a
degree ofmediation: there cannot be a statement 'A'."211
Even the supposedly immediate - the initial, abstract understanding, which is the first
moment of dialectic - is mediated. This introduces suspicion that Hegel's concept of
recognition is actually more tautological than dialectical. Bowie concludes that the
"identity of identity and non-identity," which, for Hegel, is uncovered in self-
consciousness, is impossible to grasp because it involves an a priori assumption on
the part of the author and the reader - the reality of self-consciousness as a "meta-
perspective".212 The goal is presumed in the beginning, if not by the concept, then at
least by its author, and therefore detennines the system.
This assumption is also at fault for a related "sleight of hand" that occurs in the
Phenomenology ofSpirit. William Desmond points out that Hegel's description of the
unhappy consciousness includes an awareness of the 'TJnchangeable", the absolute,
which is its, as yet, unattained goal. The problem with this is that the symmetry of
mutual need in self-consciousness is unbalanced by a notion of the unchangeable. As
an immediate inclination this "self-showing" or intuited noumenon presents a human-
divine asymmetry.213 Even Hegel's assumption, that conceptual thinking begins
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vaguely and becomes more precise, cannot account for the transition from a socially
enacted transcendence of self to an intuitive notion of transcendence.
The second problem of recognition concerns the interchangeability, especially in the
Science ofLogic, of the concepts of "the absolute" and of "God". The implication is
that pure knowledge that determines itself can lead not only to knowledge ofGod as
revealed, but also to knowledge of the very being of God. This would be problematic
enough for a sympathetic theological reading ofHegel, but we have already seen that
for him religion is only a preliminary kind of thinking, and that philosophy is its
successor. While religion and philosophy technically share the same content, religion
is concerned with the image, representation, or picture ofwhat is eventually
conceptual.
The question is whether God and the absolute are really interchangeable, or whether
the tenn "God" is just a pictorial version of the absolute? Desmond calls this the
question of the counterfeit double. How can the content of representation (religion)
and concept (philosophy) be the same, when the image mimics the original in order to
show it, but in mimicking presents itself as the original? For religious representation
to be "true to God" it must always keep open the space between itself and God. Yet,
according to Hegel das Wahre ist das Ganze, "the true is the whole". Thus, anything
short of the whole is only partly true.214 If religious representations are not identical to
the philosophical concepts can become, then God and the absolute cannot be
synonymous. Rather, the tenn "God" describes, in an inferior way, what the absolute
describes more completely.
In the Lectures ofthe Philosophy ofReligion, this problem of recognition is
confirmed, when God, religiously conceived, is described as an inferior representation
ofwhat philosophy speculatively, i.e. non-representationally, conceives as the
absolute. Even if, sympathetically, religion is not an inferior iteration, but merely less
conceptual and more representational than philosophy,215 there is still a problem in
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confirming the consistency between the content of religious and philosophical
thinking.
Conclusion
Hegel's concept of dialectic is most readily described through two concepts: life and
Spirit. As a logical process, dialectic describes the ever-increasing proximity of
subjective expressions of the concept to its objective truth and the teleological unity
that occurs in the absolute idea. As an historical, social and religious process, dialectic
is Spirit: the development of the subject by means ofmutual recognition that
resembles the cognitive development of self-consciousness. In both, the complete and
full expression of the goal intimately involves what is concrete, material, subjective
and human.
That the absolute, and its religious representation "God", can only be conceived in
relation to the activity of human cognition and existence implies two things for Hegel.
Firstly, "essence", the first "abstract" stage of dialectic, is not complete or
transcendent on its own; it is abstract, a beginning yet to be developed, and is
therefore dependent in some way on the dialectical negative of existence. This causes
further problems for any relation between the notions of the absolute idea and God, as
transcendence is limited to the standpoint of self-consciousness.
Secondly, however, this means that the place of existence in the three-fold dialectical
structure, as the negation of initial abstraction, does not discount existence as less than
essence, but positions both as necessary parts of the original abstract idea and its
development. The assumption is that what occurs in the negation stage of dialectic is
not "nothing" or "not real", but an integral part of the development of a larger
concept. Although Hegel's concern is for an account of cognition that favours
conceptualization, i.e. thinking that has moved beyond the representational stage of
religion, his dialectical account relies on human participation for the progress of
thought to the absolute idea and for the development of Spirit.
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Section III. Tillich and the Hegelian Dialectic
In the previous chapter, we saw that Tillich's dialectical system differed from
Schelling's in terms of the centrality of a notion of self-negation, especially where
revelation is concerned. For Tillich, the infinite was only infinite if it could sacrifice
the form of its finite expression in order to express its infinite meaning. The symbol of
the Cross is the prime example ofwhat Tillich means by the self-sacrifice of finite
expression. The crucified One is a negation of finite form (the man Jesus), and an
expression of infinite meaning (the Christ). Schelling's account of dialectic, however,
does not include such a notion of self-negation. In its early form, Schelling's dialectic
is an expression of opposed, but equally positive forces that result in the productivity
of nature and self-consciousness, and later describes an identity that results from
differentiation, which is itself traced to an underlying, though simple and
unconditioned, unity.
The Hegelian dialectical pattern does include a concept of self-negation as part of
three moments: positing, negating and sublating, or the negation of opposition, such
that dialectics is inherently self-negating and teleological. The structure of Tillich's
Systematic Theology can be expressed in similar terms: essence as a state of posited
balance, existence as a state of imbalance between being and non-being, and
essentialization as the teleological process by which this opposition is negated through
reunion. However, Hegel's concept of self-negation arises out of a concern to describe
the immanent cognitive development of self-consciousness. Tillich's concept of self-
negation is substantially different, as it concerns the nature of a transcendent
revelation that redeems finite existence and cognition from itself. The final section of
this chapter, then, concerns the major points of similarity and difference between the
dialectical structure ofTillich's Systematic Theology and Hegel's concept of dialectic.
This occurs in three discussions. The first considers whether Tillich's description of
dialectic as the existential experience of "going out" and "return" is subject to the
same "problem of recognition" that Bowie and others have pointed to in Hegel's
description of immanent transcendence. The second highlights the difference between
Hegel's Aufhebung and Tillich's "essentialization" as presented in the Systematic
Theology. The final discussion highlights the similarities between Hegel's notion of
the concept and Tillich's notion of revelation as ultimately "trans-historical."
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A. Tillich: A Problem ofRecognition?
Hegel's dialectical logic identifies three stages, all of which are inherent in the
development of a single entity: the concept. In the Phenomenology ofSpirit, the
speculative dialectic is only completed once it is embodied in the social and mutual
recognition of self-consciousness. Yet the goal of self-consciousness is only reached,
says Hegel, when the subject has become conscious, not just for itself, but to itself, i.e.
once it has related its current state to its past stages of development. In sum, self-
consciousness and absolute knowledge involve movement between a developing
concept and critical reflection upon it in order to develop the concept. This is integral
to Tillich's concept of essentialization.
Tillich's description of the self-integration, self-creativity and self-transcendence of
life and history are associated with kinds ofmovement: circular, horizontal and
vertical. Although different from Hegel's simple circularity of dialectic, together they
express the same general movement of self-consciousness: outward and return. This
raises the question of whether Tillich's commitment to an Hegelian dialectic causes
him to be susceptible to Bowie's and Desmond's critique ofHegel's "problem of
recognition". Whether this is the case can be ascertained by considering the extent to
which Tillich's largely experiential model resembles Hegel's largely cognitive one.
Tillich is not concerned to demonstrate the self-sufficiency of reason, as is Hegel, nor
is he concerned to account for opposition and unity in a single immanent-transcendent
process. Tillich's concern is that the subject should recognize that revelation is
revelationfor the subject. The intention for his dialectic of essentialization is to direct
the reader toward the ontological relationship between divine essence and human
existence, in order to articulate the origin ofhope for their reconciliation. Nonetheless,
this may still leave Tillich subject to critique. He may not be concerned to
demonstrate the process of the subject's self-recognition for the same reason as Hegel,
but he is concerned to demonstrate the basis for the subject's capacity to realize that
revelation isfor the subject. Whether Tillich accomplishes this can be determined by
considering how he describes the human need for revelation and the nature of the
experience of it.
113
As we have seen in the first section of the first volume of the Systematic Theology,
Tillich says that revelation "grasps" the subject, but that it is an experience that is a
fulfillment of human reason, not a destruction of it. The experience is "ecstatic" and
"inspirational", says Tillich, and the knowledge that is gained from revelation is
"receiving knowledge", as opposed to "controlling knowledge". That is, although it
has an impact on cognition and is rational, revelation does not constitute measurable
data, but includes an emotional element. (STI, 111, 97-99)
There are two factors that cause the existing subject to seek out this kind of
experience. The first, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is the human
experience of the unavoidable polarity of existence: anxious oscillation between
experiences ofbeing and non-being. Because of the limitations of finitude, however,
while the human subject is aware of the deficiency of this polar reality, he is unable to
reason toward a solution, to understand the dilemma he faces. Awareness of "need",
which is the foundation of Tillich's notion of "quest", is not, prior to the experience of
revelation, a mediated awareness; it is only an immediate one.
Like Hegel, Tillich's description of finitude and transcendence assumes the standpoint
of the philosophical observer. The connection between the polarity of existence and
revelation is drawn from this position, and, by Tillich's own argument, is not
available to the human situation until it has been revealed. The "quest" of the human
situation can only be understood as a quest for revelation once the Christ has been
revealed. This suggests that the existential situation itself, as described by Tillich,
cannot be the basis of human recognition of revelation as for humanity.
The second factor compelling the human subject toward an experience of revelation is
more fundamental even than the vague and immediate human awareness of need. The
process of essentialization, i.e. the search for reunion with original essence, is
ontologically compelled. Existence, for Tillich, is disrupted essence. So the essence
with which the human subject seeks reunion is not different from it. Rather, the
human seeks reunion with its own essence, but its own essence in undisrupted form,
unbound by the conditions and constraints of existence. Thus, the revelatory
experience of "being grasped" is not foreign to the subject experiencing it, no matter
how unfamiliar the "ecstatic" experience may be. Once revealed in the Christ, the
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subject recognizes original essence because Christ is the appearance of undisrupted
essence under the conditions of existence.
However, Tillich calls the post-Resurrection experience of the revealed Christ, i.e. the
continuing experience of revelation in the Church or "Spiritual Community",
"dependent revelation", as opposed to "original revelation". With this distinction, he
means to acknowledge that the Spiritual Community's reception of revelation is not
first-hand; this is the situation of faith. The result, for Tillich, is what he calls a
"receiving" knowledge of revelation; it is truth that it is experiential, not
experimental, and therefore not verifiable in the same way as scientific or
"controlling" knowledge. The "dilemma in knowledge", says Tillich, is that
controlling knowledge is secure, but not necessarily meaningful, while receiving
knowledge is ultimately significant, but cannot give certainty.
The requirement that Hegel sets for his self-recognizing subject is that the aufgehoben
subject can recognize its new self as identical with its old self. According to Bowie,
this means that the old selfmust be just as self-aware as the new, implying that self-
awareness is present form the beginning of Hegel's dialectic. This leads Bowie and
others to conclude that only the observing philosopher can attribute identity to the
original and the eventual subjects, making recognition an aspect of philosophy, but
not of the process philosophy describes.
If subject to the same scrutiny, Tillich also suffers from a kind of recognition
problem. Because of the polar conflicts of existence and reason, human awareness of
the revelation it needs does not arise from within the human situation. Even the
foundational relationship between undisrupted and disrupted essence that gives the
subject an immediate familiarity with the experience ofbeing grasped, provides a
knowledge that cannot be verified. The guarantor of the subject's recognition of
revelation as "for it" is the power of being-itself as revealed in the Christ and in the
Spiritual Presence. Thus, the possibility of human "recognition" of revelation is
contained within revelation itself. Recognition of revelation as for humanity is not the
result of reflective cognition or the dialectical progress of history, but something else.
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The only response to this problem of recognition from within the Systematic Theology
is the concept, discussed above, of revelation as "grasping" human reason. Reliance
on an ultimately non-cognitive apparatus to explain a cognitive problem, however,
shows the limits ofTillich's account of how the human subject knows that revelation
is for humanity. The unforgiving critic could say that Tillich's ontology simply avoids
issues of cognition; the forgiving critic could say that it is a non-epistemological
approach to the question of "recognizing" revelation. Bowie's critique ofHegel
appears to hold for Tillich, as well.
B. Difference: Aufhebung and Essentialization
The difference between Hegel's problem of recognition and Tillich's, however, is that
Tillich never intends for human cognition to be able to account for itself. For Hegel,
the central goal or telos of dialectic is a self-grounded description of difference and
identity. The immanent transcendence of the process ofAufhebung offers an account
of how a single subject becomes self-aware, how history can be accounted for
conceptually, and how cognition moves through stages of dissonance between
objective content and subjective expression to eventual unity of them. The process is
internal - even the act ofmutual recognition is first posited by the subject, and then
becomes an affirmation of embodied subjectivity. Opposition is inherent, and progress
is measurable, either by the self-conscious subject, or by the removed philosophical
observer. In sum, although it has problems, the process ofAufhebung, whether as the
development of self-consciousness, the concept, or ofhistory, attempts to account for
itself.
For Tillich, however, essentialization is not a presuppositionless process, as it is in
Hegel. The goal or telos of the dialectic of essentialization is not immanent
transcendence in the way Hegel conceives of it. The solitary subject is cast between a
sense of holiness and of anxiety, unable to adequately distinguish the two, and always
at the mercy of polarized and conflicted existence. The source of transcendence from
this situation, the catalyst of essentialization, is revelation, specifically in Jesus the
Christ. Because of this event, history and life are eternally changed. As a result of
revelation, human existence is rescued from its conflicts, from its polarities. Life as
the Spiritual Community moves continually to the Kingdom within history and
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Eternal Life outside the boundaries of history. In sum, essentialization only moves
forward because of a revelation that grasps, but is external to human cognition and
fmitude.
The transcendence that Tillich describes is expressed in the difference between the
"inner-historical" Kingdom and "trans-historical" Eternal Life, and is significant for
distinguishing Tillich's departure from Hegel. Tillich intends a distinction between
essentialization as occurring within history, and essentialization as occurring outside
of history. His concern is that human life and history are ambiguous, and ambiguity
cannot be imputed to what is truly transcendent, or to God. For Hegel, however, there
is no such thing as the "trans-historical". Aufhebung is the process by which finite
reality is included within a "true" infinity, and where representations are consistent
with and lead on toward concepts. For Hegel, history is the medium ofAufJiebung, in
which the process of increasing proximity of the subjective and objective occurs.
Tillich's distinction between the inner- and trans-historical does not, however,
represent a dichotomy. The distinction is only necessary in order to separate notions
of the in-breaking Kingdom in history, which, as appearing within history, is
fragmentary, and the vision of the Kingdom as it transcends these temporal
"victories". (STIII, 394) This is also the link between human history and the history
of salvation for Tillich. The two are not entirely identical, because human history
remains fragmentary, while the history of salvation constitutes the moments in which
the power of the Kingdom is asserted. (ST III, 364) Salvation history, then, cannot
happen without world history because it happens within it; but salvation history is not
bound by world history, but rather, fundamentally changes it. Likewise, the trans-
historical is not supra-historical, in the sense that it is completely transcendent of time,
space, or disconnected from human existence. (STIII, 363) We should recall that, for
Tillich, revelation is always revelation to humanity.
This suggests that the main difference between the notion ofAufhebung for Hegel and
the notion of essentialization for Tillich is in the role of revelation. Firstly, for Hegel,
the concept and the subject begin vaguely, but by their own dialectical development,
achieve absolute status. For Tillich, the human situation is conflicted and incapable of
its own dialectical development; its goal of reunion with essence in Eternal Life,
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although an inherent part of its essence, is disrupted and obscured from view by sin,
until Christ is revealed. Secondly, for Hegel there can be nothing outside of the
historical and cognitive aufheben that leads toward a true infinity; everything that is,
can be thought. For Tillich, there must be something outside of life and history in
order to ensure that revelation does not become reduced to them; there is something of
God reserved from human understanding.
C. Similarity: The Concept and the Trans-historical
Despite Tillich's departure from Hegel there is a parallel between the inner and trans-
historical distinction in Tillich and the difference between Hegel's dialectical
interpretation of the history of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology ofSpirit, and
of the concept in the Science ofLogic. As we have seen, although ultimately
concerned with rationality, in the Phenomenology ofSpirit, Hegel makes use of
cultural and religious history to demonstrate the rise of self-consciousness. In the
Science ofLogic, however, the ascent of subjective thought to unity with its objective
content, i.e. the absolute idea, occurs without reference to historical data. Hegel's
concern to raise history to the level of thought in the Science ofLogic shows a
distinction between the historical and the logical that could be said to resemble
Tillich's categories of inner- and trans-historical.
Clearly, for both Tillich and Hegel, the data ofhistory and the concepts by which they
can be understood are inseparable. For Tillich, the telos of the Kingdom is the same as
that of Eternal Life, which is provided by the meaning-giving event of Christ and the
formative presence of the Spirit. For Hegel, the goal of philosophy is to demonstrate a
relationship already underway, between the particularities of life and history, and the
abstract concepts of reason and cognition. And yet, both Tillich and Hegel separate
the data of history and the concepts by which they can be understood; their attempts to
show the unity of the "subjective" and "objective" ofhistory, the data and the
concept, demonstrates that, for both of them, the unification of the two requires
demonstration.
On one hand, Tillich is much like Hegel, in that the particularities of history and
religion not only can, but must be expressed symbolically or conceptually. The
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relationship ofparticular and universal must be demonstrated in order to communicate
the meaning of the particular. For Hegel, philosophical concepts capture the essential
meaning of religious and cultural representations. Cognition must go through a
religion phase, in order for essence that has become existent to be raised to the level
of essence again, in thought. Similarly, for Tillich the exigencies of human existence
are met by revelation; an experience that, once removed from the original event,
becomes conceptualized in the symbols of God, Christ, Spirit, Kingdom and Eternal
Life.216 (STI, 126jf.)
On the other hand, Tillich's need to correlate particular experiences with theological
concepts is different than Hegel's concern for raising religion to the level of
cognition. For Tillich, it is theological symbols, not philosophical concepts, which
embody the highest possible human expression ofmeaning. Echoing Schelling, for
Tillich the human mind needs symbols to convey meaning that it can never fully
grasp.217 Because they are rooted in experience, they represent the surroundings and
the context of human thought and being. (Significance, 78) The notable exceptions to
this are the "God above God", which is non-symbolic, and thereby inaccessible to
cognition; and Jesus as the Christ, the "final revelation", in whom the historical
medium of revelation is sacrificed to the universal purpose of revelation, i.e.
salvation.218 (ST I, 134) Nonetheless, the religious symbols of this sacrifice, the Cross
and the Resurrection, even as historical events remain symbols for the believer. For
Tillich, the experientially-rooted religious symbol represents the outer limits of human
cognition because in the symbol lies more than reason can access.
For Hegel, the religious symbol, or representation, does not embody the highest
possible understanding. Rather, the philosophical concept embodies ultimate
understanding because it alone is capable of transcending concrete expression while
retaining the truth it expresses. By the process ofAufhebung the significance of the
previous stage is retained, but is also transcended. As we will see through his account
216 Tillich calls the eventual conceptualization of revelation, subsequent to the "original revelation,"
"dependent revelation."
217 For Bowie, Schelling's triumph over Hegel is the ability of the concept of unmediated "intuition" to
avoid making metaphor, and thought in general, merely "representative". For Schelling, metaphor is an
attempt to bring reflection into the realm of language. Bowie, Schelling, pp. 185-186
2181 discuss the concept of "God above God," its meaning and significance, in "The Trinity in Tillich"
below.
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of the Trinity in the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, according to Hegel the
experientially rooted religious symbol is transcended in favour of cognitive concepts.
By this account, the religious symbol does not represent the outer limits of human
cognition. This difference should not be underestimated. For Tillich, philosophical
concepts help elucidate religious experience and truth. For Hegel, religious
representations help propel thought to the conceptual level.
Yet, despite the contradictory priority of religion and philosophy, the dialectical
structure employed by both Tillich and Hegel assumes that the penultimate expression
of reality is included in, not erased by, the ultimate. For Tillich, this is expressed as
revelation "fulfilling" reason, not destroying it, and in essentialization as the
"elevation of the positive" and the "judgment of the negative" of existence. (STIII,
398) For Hegel, the term Aufhebung expresses transcendence that includes prior
expressions.
Ultimately, the similarity of dialectical structure in Hegel and Tillich is evident in the
similar functions of their end goals - Eternal Life and the absolute idea - in three
ways. First, both are nascent as original and essential, yet incomplete, in the beginning
of their accounts. Second, both are the goal and end of their systems, providing the
direction, or telos, of the processes by which they develop. Third, both represent a
reunion with original essence, which is altered by and truly expressive of the infinite
in its inclusion of the historical and cognitive development that occurs through
finitude.
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Chapter Three: Trinity in Tillich
Introduction
The previous chapters of this investigation were concerned with the intention and
structure ofTillich's Systematic Theology. In the first and second chapters I argued
that Tillich's system relies on the employment of two different kinds of dialectic:
polarity and essentialization. That these notions of dialectic can be tied to the presence
of Schellingian and Hegelian concepts respectively challenges the traditional
assumption that Tillich's mature theology is guided largely by Schelling. So far, I
have established that the dialectical structure ofTillich's system, essentialization,
more closely resembles a Hegelian dialectical approach.
The remaining chapters of this thesis consider the specific doctrinal discussions of
Tillich's Systematic Theology in more depth in order to observe how the prevailing
dialectic of essentialization affects his doctrines ofGod, Christ, and the Spirit. By
examining these doctrines, which constitute the major sections of the Systematic
Theology, in this chapter I argue that essentialization, and not polarity, dominates the
interpretive content of the system. In the final chapter I further demonstrate the extent
to which the theological content ofTillich's system displays the marks of a Hegelian
dialectical approach, especially with respect to the Trinity. The evidence of these two
chapters allows me to conclude that both the structure and content ofTillich's
Systematic Theology is more Hegelian than Schellingian.
Although Tillich suggests that the Trinity be made the central interpretive doctrine of
theology, separate discussions of the doctrine in the Systematic Theology are brief.
However, the centrality of the Trinity to Tillich's system cannot be contested. Not
only is the Systematic Theology divided according to the persons of the Trinity, but
God, described as the "power of being-itself', is distinctly manifest in three persons,
all ofwhom are integral to salvation history, or essentialization. In this chapter, the
Trinity serves as a prime example ofhow the dialectic of essentialization guides every
part ofTillich's theology.
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Despite differences that we will see in the next chapter, both Schelling and Hegel also
employ a concept of the Trinity as the interpretive symbol of their dialectical systems.
1 have maintained from the outset that the appeal to Christian doctrine, by Hegel and
Schelling, is a complicated issue. In discussing the Trinity, neither of these
philosophers engages with the theological debates of his time, nor with the history of
theological discussion in any depth. For both Hegel and Schelling, the appeal to
doctrine is illustrative, not theologically concerned. Nonetheless, their discussions are
formative for Tillich and for other twentieth century theologians who are both critical
and sympathetic. Despite differences in intention, the demonstration of dialectical
thought in Hegel, Schelling and Tillich meets at the Trinity.
This chapter, on Tillich's interpretation of the Trinity as doctrine and as dogma, has
four sections. In the first three, I consider each of the sections ofTillich's system in
which he relates an aspect of existence with a person of the triune God: "Being" with
"God"; "Existence" with "the Christ"; and the "Spiritual Community" with the Spirit,
or the "Spiritual Presence". In each, I identify the theological problem to which
Tillich's reinterpretation is directed and some of the difficulties arising from his
attempted repairs. For Tillich, theology faces three problems: the necessity of an
actualized God for human existence; the restatement ofChristology in terms of the
human condition of estrangement and the sins of self-elevation; and the notion of
Spiritual Presence within, but also as a critique of, the Spiritual Community. His
reconsiderations of each doctrine are guided by these problems.
In the final part of this chapter 1 examine Tillich's discussion of the "Trinitarian
problem" as a separate phenomenon, which involves his account of the rise of
Trinitarian thinking in Christian theology and his insistence on the necessity of
dialectical thinking. The doctrine of the Trinity appears explicitly only twice in the
system, once in a discussion of the living God as "actualized" (ST I, 249ff.), and once
in a discussion of the function of the Trinitarian symbols for the Christian religion.
(STIII, 283ff.) I focus on the latter discussion, and conclude with the significance of
the dialectic of essentialization for Tillich's concept of the Trinity.
Because of the relatively few words devoted to its explicit discussion, the significance
of the doctrine of the Trinity in Tillich's theology has been critically
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underestimated.219 However, examining Tillich's theology of the Trinity as a response
to historical theological problems will help to clarify his apologetic intentions.
Addressing the major problems arising from his approach will help to determine the
extent of the appearance of Hegel and Schelling within the function of the Trinity in
Tillich's theology.
Section I. Divine Ontology
Tillich often refers to God as "the power of being" (STI, 110, 189), "the power of
being-itself' (STI, 188), or simply as "being-itself'. (STI, 79, 188, 204) According to
Tillich, this conceptualization is necessary in order to describe the unique way in
which God is the ground of all being, while avoiding both overly abstract and overly
personal concepts of God. This results in two major steps in Tillich's doctrine of God:
replacing ontological proofs for the existence ofGod with a new concept of infinity;
and describing God as "living".
The main value of traditional ontological proofs for the existence of God (ST I, 204-
208), according to Tillich, is that they acknowledge an unconditional element in the
structure and reason of reality. The usefulness of ontological proofs is limited,
however, to representing the "question ofGod". The ontological conceptualization of
God can guarantee the potential of human awareness ofGod, but not God as God.
Arguments that try to join "being" to the guarantee of awareness can only "pervert
insight". (ST 1, 204) For example, according to Tillich, Anselm's concept of God as a
necessary thought is valid for thinking, as it "implies an unconditional element which
transcends objectivity and subjectivity." (ST I, 207) In this case, the concept of God is
a logical guarantor of the possibility of thought about God. However, the concept is
not adequate as a guarantor ofbeing, because the existence of a "highest being" is not
implied in the concept of a highest being.
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Exceptions include Pan Chiu-Lai, Towards a Trinitarian Theology ofReligions. A Study ofPaul
Tillich 5 Thought (Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1994), Randall B. Bush,
Recent Ideas ofDivine Conflict. The Influences ofPsychological and Sociological Theories ofConflict
upon the Trinitarian Theology ofPaul Tillich and Jiirgen Moltmann (San Francisco: Edwin Mellon
Press, 1991); and Gert Hummel and Doris Lax (ed.), Trinity and/or Ouaternity: Tillich's Reopening of
the Trinitarian Problem, 2002 Proceedings of the IX. International Paul-Tillich-Symposium (Minister:
LIT Verlag, 2004)
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It is possible to place Tillich's divine ontology within an historical line of thought.
Though for different reasons, John P. Dourley and Donald J. Keefe agree that
Tillich's main target in this discussion is not Anselm, but Aquinas. For Keefe, Tillich
Christianizes Platonic ontology. With respect to ontological proofs, the redefinition of
human existence as disrupted essence collapses the doctrine of the Fall into the
doctrine of Creation. This, argues Keefe, blurs the distinction between what he calls
"evolving" and "sinful" humanity.220 Referring to Tillich's A History ofChristian
Thought, Dourley argues that for Tillich, Aquinas' "rejection ofAnselm amounted to
the rejection of the ontological argument itself and the loss of immediate religious
certitude...".221 According to Dourley, Tillich positions Aquinas at the beginning of an
entrenchment of the division between autonomous reason and the heteronomous
authority of the Church to mediate revelation, especially through Duns Scotus and
William of Okham. The result is that the immediate knowledge ofGod is denied, and
revealed knowledge stands alongside reason.
As with many parts of the Systematic Theology, however, Tillich's discussion of
ontological proofs is not, primarily, an engagement with scholastic theology, but with
more general theological problems. In addressing issues of historically "ontological"
theology, Tillich is targeting problems that he identifies with overly rationalistic
approaches to theology: pantheism, theism and deism. This is a clear instance where
Tillich's reference to a traditional theological concept obfuscates his intention, rather
than clarifying his thought. Nonetheless, it is in the context of his discussion of
rationalistic proofs that Tillich presents a new concept of infinity. Here, infinity is not
defined as quantity but as quality; not as entity, but as power. Defining infinity this
way enables Tillich to describe God as "calling" existence to reunification with
essence. The notion of a "substance" that grounds the "persons" of God is replaced
with the concept of the "power" of the living God, or ofbeing-itself.
220 Donald J. Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology ofPaul Tillich: A Comparison ofSystems,
pp. 181-182; 331
1 John P. Dourley, Paul Tillich and Bonaventure: An Evaluation ofTillich 's Claim to Stand in the
Augustinian-Franciscan Tradition, p. 39
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A. Infinity and the Living God
We have seen that Tillich asserts the ontological priority ofbeing over non-being, and
maintains that the two form a polar relationship. We have also seen that this polarity
expresses both God's essence as the balance of inclinations toward infinite potential
and finite actuality, and humanity's existential condition, in which the same polarity is
imperfectly balanced. (STI, 202-204) However, Tillich also describes the essential-
existential situation in terms that have not yet been addressed in detail: the
relationship of finitude and infinity.
For Tillich, finitude is not exactly equal to existence, and infinity is not exactly equal
to essence. Rather, finitude is the existent being's cognitive awareness of limitation,
and infinity is the possibility ofunlimited transcendence. (ST I, 191) The possibility of
transcendence is not the same as being-itself, but is a directive issued by it. (STI, 212)
Finite humanity is capable of self-transcendence not because of an infinite being, but
because of unlimited potential, issued by being-itself in revelation. Infinity is a quality
of, not simply an unlimited quantity of, essence and power. The "power" of divine
essence, as infinity, is the capacity to hold being and non-being in balance, to be both
actual and potential, and to provide the foundation of creation, life and the living
relationship between humanity and divinity.
As a quality and not a quantity, infinity is an expression of the power by which
humanity is called to essentialization. At this point in the system "infinity" is Tillich's
place-holder for divine essence, which he later defines as the "power" of the Christ as
New Being and the Spiritual Presence. Infinity is an early conceptual description of
how being-itself, or undisrupted essence, can both include and transcend finitude.
Tillich considers the divine "call" to infinity to be expressive of humanity's belonging
to that which is beyond the existential imbalance ofbeing and non-being, namely,
being-itself. (ST I, 191) That is, once being-itself is revealed to humanity, humanity
can conceive of, though not exhaustively, that to which it transcends. The logical
possibility of self-transcendence is enough, for Tillich, to reinforce a positive
connection between being and being-itself. He considers such an assumption to be
sufficiently different from St Anselm's traditional ontological proof, which equates
the potential to conceive ofGod with the proofof such a God. (STI, 207) Tillich is
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apparently unencumbered by the Kantian suspicion concerning the limits of the
transcendental dialectic.
The concept of infinity, then, is as useful as the ontological proof insofar as it points
to the potentially limitless transcendence of cognitive awareness. Infinity is as limited
as that proof, however, because it cannot guarantee the existence of a highest being.
This, however, is a reality Tillich acknowledges. In Tillich's language, ontological
proofs can only pose the "question of God", or describe the potential transcendence of
cognitive awareness. Cosmological proofs have a similar function for Tillich. The
positing of a "first cause" is one possible starting point in a logical argument, but does
not provide proof of a "being" which initiates a causal chain. That is to say, the
logical need for an unmoved mover does not guarantee its existence. Even the
teleological argument for the necessity of an unthreatened "meaning" or telos cannot
guarantee the existence of such an infinite meaning. (ST I, 210)
The discussion of infinity is only a preliminary step, however, to allow Tillich to
describe God as living, creating and relating. Earlier in the system he defines life as
"actualization, not actuality". (STI, 84, 153) In describing God as "living" Tillich
addresses the existential concern of his system: that the transcendent God who is said
to reveal is also inherently connected to the humanity to which God reveals. Tillich's
aim is to show that human "life" is an intimate part of the life ofGod.
As the power ofbeing-itself, God in all three persons is the ground of all being.
Tillich calls the process of the continual actualization of this ground the "life of God",
where life is "the process in which potential being becomes actual being... the
actualization of the structural elements ofbeing in their unity and in their tension."
(STI, 241) As parts of a continual process the impulses to remain as pure potentiality
and to be actualized are always in tension. However, "in God there is no distinction
between potentiality and actuality." (STI, 242) The polar elements are rooted in the
divine life, in the distinction ofbeing and non-being, but the divine life is not subject
to polarity because it is also the unity ofbeing and non-being. This is consistent with
Tillich's fundamental ontology: that in God, distinction is balanced by unity, where in
humanity, it is not. To say that God is "living" is to "assert that he is the eternal
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process in which separation [i.e. actualization] is posited and overcome by reunion."
(ST I, 242, c.f ST III, 11, 30)
This shows Tillich's clear difference from a polar dialectic and the presence of the
pattern of essentialization even in the first volume of the system and its description of
God. Like Schelling's productive ground, the polar elements of being and non-being
in the divine ground of being are responsible for the constitution ofhuman existence.
Unlike Schelling's Freiheitsphilosophie, however, for Tillich, the "nature" of God is
not distinct and posited against the "freedom" of God; God and God's actualization
are the same thing. Thus, the pattern ofunity-difference-reunion is the whole of God.
Although Tillich does not more clearly define how God's freedom and nature are one,
it is implied in the concept of infinity. The power ofbeing-itself is not in being the
essential ground of existence, i.e. in being the ideal basis of real manifestation, as it is
in Schelling. Rather, for Tillich the power ofbeing-itself is in its capacity to compel
finitude toward transcendence, that is, in the actualization of God and communication
of the telos of all being. In relation to the concept of the Trinity, which I examine
below, this is the point ofTillich's greatest departure from Schelling.
Tillich also distances his definition of God from Hegel when he describes God as
creating. Creation is an expression of God's freedom; so creation is not "contingent",
according to Tillich, "it doesn't 'happen' to God, for it is identical with his life." (ST
I, 252) This raises an important distinction between God, and God's "life": God as
"living", like all ofTillich's descriptions ofGod, must be symbolic; awareness of the
process of actualization, of the divine life, cannot exhaust God-himself. In other
words, the human experience of and participation within the revelation of God is not
identical to God. Being a creature is to be rooted in the creative ground of the divine
life and to actualize one's self through freedom. (ST 1, 256) However, the freedom of
creation, or humanity, is disrupted in an immediately non-transcendent way for Tillich
- a limitation not apparent in Hegel's dialectic of immanent transcendence.
The connections between Tillich's concept ofGod and the concepts of Schelling and
Hegel are the subject of greater focus in the next chapter. For now, it is important to
notice two things about Tillich's concept of life. First, it includes a structural
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independence, a finite freedom given by God. Second, as the process of actualization,
life remains connected to its creative ground. Human freedom is consistent with the
created structures of existence (STI, 262) and with God's intention for creation (STI,
266). That is, even in its distinction from the ground ofbeing, human existence does
not run the risk of being alienated from that ground. The structure and meaning of
human life remains consistent with the life of God. For Tillich, "What is valid for the
individual is valid for history as a whole." (STI, 267) The discussion of infinity and
finitude is Tillich's answer to any rationalism that would deny the continued presence
and activity ofGod in the world and the meaningfulness ofhuman participation in
that activity.
The persons of the Trinity are, at this point in the system, only evident in principle.
Tillich does, however, forecast these principles in his discussion of the living God as
"moments within the process of the divine life". The first principle is the Godhead,
the transcendent "ground ofbeing"; the second principle is the logos, which opens the
divine ground and brings meaning and structure; and the third principle is the
"actualization of the other two", the Spirit, in which the other two are contained and
united. Through these principles, "the finite is posited as finite within the process of
the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite in the same process."222 (STI, 251)
God can only be infinite because he has the finite posited within him, and united with
his infinity. Otherwise, finitude would stand in opposition to infinity, and thereby
place limitations on it.
B. Problems with God and Being
Tillich's identification of the "living" God with "being-itself' - an attempt to define
the "being" ofGod without calling God "a being" - is the greatest single source of the
critique of his theology, and elicits more and less sympathetic responses. Thatcher
attempts to clarify Tillich's use of "ontology" or "ontological theology", as
.. .in the first place as a purely rational inquiry into the structure ofbeing;
secondly, as a search for wisdom, or for something ultimate; thirdly, the
222 Reference to "the infinite" raises questions of equivocation concerning Tillich's initial definition of
"infinity" as a demand, or quality.
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question arises because it is the nature ofman to ask questions; fourthly, and
most commonly, the question is motivated by a profound negative human
experience, usually referred to as the ontological shock, or the shock ofnon-
being.223
As rational inquiry, ontology can provide one approach in the discussion ofGod. As
the response to the psychological shock, or threat, of non-being, however, ontology is
an inquiry into the essential origin of existential experience.
Thatcher further reduces these four meanings into two basic categories borrowed from
Heidegger: ontology as "existentialist" and as "traditional".224 He identifies traditional
ontology with structural and theoretical models of the relationship of infinite and
finite being, which seek to establish what exists and what is known, and existentialist
ontology he defines as the human pursuit ofmeaning, the articulation of the question
about the meaning ofbeing, the doctrine ofman. The existentialist approach to
ontology, according to Thatcher, is about humanity, as opposed to the logic of
establishing the existence of anything.
While the distinction is helpful, Thatcher indicates it should not be mistaken as
indicating a preference for the rationalistic or for the psychological, nor should it be
used to characterize Tillich's project as humanistic. Thatcher makes the distinction
that, where for Heidegger traditional and existential ontology are "worlds apart", for
Tillich they are inseparable. Ontology is a theological task; and Tillich calls for the
correlation of existential questions about structure, and theological answers about
meaning, within a system in which theology sets the entire agenda. Tillich's ontology
is human-concerned, but divine-centered.
Despite this clarification, there remains a strong critique ofTillich's ontology and its
human-centeredness. Less generously than Thatcher, Alistair Macleod allows Tillich
less room to equivocate on the definition of ontology. Firstly, Macleod argues that
Tillich too conveniently assumes the identity of those driven to ask the ontological
223
Thatcher, The Ontology ofPaul Tillich, pp. 11-12. Thatcher distinguishes between ontology as
"quest" and as "question," where Clayton makes the etymological argument, from the German, that
Tillich means to keep the two senses together; Clayton, The Concept ofCorrelation, pp. 180-181
224 Thatcher credits Heidegger with the distinction between traditional and existentialist ontology.
Thatcher, The Ontology ofPaul Tillich, p. 24; c.f. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics,
p. 34; Being and Time, p. 19 ff.
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question and those who engage in the religious quest.225 He suggests that the link is
contrived and consists of two steps: first, the human question ofbeing is described as
universal, and anxiety over non-being is made into a doctrine ofman; and second, the
universal question is illuminated by religious symbols. In sum, Macleod criticizes
Tillich for making essentially philosophical constructs "theological."
Secondly, however, Macleod strongly objects to Tillich's assertion that his
ontological approach is fundamentally different than traditional natural theology. He
cites two statements Tillich makes that permit an alarming human awareness of God.
First, that, "The question ofGod is possible because of an awareness ofGod present
in the question ofGod" (STI, 228-229); and second, that humanity has an
"ontological awareness of the Unconditional". (TC, 25-26) Macleod assumes that
Tillich means the same thing by "awareness" in each case, and that, therefore, Tillich
sees immediate awareness ofGod, as being-itself, as possible outside of revelation.
Tillich's central doctrines of human finitude and estrangement are thus the
products of a certain sort of analysis of experiences which human beings as
such are alleged to have... [The doctrine ofman] has the peculiar property of
also embodying an answer to the ontological question.226
Because of this, argues Macleod, Tillich cannot claim that his method is any different
than the natural theologian's claim to some knowledge ofGod outside of revelation.
The error here arises from Tillich's equivocal use of the term "awareness", and is
exacerbated by Macleod's unsuspicious acceptance of it. Macleod's judgment,
however, is the result of connecting two passages from two different volumes, whose
intention and scope are quite distinct. What Tillich means by "ontological awareness
of the Unconditional" is not clear. However, what it accomplishes in the Theology of
Culture is fairly meager and straightforward. In that volume Tillich suggests that, by
virtue ofbeing finite, humanity is at least "aware" of the possibility of that which is
infinite, yet he gives no indication that humanity's intuitive "awareness" of this
Unconditioned is complete, self-conscious, or exhaustive. It is less like Schelling's
225 Alistair Macleod, Paul Tillich: An Essav on the role ofOntology in his Philosophical Theology, p.
~26
Macleod, Tillich, p. 48, 56 Macleod notes Martin's agreement on this criticism. Martin, The
Existentialist Theology ofPaul Tillich, pp. 81 ff.
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"immediate intuition" of the Absolute, and more like Hegel's suggestion that the
logically posited "other" represents incomplete knowledge of the Absolute.
Furthermore, what Tillich means by an "awareness" of God "present in the question
ofGod" is very different than a mere logical inference. The assumption, in the
Systematic Theology, of the logical capacity of the human subject to formulate
questions about God, is dependent on the assumption that this is a God-given
capacity. "Man is the question he asks about himself', but humanity is not the source
of the answer. Tillich assumes that, "If God were not also in man so that man could
ask for God, God's speaking to man could not be perceived by man." (STIII, 127)
That an awareness ofGod is present in the question of God refers to the fact that God
created both humanity and its capacity to wonder, not that humanity is immediately
and comprehensively aware of God. For Tillich, the human capacity to ask the
question ofGod indicates the real capacity to begin to understand the revealed
answer, not to formulate or discover it apart from revelation.
A second critique ofTillich's ontology concerns the conflicting results yielded by the
statement that God is being-itself, and that there is a "God above God". The
apparently radical nature of the phrase "God above God" is the subject ofmany
commentaries linking it to many things, including a Bohmian Ungrund,121 a desire to
assert Christianity as the highest religion,228 and even ofbeing possible evidence in
support of interpreting Tillich's Godhead as a quaternity.229 Such readings, however,
read Tillich's "God above God" out of context, and expose the necessity of suspicion
where Tillich's use of concepts and terminology is concerned.
The assumption that the concept of the "God above God" stands within the long
tradition ofChristian mysticism is erroneous. This causes great difficulty for Tillich's
interpreters, especially in relation to his ontology. The central example of this
~:i John P. Dourley, "Jacob Boehme and Paul Tillich on Trinity and God: Similarities and Differences,"
Religious Studies 31/4 (Dec 1995) p. 430
228
Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 217
229 Gert Hummel and Doris Lax (ed.), Trinity and/or Quaternity: Tillich's Reopening ofthe Trinitarian
Problem, 2002 Proceedings of the IX. International Paul-Tillich-Symposium (Minister: LIT Verlag,
2004) See Eiko Hanaoka-Kawamura, "Das Problem der Trinitat und der Quaternitat bei Paul Tillich,"
pp. 313-318; John P. Dourley, "The problem of the Three and the Four in Paul Tillich and Carl G.
Jung," pp. 351-368; and Mary Ann Stenger, "Quaternity versus Trinity in Tillich," pp. 319-331.
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difficulty is Thatcher's discussion of the ontological problem in Tillich. For Thatcher,
on the one hand, "being-itself" is problematic because it is "both beyond infinity (ST
I, 212), beyond essence and existence", and yet, "everything finite participates in
being-itself (ST 1, 263) and being-itself is said to have the character of becoming or
process" (STIII, 344).m The problem is that Tillich's ontological concept cannot
differentiate between transcendence and immanence because the power ofbeing
embraces both.
On the other hand, the "God above God" is either conceptually redundant, or is
experientially remote, "ineffable, removed from the world". Thatcher acknowledges
that Tillich's intentions are apologetic: to transcend theisms which reduce God to an
empty slogan, and which are overly personalistic, naturalistic or dualistic. However,
Thatcher first argues that "God above God" is a theistic concept, and that God does
not need to be transcended in order to be understood as something other than a
totality. Second, he argues that the phrase places God further away from humanity.
Finally, Thatcher argues that the concept does not remove the difficulties of speaking
of God as an existent being, that God is a primary word (Ur-Wort), and that, "All the
questions about the existence and causality of the God of theism, are transferable to
the God above that same conception."231
Some of these criticisms can be answered. Firstly, Tillich defines God as beyond
essence and existence, or, more accurately, as beyond the distinction between essence
and existence. (STI, 204) However, God's "beyond-ness" does not suggest that God
occupies some realm separate from essence and existence, or being and non-being,
but that God transcends their competition or tension. As Jean Richard suggests, "God
is not a being out there. It is an experienced reality... God is not a purely objective
reality."232 Humanity experiences existence as distorted essence, but there is no
distortion in God. The Creator holds together in perfect unity that which humanity
experiences as conflicted. However, that God transcends distortion does not imply
that God is removed from the human experience.
230 Thatcher, The Ontology ofPaul Tillich, p. 87
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Secondly, the concept of God above God requires more context than Thatcher
provides. Despite its apparent similarity to a mystical God "beyond" the personal God
of the Christian Gospels, for Tillich, the "God above God" is a highly specific and
Christian concept. Tillich says that, "The concept of absolute faith is the 'God above
God'. Absolute faith and its consequence, the courage that takes the radical doubt, the
doubt about God, into itself, transcends the theistic idea of God." (CB, 172) The
discussion that follows this definition consistently employs not the abbreviated "God
above God", but the phrase, "the God above God of theism"- a phrase which Thatcher
acknowledges is primarily apologetic. Yet despite this, Thatcher characterizes "the
God above the God of theism" as remote, removed, and the opposite of the immanent
description ofGod as "being-itself'.
Opposed to such a decontextualization, then, is the insistence that in order to
understand Tillich's concept of the God above God, it must be understood in its
specific, apologetic context, as the God who transcends theism. According to Tillich,
the primary deficiency of all theistic accounts is the same: they allow no account of
the radical doubt that results from the threat of non-being, the anxiety of the human
condition. The remote God of theism offers no account ofhow the universal becomes
concrete, ofhow infinite meaning can be communicated to finite human existence. In
the personal and transcendent God of Christianity, Tillich finds a God "above the God
of theism;" i.e. a concept of God that embraces both divine transcendence and divine
immanence in a way that offers telos and meaning to human life and history. The
"God above God" is necessarily personal, not remote, as Thatcher implies.
Moreover, in The Courage to Be, Tillich points to the symbols of Christian theology -
the Cross and the Resurrection - as the mediators of courage because they take doubt
and meaninglessness into themselves. (CB, 178) The point is rational, not rhetorical,
and in the Systematic Theology receives greater detail. The Cross expresses God's
subjection to existence, and the Resurrection attests to the conquering of existence.
(STII, 158) For Tillich, revelation is only final, that is, authoritative, when it
overcomes its finite conditions by sacrificing, and thereby transcending, its finitude.
(ST 1, 136)
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The Cross and the Resurrection are the symbols of final revelation, for Tillich. The
Systematic Theology describes God as taking on estrangement and conquering it for
humanity. God remains manifest in the process of essentialization, in the Spirit and
through the Spiritual Community, and provides courage to anxious humanity. In sum,
the God ofBeing, of Existence, and of History, the living God, is the only God who
can account for the anxiety of existence, yet remain transcendent. That is, only the
living God, can be the "God above the God of theism". The God above God is not a
concept of a remote deity, as Thatcher assumes.
Finally, this explanation also answers Thatcher's original concern, that "God above
God" and "God as being-itself' seem contradictory. For Thatcher, "One is the super-
transcendent deity, beyond any predication whatsoever, the other the involved God
whose life is strictly analogous to earthly life processes and which in Jesus Christ
became identical with them."233 Placed back in its context, however, the God above
God is not a super-transcendent concept, but is a concept of divinity that encompasses
both infinite transcendence and finite participation: the personal, living God.234
In the first volume of the Systematic Theology, Tillich is laying the groundwork for a
Trinitarian concept ofGod that follows the pattern of essentialization. Although it is
not conceptually rigorous, the description of infinity as a "quality" aligns it with the
concept of the "power of being-itself'. In so doing, Tillich suggests that divine
essence is not a polarized "nature" and "freedom", but that the nature ofGod is itself
free. In this way, he can locate both the pattern of existence and the possibility of
human existence to transcend existence, in divine essence. Infinity is an indication,
early in the Systematic Theology, that the dialectic of essentialization is what guides
the entire system. This is more clearly demonstrated in the subsequent sections of the
system, especially in the second volume's consideration of revelation as the "power of
being-itself' in the Christ.
233 Thatcher, The Ontology ofPaul Tillich, p. 86
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Section II. Christology
Having described the essential ground of human existence in the first volume of the
Systematic Theology, the second volume describes the Christ as the revelation of
undisrupted essence under the conditions of existence - a revelation that repairs the
existential estrangement suffered by all humanity. This volume of the system has two
main sections. The first describes the radical nature of estrangement, or sin, and
humanity's inability to overcome it autonomously. The second describes the universal
significance of the event of Jesus the Christ.
As infinity was a response to the problem of ontological proofs for God's existence,
the discussion ofChristology in the system is largely a response to the challenge of
historical criticism. Tillich's concern is the erosion of a secure, historical picture of
Jesus ofNazareth in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the consequent
insecurity in the theological picture of Jesus "as the Christ." In this section we argue
two things: that in the Systematic Theology Tillich attempts a repair of his earlier
theology ofChrist as kairos; and that his intention in doing so is to more closely align
salvation with ontology. The redefinition of the Christ as the New Being, that is, in
terms of divine essence under the conditions of existence, is an attempt to make the
significance of the Christ more than a collection of historical data, with a view to
answering the challenge of the historical Jesus project.
For Tillich, sin expresses the very personal nature, and subsequent willfulness, of
estrangement. Estrangement is "unbelief', "hubris", and "concupiscence", though an
emphasis on the self-elevation of hubris is at the heart of both the willfulness of
unbelief and the self-destruction of concupiscence. (ST II, 47-55) Tillich emphasizes a
personal responsibility for estrangement over a communal notion of sin. However,
since communities have no singular reflective center, autonomous self-assertion is a
universal fact, for Tillich, even before it becomes an individual act. The estrangement
of the human condition is a given. (STII, 56-59) As a universal and fundamental
condition of human existence, it is impossible for humanity to overcome
estrangement, whether through legalism, asceticism, mysticism, sacramentalism or
pietism. (STII, 80-86) As discussed before, Tillich argues that the one-sided demands
of heteronomous law or practice are also not a sufficient response to the self-
assertions of autonomy. Something new is required.
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A. Kairos and the New Being
The idea of the "new" first appears substantially in The Interpretation ofHistory as
the concept of kairos. In this earlier work, and in the Systematic Theology, Tillich
describes kairos as the freedom ofbeing-itself to make a leap into history, to
transgress the realm of pure being. Karios, from the Greek for "season", "appropriate
time", or "time fulfilled", is used instead of the other Greek word for time, chronos,
which is commonly used to express time as a measurement. (STIII, 369) This
distinction is key: while chronos is quantitative, kairos is qualitative. Tillich suggests
that there are 'kairotic' moments in history, or kairoi. Kairoi are times when the
realization of the logos, God's Word, or the eternal meaning ofbeing, occurs; but
these kairoi receive their meaning from the central kairos.
Tillich has been criticized for 'grafting' the notion of kairos onto Christ, for not doing
enough to show why Christ is the kairos.235 Where the early Tillich is concerned, this
is mostly correct. Christology, Tillich says in earlier writings, describes "the point at
which something absolute appears in history and provides it with meaning and
purpose", where "a given kairos [is identified] with the universal logos". (IH, 243,
250) For Tillich, Christology is not aproofthat Christ is the centre ofhistory; it is
only a "possible answer to the basic question implied in history, an answer which can
never be proved by arguments, but is a matter of decision and fate." (IH, 259) By such
a reading, Christ is the kairos because of fate, or the circumstances of history, and
faith. "The centre ofhistory is acknowledged as a centre in an attitude in which there
is decision as well as fate, grasping, as well as being grasped by it." (IH, 256)
In The Interpretation ofHistoiy, Tillich associates the notion of kairos not only with
the symbol of the Christ, but also with the symbol of the Kingdom. (IH, 300) What is
only briefly mentioned in this early work is made explicit in the Systematic Theology.
Here Christ is not only a symbol of God's concrete manifestation in history, as a past
event which gives all other historical events (kairoi), past and future, their meaning;
Christ is also a foretaste of the Kingdom, the completed fulfilment of history. In fact,
in the Systematic Theology references to kairos and kairoi only occur in reference to
the Kingdom ofGod (STIII, 369) and are absent from the second volume on Christ.
235
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This is not to suggest that Tillich has changed his mind, that Christ is no longer the
kairos of reality, history and faith. Rather, the function ofChristology in the system is
slightly different than in previous writings, as the Christ is identified less as the kairos
of history, and more as the New Being. This reflects two concerns Tillich has at the
time of the Systematic Theology: that the hopeful anticipation embedded in the
concept of kairos expressed by the social Christian movement of post-First World
War Europe is mitigated against by the horror of the Second World War (ST III, 369);
and, that the notion of kairos is too close to a notion ofhistory, and the assertion of
historical accuracy, which allows the universal significance of the Christ event to wax
and wane with historical findings. In the Systematic Theology, "Christology is a
function of soteriology". (STII, 150) The concept of Christ "bringing] the New
Being" defines the historical uniqueness and eternal significance of the Christ. The
move away from Christ as kairos to Christ as New Being is likely a move away from
a strongly historical theology toward a more ontological theology.
This is echoed in Tillich's characterization of the "task of present theology" as finding
a new way to express the Christological substance. (STII, 145) The Christ as New
Being shows Tillich's concern to describe the truth of Christ in a way not tied to the
data of history. The question remaining for Tillich is how an historically and
existentially conditioned event can be evidence of an eternal divine-human
relationship and the basis ofuniversal salvation? This concern is expressed in
Tillich's discussion of the insufficiency of the Christological "two natures" doctrine.
In the previous section we saw that Tillich's definition of infinity was meant to
provide an alternative account of the connection between God and humanity. Infinity,
as a "call" to existence toward reunion with essence, both describes the distance
between being-itself and being, and reinforces their essential connection. Thus, the
concept of infinity reinforces Tillich's ontological description of salvation, or
essentialization. God is being-itself, and that power is manifest in New Being, which
is identified with the Christ. However, the "existentially conditioned event" of the
Christ, described as "two natures", is too historically conditioned for Tillich. The
concept of infinity, though, and the "call" of the power ofbeing-itself, can describe
the simultaneous situations of human estrangement from God and God's will to
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actively seek reunion with estranged existence. Thus, Tillich restates the two natures
doctrine in terms consistent with the infinite call, issued by divine essence to
existence, of the process of essentialization.
In place of the "two natures", Tillich suggests the concept of "eternal God-man-
unity", or "Eternal God-Manhood" - what Tillich calls a "dynamic-relational
concept." (ST II, 148) The effect is to give priority to the universal significance of the
event of the Christ, over the particular details of the event. "In [Christ's] being, the
New Being is real, and the New Being is the re-established unity between God and
man." (ST II, 148) The New Being, the concept of existential essence, of "eternal
God-man-unity", changes the emphasis from historical necessity, to the underlying
connection ofbeing between God and the New Being. Jesus is the Christ, but
primarily as a new expression ofbeing, not as an historical necessity.
The emphasis on Christ as New Being is consistent with Tillich's emphasis on
theology as primarily dialectical and not paradoxical. We have seen that Tillich
supports the notion ofChrist as the paradox of grace - a notion upon which "all
theology depends." However, with the concept ofNew Being and its connection to the
power ofbeing-itself, Tillich is demonstrating the place of Christology within a larger
theological account. New Being is not only the revelation of essence within existence;
it is also manifest "in the power of Spirit." (STIII, 125) The central point for Tillich is
the function of the Christ, in the process of essentialization, as the temporal event that
makes "history" the history of salvation. The New Being is essence that lifts existence
out of polarity, and is therefore the catalyst of essentialization.
The Christ as "eternal God-man-unity" is also consistent with Tillich's doctrine of
symbols, particularly with the symbol of final revelation. The finite symbol, inasmuch
as it represents infinite meaning, sacrifices its finitude in favour of displaying infinite
meaning. The sacrifice of the Cross and the Resurrection are the symbols of Christ's
status as final revelation. The ontological concept of the New Being does have the
advantage of emphasizing the universality of the event over and against its personal
and historical character. As Ruth Page suggests,
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Faith is certain of its foundations - that the New Being has been experienced -
but takes the risk of affirming that this experience come through the biblical
picture. It does not affirm that it comes through Jesus ofNazareth... But it
does affirm the power of the biblical picture to produce the New Being in
those for whom it functions as a symbol.236
Page considers it to be a strength ofTillich's theology that the New Being can avoid
the charge of inconsistency between a historical Jesus and a symbolic Christ. Tillich is
certainly concerned that theology and faith not stand or fall on the Scriptural
accuracies of geography or biography.237 Certainly one answer to the criticisms of the
historical Jesus project is to conceptualize and give priority to the content of
Scripture: "The foundation of Christian belief is not the historical Jesus but the
Biblical picture ofChrist." (IH, 265) Once the Christ has occurred, it is possible to
conceptually demonstrate the necessity of such an event within a framework of faith.
However, there are many problems with Tillich's account of the New Being as almost
independent of the historical Jesus.
B. Problems with the New Being
Firstly, the over-conceptualization of the Christ event is problematic, for at least three
reasons. In wanting to interpret the biblical picture symbolically, Tillich bypasses the
very details that permit the biblical narrative to be an account of the Christ as the New
Being.238 Furthermore, the symbol of the New Being conceptualizes the very thing
Scripture insists must not be conceptual, God's personal encounter with humanity,
and puts into question all manner ofScriptural detail. If Jesus ofNazareth is not
necessary to the manifestation ofNew Being, then all biblical personalities, prophets,
kings, judges, are also only incidental. It is not clear how the "biblical picture", what
Tillich calls the analogia imaginis (STII, 107ff.) can produce the New Being while
Jesus ofNazareth cannot. Even more troubling for Tillich is the possibility that if
236 Ruth Page, "The Consistent Christology of Paul Tillich," Scottish Journal ofTheology 6 (1983) p.
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temporal and historical specificity are only incidental then the very concept of kairos
as an appropriate time of God's manifestation is not just diminished, but demolished.
Secondly, the concept of the New Being makes too neat a distinction between the
biblical picture of the Christ and the historical Jesus. Bruce Cameron makes three
arguments concerning the difficulties of this distinction: that a difference between
faith and historical truth cannot be absolute, as both require the interpretive
involvement of a judging subject; that the truth of faith must, at least to some degree,
be based on historical truth, otherwise it is not an analogia imaginis, but simply
imagines; and that matters of faith transcend the jurisdiction ofhistorical truth even if
they arise out of it.239 Tillich is concerned that the universal significance of the Christ
not be diminished by the increasing criticism of historical research. Cameron's
conclusion is that the biblical picture and the assertion of the New Being do, to some
extent, depend on historical fact, and that Tillich's efforts to discount the latter fail.
Thirdly, it is in Tillich's abandonment of the particularity of Jesus in favour of the
universality ofChrist that Kenneth Hamilton feels Tillich's system departs most
clearly from the Gospel. The analogia imaginis is not strong enough to count as an
assertion of truth, but is a weak tool used to distinguish between universal and
particular. Hamilton argues that the "biblical picture", as distinct from historical fact,
is a plain insertion within Tillich's system. "The 'picture' of one human life is not
itself a life or a reproduction of a life but simply analogous to a life, and it serves as
an occasion, not a cause, of the manifestation of the power of the New Being."240
Furthermore, Hamilton argues that this picture is more like a myth than anything else,
where myths represent the truth "under the guise of events".
Finally, Tillich's ontological New Being does not, on its own, require the scriptural
Jesus Christ. Thus, the concept of the New Being cannot replace the theological
affirmation of the historical and personal Christ. Michael Palmer argues that, while
the attempt fails, Tillich's intention is to fit the Gospel message within his apologetic
and existential method, and that the analogia imaginis is the result of faith requiring
~39 Bruce J.R. Cameron, The Historical Problem in Paul Tillich's Christology," Scottish Journal of
Theology 18 (1965) pp. 260, 261, 270.
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more than theoretical possibility. The nuance which Palmer adds is that Tillich's
"theontological language" does not prove the historical fact of Jesus, but that it does,
...demonstrate that the appearance of the New Being, in an historical and
personal form subject to the conditions of existence, is the only form in which
the answer to the question of existence could be given, should that answer be
possible.241
For Palmer, however, Tillich's biblical picture is ultimately too formless, and the
ontological category of the New Being lacks the "specificness concerning the so-
called 'bearer ofNew Being.'"
Though he does not avoid serious criticism, Tillich's argument is that the Christ of
faith is ontologically linked to human existence, not merely heternomously imposed
upon humanity. The problem with existence, for Tillich, is that the human faculty of
reason struggles for autonomy from external imposition. This results in increasing
distance of the essential, human self from God, from other human beings, and from its
true nature. The effort of the Systematic Theology, however, is to demonstrate the
underlying connection between the human condition and the divine life.
In sum, the movement from kairos to New Being demonstrates Tillich's concern that
the Christ event not be circumscribed by historical findings, and that the content of
revelation itself not be determined by the structure of the existence which seeks it.
FTowever, he makes too many compromises in order to preserve his apologetic
approach. A theological method may need to account for the advance of historical
research, but Tillich's concept gives too much of the uniqueness of Christ away, even
in its attempt to preserve Christian uniqueness.
Nonetheless, the whole of the system must be borne in mind. The New Being is a
statement of divine essence "under the conditions of existence" and is the
fundamental revelatory expression of essence, perfectly balanced being and non-
being, to humanity. Yet, while it reveals them, the New Being is neither the terminus
of existential ambiguity nor the telos of human life. The New Being is not the end of
241 Michael Palmer, "Correlation and Ontology: A Study in Tillich's Christology," Downside Review
96 (1978) pp. 122-123
141
God's revelation; the salvation accomplished in the Christ event changes the meaning
of human history, but is not the end of it. Humanity is guided toward its telos,
expressed in the Kingdom of God and Eternal Life, by the Spiritual Presence. In fact,
Tillich relies more on the doctrine of Spirit than on the doctrine of Christ to describe
the relationship between the divine life and human life. In the next section I argue that
this not only signifies the truly Trinitarian nature ofTillich's theology, but also that
the dialectic of essentialization, not polarity, guides the system as a whole.
Section III. Spiritual Presence
A. Spiritual Presence and Spiritual Community
The discussion of the divine Spirit is where the Systematic Theology demonstrates the
centrality of essentialization to its doctrinal interpretation. In the third and final
volume, Tillich describes Spirit as the "power ofbeing-itself' and as the power of the
New Being. (STIII, 125) As divine essence, Spirit completes the Trinitarian
description ofGod. As revealed Spiritual Presence, Spirit is the power that guides
human life and history in essentialization.
Like all statements about God, says Tillich, "Spirit" is symbolic. The capitalization of
the term distinguishes it as divine presence, as something different than the spiritual
life of humanity in culture, morality and religion. (ST III, 111) The difference between
the two is not meant to introduce a dualism between human and divine Spirit. Rather,
for Tillich, metaphors that describe the relations of finite realms cannot apply to
relationship between finite and infinite realms. (STIII, 111 ff.) The problem, however,
remains that human understanding is bound by finite language and symbols. Thus,
Tillich prefers the terminology of "dimension," by which divine Spirit and human
spirit are thought of as mutually indwelling.
The phenomenology of the Spiritual Presence is drawn from the historical experiences
of inspiration (ST III, 116), ofWord and sacrament (ST III, 120-124), and of faith and
love. (ST III, 129ff.) For Tillich, faith is "the state ofbeing grasped by the
transcendent unity ofunambiguous life", i.e. the Spirit. In this case, as in the case of
all revelatory experience, "being grasped' by the Spirit implies two assertions: the
inability to verify this experience against some experimental criteria, and the
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experience as fulfilling reason not replacing or destroying it. Tillich does not want the
experience of the Spirit to rely on appeals to emotion only, or to the rational only. The
Spiritual Presence is experienced as reception and participation, that is, love.
The doctrine of the divine Spirit is consistent with Tillich's other definitions, of
revelation and of the other persons of the Trinity. Like revelation, the divine Spirit
"grasps" the human spirit; it cannot be compelled to indwell in the human situation by
human spirit, as human spirit remains ambiguous, conflicted, and disrupted, while
divine Spirit is not. (STIII, 114) Like the Christ, or the New Being, the transcendence
of the Spirit is expressed through its self-negation: "the language which is bearer of
the Spirit is universal because it transcends the particular encounter which it expresses
in the direction of that which is universal, the Logos." (ST III, 254)
The divine Spirit does not, therefore, "invade individuals", but groups. (STIII, 139)
The Christ is the presence of the divine Spirit without distortion; "the Spirit who
prepared Christ in Jesus is the same Spirit who prepares mankind for its encounter
with New Being in him." (STIII, 147-148) The Spiritual Community fostered by the
Spiritual Presence is the community made "new" in its "existential experience" of the
Christ. However, the Spiritual Community is not the Christian Church, neither is it
found in any one Christian denomination, nor in the collection of all denominations.
The Spiritual Community is the power and structure inherent in Christianity, the
"inner telos" of the religion. (ST III, 1651
The distinction between the Church, or churches, and the Spiritual Community is
meant to keep the ambiguous or conflicted life of the Church separate from the
unambiguous presence of the Spirit in the Church. The life of the Church is its
struggle against the ambiguities of existence, but it does so in the power of the Spirit.
Under the Spirit the individual experiences the New being as creation and
regeneration, as positive paradox and justification, and as process and sanctification.
(ST III, 217ff.) In all of its experiences, the Church attempts to actualize its essence,
which is the Spiritual Presence, but it is simultaneously judged by that essence. Like
the individual, the Church is prey to the self-elevating ambiguities of life. Tillich's
"Protestant principle" expresses the priority of the Spiritual Presence over religion, its
conquering of religion and its victory over the profanization and demonization of the
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Church. (STIII, 244) This implies that the power of "truth and love", are not the
province of the Church, but of the Spiritual Presence.
This description of the Spirit, or Spiritual Presence, supports the argument concerning
the significance of symbolic statements for Tillich. Tillich's intention in restating the
doctrine of the Spirit in conceptual terms is not to empty it of specificity or to remove
it from particularity; the Spirit is intimately involved in human life and history. The
purpose ofTillich's conceptual description of the Spirit, and ofGod and Christ, is to
ensure their independence beyond the sum of historical experiences of them and to
avoid an identification of infinite and finite.242 History and life, especially in the
Church, are ambiguous for Tillich; they are subject to distortion, hubris, self-
elevation, collectively called sin. Tillich's apologetic task is to differentiate human
ambiguity from divine unity, in order to make that divine unity the judge and
salvation of human estrangement. (ST II, 167)
B. Spirit-Christology
There is very little written about Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit, or Spiritual Presence,
owing mostly to the fact that Tillich's focus on the doctrine seems to be restricted to
the last few years ofhis life. However, some suggest that in terms of the Systematic
Theology, the concept of Spirit is the most central.243 In the third volume of the
system, Tillich identifies the divine Spirit as God (STIII, 140) and as the one who
constitutes Jesus as the Christ and the power ofNew Being (ST III, 144, c.f 274). The
weight given to the doctrine of the Spirit in the third volume of the system has led one
theologian to argue that Tillich's Christology is a "Spirit-Christology" more than it is
a "Logos-Christology", something that could not be argued from the first two volumes
of the system.244
The significance of this point cannot be underestimated. Most Tillich scholarship
focuses on the first volume of the Systematic Theology, the problematic results of
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which we have seen in the misinterpretation of it underlying structure in terms of a
Schellingian polar concept of God. The bulk of the Systematic Theology, however, is
focused on existence in terms of the Spirit and, therefore, human participation in the
process of essentialization. Placing the Spirit at the centre ofTillich's system yields
an entirely different perspective than if the doctrine ofGod as being-itself, or Christ as
New Being, are taken as central. The divine Spirit, not being-itself or the New Being,
becomes Tillich's central definition of divinity.
The basic ontology presented in the first volume ofTillich's system is that being and
non-being are constitutive of essence and existence. This remains the case in the
second and third volumes, but there is also a shift in focus in these volumes.
According to the third volume, "Christ is the presence of the divine Spirit without
distortion." (ST III, 144) The focus moves from Christ as the point of embodiment or
contact between undisrupted and disrupted essence, to the Spirit as that power which
is embodied in Christ: the power of being-itself. Some have argued that the power of
being-itself is only one ontological element in God, for Tillich, and that his notion of
Trinity is not clear, as a result.245 However, as that which is identified not only with
the power ofbeing and non-being, but also with the power ofNew Being and of the
Spiritual Presence, the power ofbeing is the concept that binds the triune God as a
unity, for Tillich.
Seen in light of the dialectic of essentialization, the Systematic Theology equates the
"power ofbeing" with the "power ofdivine essence". The identification of each
member of the Trinity with the power of being-itself, or the "power ofbeing",
provides the consistency among the creating activity of God as essence, of the
relational activity ofGod under the conditions of existence, and of the salvific activity
ofGod in the process of essentialization. Coupled with the third volume's emphasis
on the activity of the Spiritual Presence as the power of divine essence re-established
and operative within existence, Tillich's system is clearly focused on the power of
being in the salvific task of the Spirit. The process of essentialization is still utterly
dependent on the event of the Christ who as New Being unites essence and existence
and, as the Kairos, redeems all history, past and present. But in Tillich's existential
245 Lewis S. Ford, "The Appropriation ofDynamics and Form for Tillich's God," Harvard
Theological Review 68 (Jan 1975) p. 47
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system, it is the divine Spirit, experienced by humanity as the Spiritual Presence, that
constitutes the power of the Christ event, that guides all human activity and change
according to the telos of God's Kingdom, and that facilitates the movement toward
Eternal Life. That is, the divine Spirit is the power of essentialization.
The life of the triune God is thus described according to the same concepts that
describe human life. Both human life and divine life are, according to Tillich,
essential, then existent, then essentialized, or reunified. The description of the divine
Spirit as the power ofbeing is what makes the continuing events of human life and
salvation part of the history and life of God. The human experience of essentialization
is triadic because the divine life is triune, because humanity experiences its history
and telos according to the pattern of God's revelation.
The lack of scholarship on the relationship of the Trinity and the concept of
essentialization in Tillich has led to at least one drastic misreading ofhis doctrine of
God. Leonard Wheat argues that "Tillich's God, of course, is... humanity, all
humanity. Tillichian history therefore becomes the story of the self-realization of
humanity as God."246 Wheat's argument rests on Tillich's analogy between the divine
life and the human soul, their shared dialectical pattern of "going out" and "return,"
and the concept of essentialization as the eventual unity of human spirit and divine
Spirit. He concludes not only that history is, for Tillich, directed toward human self-
realization as God, but that Tillich is under "no illusion" that this goal, the "Kingdom
ofGod," will ever materialize.
In addition to a gross misreading of the teleology of the Kingdom in Tillich,247 Wheat
erroneously assumes that analogy is identity, making the dialectical structure shared
by the divine life and human existence identical in every other respect. Yet nothing
could be further from the intention ofTillich's system. If nothing else, the entire
discussion of Spiritual Presence and the Spiritual Community achieves one thing: to
distinguish between divine Spirit and human spirit. The Spiritual Community is not
246 Leonard F. Wheat, Paul Tillich's Dialectical Humanism, p. 79
247 On this point. Wheat is entirely alone in Tillich scholarship. Alexander McKelway is unreservedly
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identified with any one church or group of churches. Tillich's concept of the Spiritual
Community ensures that even though revelation occurs by finite means, allowing
humanity to understand that revelation is for humanity, the truth it expresses is not
finitely circumscribed.
The case of the Spiritual Presence underscores the crucial fact that, for Tillich,
revelation occurs both in a way that is observable to human cognition and in a way
that transforms and transcends cognition. That reason is "grasped", and that the
Spiritual Presence infuses and transforms human existence through participation in
essence, does not suggest that "God is humanity", but that humanity is revealed to and
reconciled by a God simultaneously capable of transcendence and immanence. For
Tillich, the critique of the Spiritual Presence is directed at the manifest and manifold
churches, while the critique of the Protestant principle is directed at theology in
general. Both concepts ensure that the hubris and self-elevation characteristic of
human existence does not override the eternal meaning of its symbols. Always, for
Tillich, the human condition is the evidence both of the need for revelation and of
humanity's essential connection with and participation in the divine life.
Section IV. The Trinity
Tillich's most direct discussion of the Trinity occurs in the third volume of the
Systematic Theology. As with other sections of the system, his concern in this
discussion is to address particular problems in theology by reconsidering doctrine. In
the case of the Trinity, Tillich focuses on the historical difficulties arising from the
confession of the two natures ofChrist, and the need to "re-open" the discussion of
the significance of the Trinity. In the course of this brief discussion, however, Tillich
definitively distinguishes between the paradox of grace and the dialectical nature of
the Godhead. This distinction points to the Trinity as the primary symbol of
dialectical theology.
A. A Question ofDoctrine
The main problem in Trinitarian dogma, according to Tillich, is not unique to
Christianity: ".. .it is impossible to develop a doctrine of the living God and of the
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creation without distinguishing the 'ground' and the 'form' of God, the principle of
the abyss and the principle of the self-manifestation in God." (ST III, 288) The first
difficulty, for Tillich, in Trinitarian thinking is the basic conceptual problem of
asserting both that God is transcendent and that God became manifest in human form.
On one hand, the Christological discussion begins when God's revelation is identified
with the manifestation of the divine ground ofbeing. Theological interpretation of the
Christ event attempts to describe the universal impact of the particular historical
event. (STIII, 287) On the other hand, the Trinitarian discussion begins with the
practical reverence for this historical event. That is, liturgical devotion to the Christ
raises a conceptual problem: "The decision ofNicaea acknowledged that the Logos-
Son, like the God-Father, is an expression of ultimate concern. But how can concern
be expressed in two divine figures...?" (STIII 289)
The second difficulty is that the subsequent post-Nicaean confession of the divinity of
the Spirit does not solve the basic conceptual problem. The resulting language of
personae and hypostasis, according to Tillich, only provides a way of referring to the
problem; it does not bring an end to the discussion. The final and compounding
difficulty is that the centuries-old confession of "one is three and three is one" was
"put on the altar, to be adored. The mystery ceased to be the eternal mystery of the
ground ofbeing; it became instead the riddle of an unsolved theological problem..."
(ST III, 291) Understood only as "three is one and one is three", the doctrine of the
Trinity is a distortion, "a trick or simply nonsense". Although it is not entirely clear
for what kind or era ofChristianity the Trinity is this kind of riddle (ST III, 291-292),
it is clear that Tillich feels that the doctrine of the Trinity has erroneously become an
apophatic or esoteric doctrine. The solution to the Trinitarian problem begins by
relating it to, and distinguishing it from, Christology.
Tillich's doctrine of the Trinity rests on two critical distinctions. The first is more
implicit in Tillich's characterization of the history and logical necessity of the
Christological confession for Trinitarian thinking: the Trinity is a concept used to
make sense of issues raised by Christology. (STIII, 285ff.) The second is more
explicit: the Trinity is fundamentally dialectical. For Tillich, the doctrine of the
Trinity can be recovered from problems, and made useful, if thought of as
Christologically rooted and dialectical.
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In the first volume of the Systematic Theology the Christological basis of the doctrine
of the Trinity is asserted as a dogmatic necessity. "Any discussion of the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity must begin with the Christological assertion that Jesus is the
Christ. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a corroboration of the Christological
dogma." (ST/, 250) In the third volume, in addition to being a dogmatic necessity, the
Christological basis of the Trinity is characterized more as logical necessity. (ST III,
286-291) In his account of the Ecumenical Councils, Tillich suggests that, although
the confession of the Trinity came before the distinction of the two natures and one
person of Christ, Trinitarian thinking is the conceptual result of the issue of distinction
and unity in God, which is primarily a Christological issue.
For Tillich, the Trinity is a helpful "metaphysical" concept, that is, a way of talking
about God as both diversity and unity.
... the Trinitarian doctrine is the work of theological thought which uses
philosophical concepts and follows the general rules of theological rationality.
There is no such thing as Trinitarian "speculation" (where "speculation"
means conceptual phantasies). The substance of all Trinitarian thought is given
in revelatory experiences, and the form has the same rationality that all
theology, as a work of the Logos, must have. (ST III, 286)
The doctrine provides a speculative description of the Godhead, a way of talking
about God and the human experience of God that does not presume to be exhaustive
ofGod. The Trinity, however, is further distinguished from the doctrine of the Christ
in that, while Tillich calls Christology "paradoxical", he calls the Trinity "dialectical."
(ST III, 284)
Previously, Tillich's distinction between paradox and dialectic referred to the
difference between God's gracious self-manifestation and human knowledge of it. (ST
I, 57, 64; cf. STII, 90-93, 106, 108, and "Dialectic", 127) Here, the distinction is
employed the same way. This is why Tillich argues that Trinitarian discussions
actually begin with the Christological doctrine. The answer to the first problem
implied in the doctrine of the Trinity, that God is transcendent and yet revealed, is the
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paradox of the Christ. The remaining problem in the doctrine of the Trinity is the
problem of the diversity of revelation.
On its own, the paradox of grace gives no account of the human experience of
revelation which, although not completely rational, is in some way available to
cognition and reason. Yet, without a concept of paradox the distinction of persons
within the Godhead becomes mere enumeration. Thus, the doctrine of the two natures
ofChrist is paradoxical. However, because of the importance of the Spiritual
Presence, as the means by which humanity is both judged and saved, and as the power
ofbeing-itself and New Being, the doctrine of the Trinity is properly dialectical; that
is, a symbol of the eternal and enduring process of divine self-manifestation, and of
the continued human experience of that revelation.
For Tillich, Trinitarian confession remains possible, "but it requires a radical revision
of the Trinitarian doctrine and a new understanding of the Divine Life and the
Spiritual Presence." (STIII, 292) True to his entire project, the effort to understand
God by means of the Trinity is rooted in the human experience of revelation. The
activity of the Christ is paradoxical, but the doctrine of Christ is the human expression
of that paradox. In the same way, although expressive of dialectic, the Trinity is a
symbol that helps humanity frame its experience of revelation and its continuing
participation in the life and history of salvation.
B. Problems ofLanguage and Symbol
The first area of criticism centers on Tillich's conceptual interpretation of the Trinity
and his characterization of it as symbolic. Robison James alleges that the attention
Tillich calls to the historical process of the early Church Councils, and to the necessity
of the Christological doctrine as logically prior to the Trinitarian doctrine, makes
Tillich's use of the Trinity merely pragmatic. However, James seems to be less
suspicious ofTillich specifically, and more of theology in general: "It follows that the
truth ofTrinitarian faith is its utility for us human beings - its meeting our deepmost
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need, and its fulfilling the purposive drive that so profoundly moves our lives."248 This
criticism could apply to all theology as interpretation resulting from psychological
need rather than ontological experience.
Some apply the critique of pragmatism to Tillich's concept of "symbolic" doctrines.
Dreisbach argues that, by its description as symbolic, Tillich's use of the Trinity is
superfluous. He equates Tillich's statement that everything that can be said about God
is symbolic (except that God is being-itself) with an inability to make any claims
about God being triune. He concludes that this makes it difficult for Tillich to develop
a doctrine of the Trinity and causes him to locate the unity of the Trinity in the unity
of being-itself.249 Dreisbach further speculates that the distinction within the Trinity is,
for Tillich, primarily a result of the different existential questions arising out of the
human predicament.
The suggestion is that Tillich's notion of symbol is overly laboured, and that it does
not accomplish more than any other concept of religious language might. Dreisbach
says that symbols supposedly "mediate the power of Being Itself and so are
revelatory, and Tillich says that revelation is salvation (STII, 166)."250 Yet for Tillich,
it is "events, persons and things," not words, that are the carriers of revelation. The
problem, according to Dreisbach, is in what way symbols, which are human words
and concepts used to refer to revelatory experience, can be any more meaningful or
any more the bearer ofmeaning than words can be? This question leads Dreisbach to
conclude that the concept of symbols could be very simply replaced with a notion of
religious language as metaphorical. For Tillich, however, symbols and metaphor do
not perform the same task.
Some clarification ofTillich's concept of symbol is required. In the first volume of
the Systematic Theology, Tillich suggests that,
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The statement that God is being-itself is a non-symbolic statement. It does not
point beyond itself. It means what it says directly and properly; ifwe speak of
the actuality of God, we first assert that he is not God if he is not being-itself.
... nothing else can be said about God which is not symbolic. (STI, 238-239)
He also suggests that the concept of symbols has two balancing effects: it attempts to
represent the power of its object, but in doing so diminishes that power by giving it
specificity. (STI, 240-241) To make symbolic statements about God, then, is to
describe the object of religion without emptying or exhausting its meaning. In the
second volume, however, Tillich says that, everything we say about God is symbolic,
but that,
Such a statement is an assertion about God which itself is not symbolic.
Otherwise we would fall into a circular argument. On the other hand, ifwe
make one non-symbolic assertion about God, his ecstatic-transcendent
character seems to be endangered. (STII, 9)
For Tillich, "God is being-itself' is the logical, non-symbolic reality that grounds the
possibility that other things are, and that in their existence they refer to God. Yet even
this statement itself is symbolic, insofar as its logical necessity does not confine God
to an ontological necessity. The assertion ofGod as being-itself is not the result of
Tillich's failure or unwillingness to say anything specific, or "non-symbolic" about
God, as Dreisbach's first critique suggests. By Tillich's account no theologian can say
anything literal about God, because to do so is to delimit God by human incapacity.
The language of symbol is not a less fulsome or less faithful alternative to "a
metaphysical account of the inner life of a divine being."251 All words and concepts
that refer to God, and thereby the Trinity, are ultimately symbolic because none of
them can exhaustively describe their referents. It is not what theology refers to that is
bound by the symbol, but theology itself which is bound by the finite human capacity
to describe. (STIII, 113) A symbol participates in a deeper meaning, which it
represents, by conveying metaphorically that which is otherwise inexpressible. (STII,
19) Theologians must employ symbols because, "on the one hand theology has a
"5I John J. Thatamanil, "Beyond Number: On the Relational Possibilities ofTillich's Symbolic and
Speculative Trinitarianism," Trinity and/or Quaternity: Tillich's Reopening ofthe Trinitarian Problem,
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meditative task, to experience the power of the symbols; on the other a discursive
function to analyze and describe the form in which the substance can be grasped."252
Here we encounter an initial response to Dreisbach's second critique that the notion of
symbols in Tillich is unnecessarily burdened, and a notion of religious language as
simply metaphorical would do. Although symbols, for Tillich, are always constrained
and finite, they are never "merely", because that to which they refer is unconstrained
and infinite.253 "A symbol participates in the reality it symbolizes", but most
importantly, "the Christian participates in the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus the
Christ." (ST I, 177) The vagueness of what Tillich means by "participation" is still a
topic of debate.254 However, it is clear that he still intends some difference between
metaphorical language and symbol.
It could be that for Tillich "metaphor" captures a helpful sense of description, but not
participation. It could also be that Tillich's emphasis on "symbol" has more to do with
his distinction between symbols and signs. The sign merely points to meaning, while
the symbol is an embodiment ofmeaning. Dreisbach uses the example that "the
American flag" is a sign, but the "United States ofAmerica" is a symbol. One cannot
participate in the flag; one can participate in the United States ofAmerica. In this
simple typology, a concept ofmetaphor can be used to describe both signs and
symbols, but it cannot do the work of providing the distinction that Tillich intends
between description and participation.
A final possible interpretation ofTillich's insistence on the concept of symbols,
instead ofmetaphor, comes from the difference in the location of the essential power
of human words and the Divine Word. In the third volume of the Systematic Theology
Tillich describes life in terms of three processes. In self-integration, the center of the
subject's awareness, critique and alteration is itself. (STIII, 30 ff.) In self-creation,
new centers are created, and the individual is understood as a social being. (STIII, 50
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ff.) In self-transcendence, the individual and the community are understood in relation
to the inexhaustible source ofmeaning: God. (ST III, 86ff.)
Tillich describes language as the medium of self-creation, which is the second
function of life under the dimension of the Spirit. (ST III, 30) The symbol, however, is
the medium of self-transcendence, mediating between the divine and the human. This
suggests that the symbol, as participation in the revelation of Being, is the bearer of
something more than is language. James Reimer points out that "particular languages
always both reveal and conceal,"255 but that according to Tillich, "Where there is
spirit, there estrangement in terms of language is overcome - as in the story of
Pentecost." (STIII, 255) Reimer's conclusion is that, "Distortion and estrangement
are overcome... when the human word becomes the Divine Word." The Spirit's
presence is mediated by ordinary words (STI, 123; STIII, 127), but the Spirit is not
bound by particular words. This implies that all literature, not only the Bible, can
communicate the Word ofGod (STII, 125).256
The difference between symbol and language is reminiscent ofTillich's emphasis on
the difference between the Spiritual Community and the Church. Like the worldly
Church, human language does not itself posses the power of self-critique and
transformation. Like the Spiritual Community that critiques the Church, however, the
symbol does include a transcendent critique of language. The implication is not that
human language cannot be self-critical and adaptable. The implication is that the
capacity for critique and adaptation ultimately lies not within language itself, or
within reason, but with the power of Being. The concerns here for Tillich, as in the
whole of the Systematic Theology, are divine freedom and the sin of human self-
elevation.
The second and most serious criticism ofTillich's concept of the Trinity arises from
its apparently "dialectical" nature. In particular, Thatcher has two major criticisms of
Tillich's doctrine. The first is that Tillich's dialectical Trinity is incompatible with a
remote "God above God" and that Tillich's concept of the Trinity is therefore
255 A. James Reimer, "Metaphysics and Communication," Being versus Word in Paul Tillich's
Theology, 1998 Proceedings of the VII International Paul-Tillich-Symposium (Berlin: Walter
deGruyter, 1999), p. 204
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incompatible with "the orthodox conception of it." The non-contextual error of
Thatcher's understanding of the "God above the God of theism" has been
demonstrated. However, Thatcher's second criticism concerns the difficulty of
sustaining a concept of God as "living" with a dialectical interpretation of the Trinity.
According to Thatcher, Tillich has confused the triadic structure of dialectical
thinking with the triadic structure ofTrinitarian thinking. Furthermore, the confusion
is a result, according to Thatcher, partly of Schelling's description of life processes,
and partly Hegel's dialectic.
Tillich describes the divine life as dialectical: absolute being-itself, eternal separation
from, or, going beyond itself, and return to itself, which serves as the blueprint for all
life. (STI, 63; c.f STII, 105) In his volume on Tillich's ontology, however, Thatcher
takes dialectic in Tillich to refer only to being and non-being, a dialectical pair which,
he says, depicts a "tension within God or being-itself." That is, Thatcher interprets
Tillich's ontological distinctions ofbeing, non-being and being-itself to be in some
way analogous to God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.257 He argues that the problem
with calling the divine life dialectical is that it implies that one person of the Trinity
must represent non-being.
Because the publication of and commentary on nineteenth century German idealists
constitute a recent phenomenon of English-speaking scholarship, and because he
stands alone in Tillich scholarship on tackling the Hegelian nature ofTillich's concept
of the Trinity, Thatcher should not be indicted severely. With this in mind, there are
two ways to answer his criticism: one from outside the argument of this thesis, and
one from within it. Firstly, Pan-Chui Lai has argued that Thatcher's reticence to allow
negation within the Trinity is not entirely fair to Tillich, and depends on a narrow
definition of "negation":
It is possible to say that in his obedience to the Father unto death, the Son was
negating himselfor his historical particularity. Furthermore, it is possible to
say that when the Spirit veils itself in order to manifest the Son and the Father,
the Spirit is negating itself. Furthermore, it is possible to say what is negated is
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not one of the persons of the Trinity, but the element of finitude which is
closely related to non-being in the second person of the Trinity.258
Lai is making three points here. First, applying the concept of negation to a person of
the immanent Trinity is defensible ifby it one does not mean destruction, but self-
sacrifice or self-giving. Second, each member of the Trinity can be described as
negating itself in terms of a sacrifice ofhistorical particularity in favour of universal
divine self-manifestation; which is, for example, consistent with Tillich's concept of
the sacrifice of Jesus to reveal the Christ. Third, it is not necessary to assume that
negation of any sort need be applied to a person of the Trinity. Tillich's eschatology
suggests that the process of essentialization culminates in Eternal Life, where the
confusion ofbeing and non-being in existence is resolved, where history and the
divine life are brought into unity, and what is good about existence is taken up into
union with God and what is negative is itself negated. (ST III, 400) Thus, negation in
the Trinity can refer to what, in the end, is "left-out" in Eternal Life.
Secondly, as this thesis shows, Thatcher and many others become entangled in
Tillich's equivocal uses of dialectic. As we have demonstrated, being and non-being
as constitutive ofboth essence and existence form just one of two kinds of dialectic
operating in Tillich's system. The polarity ofbeing and non-being is experienced as
tension or conflict only by humanity, not by God. As being-itself, God is the perfect
unity of the power ofbeing and non-being, and as such maintains the priority of being
over non-being. There is no tension in God, only in humanity.
The divine life as dialectical refers to the triadic formula of essence, existence and
essentialization. Divine essence is the perfect unity of being and non-being, which
"goes beyond" itself into existence, the mixture ofbeing and non-being, and the return
to itself in the process of essentialization. It is, therefore, the dialectic of
essentialization which is properly triadic, and which can be seen as analogous to the
Trinity, not the dialectic ofpolarity, as Thatcher assumes.
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Finally, the real problem for Thatcher is the extent to which Tillich's triadic structure
appears to resemble Hegel's concept of dialectic. Thatcher asserts that Tillich is trying
to force the concept of existence into a Hegelian "mould".259 Taking Tillich's triad as
being, non-being and being-itself, which we have already shown is incorrect, Thatcher
argues that Tillich's moment of non-being in God is like the second and passing step
in Hegel's ascending model of dialectic as aufhebung. The problem as Thatcher sees
it is that in Hegel, the negative moment is merely the opposite of the positive
proposition, and is therefore either an empty logical counterpart, or an insufficient
moment; the negative moment has little or no actual status of its own. Thatcher is
correct in assuming that it would be a considerable problem if such a moment were
imputed into the divine life, and identified with one person of the Trinity. Yet it is
clear that Tillich is not trying to place a moment of negation, or non-being, in the
divine life, but is drawing an analogy between God's self-manifestation in the Christ
and the manifestation of divine essence under the conditions of existence.
For Tillich, the dialectic of essentialization describes the pattern of human life and
history because it describes the divine life as manifest in revelation. God the Father is
the divine essence in which there is a perfect unity of being and non-being. God the
Son is the divine essence under the conditions of existence. God reveals himself
within existence in order to experience and overcome the tension of being and non-
being. And God the Spirit helps humanity to achieve that essentialization which God
the Son ushered in; through life in the Spirit, humanity participates in the resolution of
human essence and existence in God. Inasmuch as the process of essentialization is
concordant with the Christian account ofGod's unity, Incarnation and Spiritual
Presence, Tillich's dialectical system is expressed by the symbol of the Trinity.
In conclusion, the aim of this chapter is to show how the dialectical structure of the
Systematic Theology is expressed in Tillich's theology of the Trinity. Each of his
discussions of God attempts to conceptualize doctrine in order to address perceived
problems in theology. It is clear that in his reconsideration of doctrine Tillich's system
conceives of the persons of the triune God, and the Trinity itself, in tenns that attempt
to make the activity ofGod essential and meaningful in all human history without
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making God contingent upon history and existence. Whether Tillich is successful in
each case is debatable.
However, that Tillich's description of the triune God is based on the pattern of
essentialization is not debatable. In the Systematic Theology, each person of the
Trinity is described in terms of the dialectic of essentialization: God as "being-itself
the balance ofbeing and non-being, constitutes the essential connection between
divine essence and human existence; Christ as the New Being provides the human
experience of the revelation ofdivine essence in existence; and the Spiritual Presence
within guides the Spiritual Community to the reunion of divine essence with human
existence, i.e. essentialization.
There is a larger question concerning the use of the Trinity as a central interpretive
image: whether it is the right tool for the task. In the Systematic Theology, Tillich's
main concern is to address current theological issues and meet them with an
existential interpretation of doctrine. For example, Tillich's interpretation of
Christology in tenns of the concept of "the power ofbeing-itself', and thus as "New
Being", is, in part, an attempt to address the conflicts raised by the historical Jesus
project. Whether the Trinity, reinterpreted in tenns ofbeing, is the appropriate tool for
this task, is a legitimate question - one that can be applied to all ofTillich's doctrinal
reinterpretations.
The same question of appropriateness can be directed toward Hegel's use of the
Trinity as the religious representation that connects immanent experience and
transcendent concept, and Schelling's use of the Trinity as an analogue to the
primordial stages ofGod's self-identification. Although these uses of the Trinity are
the subject of the next chapter, the question of appropriateness is well beyond the
scope of the present inquiry. This thesis seeks only to establish the relative
resemblance ofTillich's concept of the Trinity to the concepts employed by Hegel
and Schelling.
Though different from it, Tillich's description of life processes has a clear relationship
to Schelling's philosophy ofGod as the ground and origin of productivity and
identity. However, the triadic structure of the process of essentialization, though it is a
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term borrowed from Schelling (STIII, 400), has a clear relationship to Hegel's
dialectical structure. What remains is to demonstrate how these very different
philosophies have been adapted by Tillich in order to describe a dialectical and
Trinitarian God as "living," and human participation in God as "essentialization". We
have seen that Hegel's notion of dialectic is more present in Tillich's system than
Schelling's, and that the resulting concept of essentialization in the Systematic
Theology also guides Tillich's theology of the Trinity and concept of God. In the final
chapter of this thesis, I consider Hegel and Schelling's presentations of the Trinity as
final evidence of and confirmation that, in the Systematic Theology, it is Hegel's
notion of the Trinity which is more in evidence.
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Chapter Four: Trinity in Hegel and Schelling
Introduction
For Tillich, the doctrine of the Trinity is a symbol that expresses the relationship
between finite human participation in revelation and God's eternal and unlimited
redeeming activity. Frederick Beiser suggests that the concept of the absolute serves a
similar function for much ofGerman Idealism.260 In the previous chapter I established
that Tillich's Hegelian-indebted dialectic of essentialization has a significant effect
not only on the structure of the Systematic Theology, but also on Tillich's
interpretation ofTrinitarian theology. In this chapter, I extend the argument one step
further and argue that Hegel's concept of the Trinity, not Schelling's, is also more in
evidence in Tillich's concept of the Trinity. To do so, I outline the description and
function of the Trinity in both Hegel and Schelling.
The section on Hegel here focuses on his description of the Trinity in the Lectures on
the Philosophy ofReligion, with reference throughout to discussions of the problems
which result from Hegel's use of the concept. Specifically, I focus on the distinction
of the immanent and economic trinities, and the concept of Love meant to bind them
together. As with Hegel's concept of dialectic, there are many different interpretations
of Hegel's use of symbol and doctrine. Therefore, I am concerned primarily with the
function of the Trinity in the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion rather than with
current debates in Hegel scholarship regarding the place of religion, in general, in his
work.
For Hegel, the Trinity, although a mystery, is a conceptual necessity, because it
describes the relationship between divine and human agency.26' Problems in Hegel's
use of the symbol, however, arise from his distinction between religious and
philosophical cognition. Hegel employs the concept of the Trinity not to engage with
the debates of his theological contemporaries, but to provide an image for his
conceptual philosophy. The Trinity is a religious "representation", for Hegel, which
describes the history of human thought about God, but which does not transcend
260 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism, p. 4
261 See Erik Schmidt, "Hegel und die kirchliche Trinitatslehre," Neue Zeitschriftfur Systematische
Theologie undReligionsphilosophie 24/3 (1982) pp. 242-43
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historical subjectivity. The most significant problem arising out from Hegel's use of
the Trinity in this way is his account of the place of religion within a philosophical
framework. Even the concept of Love cannot rescue Hegel from reducing the
significance of the Trinity to mere representation while co-opting it for his
philosophical framework.
In the section on Schelling I focus on the work of his later writings. Special attention
is given to The Ages ofthe World, which contains Schelling's most systematic
account of the doctrine of God. However, I also refer to one ofhis last set of lectures,
on the Philosophy ofReligion, in which Schelling links the polar concept ofGod from
the Freiheitsphilosophie with a Trinitarian concept. This period in Schelling's
philosophy most clearly focuses on mythology and religion, especially on
Christianity. However, the extent to which this "New Mythology" remains systematic,
and thereby related to his philosophies of nature, identity and freedom, is still debated.
Moreover, it is less clear what task the Trinity performs, for Schelling, than for Hegel.
Schelling's later description, like Hegel's, renders the Trinity as human thought about
God and as the culmination of a long history of religious and mythological ideas.
However, the triadic doctrine of the potencies, initially in The Ages of the World and
also in the lectures on the Philosophy ofRevelation, does not overcome the essential
polarity ofGod's nature and freedom. The potencies articulate the nature ofGod, for
Schelling, and are analogous to the three persons of Christian doctrine. Yet, the nature
of God serves as the basis against which the seemingly independent freedom of God is
asserted. In this way, Schelling's appeal to the Trinity is even further from the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity than Hegel's.
Section I. The Trinity in Hegel
Within current scholarship there is a clear division between those who focus on the
topics of religion or Christianity in Hegel and those who do not. For some, the issue
ofChristianity and religion in Hegel's writings is not significant.262 Within this
262 Current Hegel scholarship reflects a relative disinterest in the theological aspect of his thought, and
goes as far as ignoring the religious language employed throughout his work. For example Andrew
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tradition studies are devoted, instead, to Hegel's influence on concepts of freedom,
history, and the state. Where the concern for topics such as God, the Trinity and
Christianity does appear, the primary focus is Hegel's orthodoxy or heterodoxy in
relation to historical Christian theology.263 Often such studies read Hegel not only as a
contributor to Christian theology, but also as a contributor to contemporary
theological debates.264
While the contributions ofboth traditions will be consulted here, the aim of this
section is not to rehabilitate Hegel's concept of the Trinity in order to determine its
orthodoxy relative to some external theological account. Rather, the intention is to
establish the way the Trinity functions in Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion, in order both to draw a distinction between Hegel's use and Schelling's of
the concept of the Trinity, and to forge a link between Hegel's use of the concept and
the way it functions in Tillich's Systematic Theology.
A. The Trinity in the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion
According to Hodgson, the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion effectively
reconciles the phenomenological approach of Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit and
the "speculative" approach of the Science ofLogic.265 Hegel's work on logic was
concerned with the expression of the highest concept - the absolute idea - as life, the
unifying concept of cognition and nature, of universality and particularity.266 "Life"
had received earlier expression as an historical struggle, lived out by the individual
and the community, in the Phenomenology ofSpirit. In both the Phenomenology of
Spirit and the Science ofLogic, the identity of object and subject occurs within a
struggle for increasingly closer identifications of them in self-consciousness.
Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy, Houlgate, Hegel's Logic, Pinkard, Hegel's
Phenomenology, and Pippin, Hegel's Idealism.
263 The most notable exception to this is Peter C. Hodgson, editor of the Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion, and frequent commentator on the topic of religion in Hegel. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian
Theology: A Reading ofthe Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, and Hodgson, "Hegel's Approach
to Religion: The Dialectic of Speculation and Phenomenology," Journal ofReligion 65/2 (Apr 1984)
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In the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, religion is described as an integral part
of this historical struggle. Through its representations - stories, signs, and symbols -
religion mediates to thinking subjects concepts that, until religion, are merely posited.
"Representation" refers to an integral stage in overcoming the dichotomy of finite and
infinite, reason and faith, or immanence and transcendence. For Hegel, religion is the
sphere in which transcendence becomes immanent. The Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion links the concept of "immanent transcendence" historically to Christ and
conceptually to the symbol of the Trinity, which Hegel sees as a description of the
unfolding of human consciousness in religious terminology.267 Hegel calls Christianity
the "Consummate Religion" because it alone has the symbols that express religion
that has become objective to itself, or self-conscious. My tasks in this section are to
outline how Hegel clarifies the relation of "the absolute" and "God" by means of his
concept of the Trinity, and to clarify this relation by considering some of the
associated contemporary commentary and debate.
In the first section of the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, Hegel makes two
points about his intention. Firstly, the object of the philosophy of religion is not
actually God, but religion itself.
Our concern here is therefore not with God as such or as object, but with God
as he is [present] in his community. It will be evident that God can only be
genuinely understood in the mode of his being as spirit, by means ofwhich he
makes himself into the counterpart of a community and brings about the
activity of a community in relation to him.268
Religion is the mode of understanding that sees God as active in the world, as spirit.
Therefore, the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion aims to articulate the link
between religious thinking and philosophical thinking.
267 In referring to these two concepts as they appear in the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion,
commentators use the terms "immanent" and "economic," e.g. Hodgson, Hegel and Christian
Theology, pp. 129-130, or "intrinsic" and "extrinsic", e.g. Calton, Hegel's Metaphysics ofGod, pp. 73-
78, 82-89. Here I use the terms "immanent" and "economic," in order to maintain consistency between
the concept of "immanent transcendence" in the volumes on logic and the description of the
"immanent" Trinity that follows the same dialectical pattern in the Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion. This pair of terms is also preferable to "transcendent" and "immediate," which have specific
meanings for Hegel not associated with theology but with self-consciousness.
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That there are different kinds of thinking in need ofbeing joined together displays
Hegel's assumption that religion and philosophy are separated. Before the Aufklarung
there is no clear distinction between philosophy and theology, either in terms of the
object of inquiry, which is God, or the purpose of inquiry, which is knowledge of
God. The problem that Hegel sets for himself is a distinctly post-Enlightenment
problem, and already distinguishes his task of relating philosophy and religion from
most of Christian theology, which presupposes it.
Secondly, Hegel says that philosophy and religion have the same object, God, but
that, "In philosophy the supreme being is called the absolute or the idea... but what
we call the absolute and the idea is still not... synonymous with what we call God."269
He clarifies the difference between the absolute and God in the lecture manuscripts,
where he says that God is manifest for both religion and philosophy, in the finite
world, in the form of "being as spirit." The religious understanding of God is tied to
finite things: the created world, a man named Jesus, an ever-present Spirit. Religion,
therefore, makes God contingent upon finite things, for Hegel. Philosophy, however,
seeks a conceptual understanding of God.270 The philosophy of religion recognizes this
difference and seeks the reconciliation of experience and concept by describing them
as two different ways of thinking about the same thing. The mechanism of this
demonstration is the concept of the Trinity, which relates the immanent to the
economic.271
In the second volume of lectures, Hegel fits the history ofworld religions into a
general scheme resembling the development of self-consciousness in the
Phenomenology ofSpirit. Religion dialectically develops an increasing awareness,
through various stages of identity and difference, of the relationship of object and
subject, ofGod and human experience. Until Christianity, however, the focus of
religion is one-sidedly either too objective or too subjective; either God is abstracted
to the point where human activity is merely subjugated to externalized ethical norms,
or God is too closely identified with individual human experience. In the
Phenomenology ofSpirit, Spirit is said to contain the two abstracted sides of
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objectivity and experience.272 In the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, this
identity does not occur in religion, except in Christianity.
In the third and final volume of lectures, Hegel describes Christianity as the
"consummate''', or "revealed", religion because it is concerned with the unity of
subject and object, of the presence of the object within the subject. Christianity does
not consider God to be completely external and transcendent, nor does it consider the
experience of the object to be completely subjective. "The devout submerge
themselves in their object with their heart, devotion and will; thus at the pinnacle of
devotion they have sublated the separation."273 Not just consciousness ofGod as
posited, but consciousness of God as absolute, that is as God for the conscious
subject, allows the Christian to sublate the separation between divinity and humanity.
God does not simply create the world but reveals himself as creator. For Hegel, God is
"the eternal creator, the eternal act of self-revelation".
Hegel proves unconcerned to interpret doctrine for the Gennan Church of the
nineteenth century. Though the precise meaning of "representation" is debated,
Hegel's concern is that the "representational", i.e. the concretely or symbolically
dependent, language of religion be raised to the level of concept - that experience be
raised to the level of thought.274 While religion is immersed in its picture-language of
human experience and history, philosophy is capable of observing religion as part of a
larger dialectical process, whose ultimate aim is conceptual thought that can account
both for the symbols of religion and itself.
However, in the course of these lectures Hegel appeals to theological concepts related
to the Trinity - the Fall as human estrangement from God, Christ as the embodied
reconciliation ofhumanity and divinity. So, on the one hand, Hegel's use of the
Trinity can be held accountable to theology, for its relative orthodoxy. On the other
hand, Hegel's intention is not to identify the Trinity as God or as the human
experience of God. The religious concept serves as only one moment in a much larger
process by which concept and reality are united, according to Hegel's dialectical and
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social model of self-consciousness. The persons of the Trinity are, for Hegel, the three
posited determinations of universal spirit that together constitute the diversity and
unity of the dialectically developed concept.275
The structure of the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion helps demonstrate this
interpretation. The original manuscript is outlined by three sections: the Abstract
Concept ofGod, the Concrete Representation of God, and the Community, or
Cultus.276 By "abstract concept" Hegel means a proposition that has yet to be
demonstrated. In the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, "[t]he concept is the
presupposition", in much the same way as the initial concept of the Science ofLogic
was to be demonstrated in and by that work itself.277 Hegel also calls this initial
abstraction the "metaphysical concept of God... God as represented, not God as spirit
internally developed".278 At this early stage of cognition, knowledge ofGod is
immediate and is only knowledge "that God is, not what God is".279 Eventually, says
Hegel, "this content 'God' dissolves itself, that it essentially has the meaning of the
unity of the concept; i.e. it has the meaning both of the pure [abstract] concept and of
reality, and of the unity of the two."280 This first stage is also called "revelation".
By "concrete representation" Hegel means the symbols of religion, the "appearance"
of the abstract concept, the way it is manifest in the world. The dialectical
differentiation and identity occurring in the concept is manifest in the world as
estrangement, the symbol ofwhich is the Fall. The Fall is a symbol of logical
distinction and difference, of separation from divinity that defines the infinite need for
reconciliation.281 Christ is the symbol of reconciliation, of the identity of identity and
non-identity, and "its appearance in a single individual", the "sensible presence" of
God.282 This is the content of history, "the history of spirit, the history of God (which
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is God himself), the divine history as that of a single self-consciousness which has
united divine and human nature within itself."283
The community, or "cultus", is where the concept and its appearance are reunited in
the self-conscious knowledge of faith.284 Initially, the awareness of God had been one¬
sided, "defined as sense-consciousness", or immediate. However, for Hegel, "The
realization of faith or of religion is simply the reconciliation of spirit... the way in
which the antithesis is sublated, how the idea takes shape in it and seems in so doing
to run the risk of losing itself."285 In Hegel's logical dialectic, the concept is only
fulfilled, and the absolute idea reached, when subjective determinations are
recognized as detenninations of the objective concept. In the Lectures on the
Philosophy ofReligion, faith is not unmediated belief. Rather, faith is the self-
consciousness of spirit in the individual, the awareness that the representation it holds
as authoritative is the representation of the absolute.
As the divine "idea", God actualizes Godself in and to finite self-consciousness in
creation and Incarnation. As eternal creator, God is involved in the history of finite
self-consciousness. For Hegel, the history of the divine idea as revealed in the realm
of finite spirit is experienced as the three "elements" of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.286
These three religious representations correspond to the three inner differentiations of
God: subject, differentiated subject, and reunited, self-conscious subject. Thus, in the
Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, religion describes the absolute as the triune
God. The Trinity, for Hegel, connects logical distinction within the concept of God
with the outward distinction ofGod as revealed.
The appearance of the Trinity corresponds to three stages of cognition: the initial,
abstract concept, as yet indeterminate and unfulfilled; the determinate representation,
the outward manifestation of otherwise inherent negation; and the developed concept,
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which unites the initially abstract concept to its determinate expression. To reach the
absolute idea, the subjective expression of the concept must be seen as an expression
ofwhat is objective; that is, experience must be seen as a reflection of the logical
concept. The religious symbol ofTrinitarian revelation corresponds to the second
stage of three in the development of the "absolute idea" of speculative philosophy.
Religious "content", or God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, eventually "dissolves", as
the Christian community "passes away".287 In the terminology of the Science ofLogic,
philosophy moves beyond the concrete representations of religion, which are
subjective expressions of the objective concept, by recognizing them as subjective
expressions of the objective concept. Only philosophy can raise religion to the level of
cognition because it alone is capable of seeing religious truth as subjectively
conditioned.
The difference between the Trinity as "concept" and as "religious representation" has
led some commentators to argue that there are "two trinities" in Hegel. However,
Peter Hodgson argues that it is important not to read these "intrinsic" and "extrinsic"
concepts as "two trinities". Rather,
The economic Trinity overreaches and includes the immanent Trinity as the
first of its moments. Thus a more accurate designation is that of the inclusive
or holistic Trinity. The inclusive Trinity encompasses both the inner,
preworldly dialectic of the divine life and the outward mediations by which
the world is created and redeemed... there is one Trinity of three elements
with replicating patterns.288
That is, the immanent Trinity describes the free potential for distinction within God,
while the economic Trinity describes the actual distinction of God within human
experience. For Hodgson, Hegel is combining the classical theological precedence of
God's "ideal self-relations," and the modem theological prioritization of "God's
appearance and work in the world", such that the elements of the Trinity are "co-
essential". Ultimately, in connecting the concepts of immanent and economic Trinity
Hegel connects philosophy and religion, and the speculative Trinity with the
dialectical concept.
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Hegel distinguishes between the Trinity as religious and as conceptual, according to
the typology of representation and concept. However, the Trinity also provides Hegel
with a link between the divine life and human agency by making human history and
thought the location of reconciliation between immanence and transcendence. Hegel
uses two other concepts to describe the Trinity: love and cognition.
Firstly, love is the concept that binds the moments of the immanent Trinity, or divine
life, and that binds them to the economic Trinity, or the human experience of the
divine. Hegel first takes up the theme of love in the early essay The Spirit of
Christianity, and in some other fragments from Hegel's career in Frankfurt.289 It is a
theme to which he returns in the Phenomenology ofSpirit, the Science ofLogic and
the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion. However, Hegel's use of the concept of
love changes between its early and later uses.
In his early writings, love and life are the location of unity. Here Hegel suggests that
in love there occurs a "pure subject-object identity"- that the identity of self and other,
and their difference, are both found simultaneously in the unity of love. Because of
this, Beiser argues that the concept of Love in the early Hegel is a precursor to the
concept of Spirit for the mature Hegel. For the young Hegel, love is a paradoxical
process of self-surrender and self-discovery.290 Beiser notes that in this period Hegel
calls the paradox of externalization and internalization Geist. Spirit begins as a
religious concept, for Hegel, but becomes a more formal concept later in his
philosophy, which coincides with a "demotion" of the concept of love.
In the Phenomenology ofSpirit, "pure love" binds the moments of the absolute
together in pure thought. Foreshadowing the concept of God in the Lectures on the
Philosophy ofReligion, here God is manifest firstly as essence (Father), secondly as
the Other for whom essence "is" (the Logos/Word), and thirdly as the being-for-self
which knows itself in the other (the Spirit). Hegel says that pictorial religion turns
these necessary relations of essential moments within the absolute into external,
generative relations of paternity and sonship. As the force of relationship between
289 Herman Nohl (ed.), Hegels theologische Jugendschriften (Tubingen: Mohr, 1907)
290
Beiser, Hegel, p. 112 ff.
169
distinctions, love is unity.291 There is another kind of love, however, which Hegel says
the religious community only feels but does not know absolutely, and which will
eventually bind it with God: eternal love.292
In the Encyclopedia Logic, love is only mentioned in the notes added for the third
edition of 1830. Here Hegel says that in the Incarnation, "God becomes known as
love, precisely because he revealed himself to man in his Son, who is one with
him."293 The Incarnation is the location of redemption through the implicit overcoming
of the "antithesis ofobjectivity and subjectivity".
In the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, however, while eternal love is
identified with God's self-objectification, it is also identified with the triune God who
is both unity and diversity.294 Peter Hodgson says that, for Hegel,
The truth of the Trinity is most adequately grasped in purely speculative,
logical categories as the dialectic of unity, differentiation, and return... The
truth of the Trinity may also be grasped in the representational language of
love and personality. Love entails a union mediated by relationship and hence
distinction.295
For Hegel, love is the union among the persons of the immanent and economic
Trinity.
Secondly, Hegel describes the Trinity according to human knowledge of the
relationship between the concept and reality.296 The concept of the immanent Trinity
describes internal distinction, or difference, while the concept of the economic Trinity
includes real difference and separation, and implies the possibility of true identity.297
God's true self-knowledge cannot be achieved internally; true self-consciousness is
the result of the dialectic of "going out" and "return", ofbeing that is initially for-
itself (fur sich). The movement from the unity of universality to the particularity of
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individual beings and back to knowledge of original unity constitutes the divine life as
a whole.298
Similarly, human self-knowledge is only fulfilled, or self-conscious, when it is aware
of its difference from and reunion with God. In the process of the extrinsic Trinity,
creation, i.e. the world and human thought, comes to know its own true essence, as the
created self-expression of divine nature and returns to its origin by means of this
knowledge- human consciousness. Humanity comes to know God himself, not just
about God, because it comes to know God's nature by means of self-expression,
through the same concepts that communicate God's essence.299 The concept of the
Trinity constitutes the return of human cognition to its origin, but a return that now
includes self-knowledge.
Sympathetic readings of Hegel's use of the Trinity, with related themes of love and
reflective cognition, focus on the theme of reconciliation. For example, Andrew
Shanks states that Hegel's trinitarianism is the result of trying to discover the "most
constructive possible interplay between philosophy... and religion."300 He helpfully
summarizes three "moves" that Hegel makes with this approach. First, like Kant,
Fichte and Schelling, Hegel asserts the greater capacity of philosophy - over dogmatic
theology - to express the truth, even of religion. Second, however, he is careful not to
distance himself too far from dogmatic theology. Third, Hegel stakes a claim for
philosophy within the ongoing life of the Church through the importance of religious
thinking.
Hegel's alignment of the Trinity with the dialectical unfolding of the absolute
achieves reconciliation in at least two other positive ways. Firstly, Patricia Marie
Calton argues that a dialectical concept ofTrinity reasserts the connection between
human consciousness and God in a way that neither relies on nor suspends the
Enlightenment demand for scientific knowledge and the Romantic impulse toward
intuition.301 For Hegel, the Aufklarung placed restrictions on the scope of human
knowledge, such that concrete knowledge of God was made impossible. These
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restrictions relegate faith to the realm of the immediate or the intuitive, confining it to
opinion and pleasure only.302 Against these concepts, Hegel's model asserts that
knowledge of God is rooted in divine ontology, which is manifest in the appearance of
God, and to which human thought, in the form of Spirit, is witness.303 Peter Hodgson
argues that, although Hegel reads Schleiermacher incorrectly, it is likely he to whom
Hegel is responding in this regard.
Hegel understood Schleiermacher's notion of religion as unmediated intuition as an
attempt to get around the problem of the finite subject's knowledge of the infinite by
appealing to an uncritical kind of knowledge.304 Hodgson suggests that Hegel misread
Schleiermacher's 'feeling' (Gefuhl) as 'sensibility' (Empfindung), and that by
'feeling' Schleiermacher means a "prereflective awareness," not a substitution for
cognitive reflection.305 Schleiermacher himself suggests that God-consciousness is
mediated, albeit passively, through the practices of the spiritual community.306 Hegel's
use of the Trinity can, therefore, be read as his response to what he perceived as a
problematic theory of immediate intuition.
Other discussions ofHegel's rejection of intuition, however, focus on his
disagreement with Schelling. Andrew Bowie contends two related assumptions: that
where Schelling's identity philosophy "has come to be associated with 'immediacy,'
[and] the failure to carry out the 'exertion of the concept'," Hegel's philosophy is
characterized as a great achievement was to have articulated the development of the
absolute without relying on a notion of immediacy.307 The issue between them,
according to Bowie, is whether the absolute can be grasped by the process of
reflection alone, as Hegel thinks, or whether an intuition of the absolute that is
"external to reflection" is required, as Schelling thinks. As we saw in the previous
chapter, Hegel's dialectical approach suffers from a problem of recognition. His
notion ofmediated recognition actually relies on an immediate intuition of self from
the beginning.
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Yet, despite this problem and his misreading ofboth Schleiermacher and Schelling,308
Hegel's reaction to pre-reflective religion raises two valid concerns. First, even a
spontaneous and immediate experience, in order to be recognized as an experience "of
God", is mediated through the reflective thinking activity of the subject who
experiences it.309 Echoing Schleiermacher, Bernard Reardon suggests that, for the
religious adherent capable of or inclined to interpret various experiences as
experiences ofGod, feeling and intuition are filtered through the constructs of
religious education and training.310 Second, there are no criteria available to
"immediate consciousness" to verify such an individual experience as in any way
related or similar to any other individual's experience. "What I find to be present in
my consciousness is thereby promoted into something present in the consciousness of
everyone, and given out as the nature of consciousness itself."3" The assertion of
religious experience as immediate does not obviate the question ofhow the finite
thinking subject is capable of recognizing religious feeling as the experience of
something infinite. For Hegel, because even so-called "immediate intuition" of God
requires the subject to recognize the activity as intuitive, some mediation is always
occurring, even where the concept ofGod is concerned. His concept of the Trinity
places the experience of the concept within the unfolding of the Concept itself, to
overcome problems of intuition and mediation.
This observation relates to the second way in which Hegel's use of the Trinity
emphasizes reconciliation. The dialectical concept of the Trinity attempts to overreach
dualistie or dyadic philosophies by including within the concept both negation and
reconciliation, or difference and identity.312 Desmond recalls Hegel's critique of
theories of "identity," that unity is unintelligible without internal mediation, and
argues that the move toward the triune God is a move away from simple monadism to
an internally self-differentiating absolute. The self-othering of the origin is a concrete
self-constitution. In such a model there is no difference between a transcendent God
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and a resident spirituality. Rather, there is the same, continuous circular movement of
the concept that God represents within all things.
For theologians, such a strongly immanent concept of God presents a problem. Peter
Koslowski argues that, for Hegel, the concept of the Trinity helps express "the
identity of identity and non-identity" in the absolute idea, or Spirit.313 This "idealistic
monism" shows that Hegel's chief concern is the reconciliation of the Kantian
dichotomy of finite and infinite, not necessarily the theological significance of a self-
othering and reconciling God. The Christian concept of the Trinity, though also
expressive of "the identity of identity and non-identity", does so in terms of the
reconciliation of humanity and God in Christ. Koslowski concludes that Hegel's
employment of the concept of the Trinity is wide of the theological mark. Whether
that poses a problem for Hegel is not clear.
It is clear, however, that Hegel's Trinity is expressive of the inherently transcending
capacity of human thought. The concept includes two notions: that human cognition
can be limited; and that human cognition can sublate limits. This is reflected in the
Trinitarian relationship between Father and Son, where the dualism of time and
eternity, or of the finite and the infinite, appears overcome. However, while Hegel's
account of the Trinity seems to result in a reconciliation of the infinite and the finite, it
is severely problematic. Here we consider two problems in particular: Hegel's
equivocal use of the theological concepts of the "love" and transcendence of God, and
the compromise inherent in Hegel's account of the second person of the Trinity.
B. Problems in Hegel's Account of the Trinity
Hegel uses the Trinity as a symbol that bridges the distance between the objective
truth of the concept subjectively expressed as religious representation and the
objective truth of the concept reflectively recognized in representation. As such, the
Trinity is the Christian doctrine expressive of the goal of speculative philosophy: to
raise experience to the level of cognition. In the course of using the Trinity this way,
however, Hegel employs concepts of love and Christ as analogues of stages in the
313 Peter Koslowski, "Hegel 'der Philosoph der Trinitat?'" Theologische Quartalischrift 162/2 (1982) p.
129
174
development of self-consciousness. Here, I consider some of the problems associated
with Hegel's account of the Trinity.
i. Love and Transcendence
For the mature Hegel, "love" is the binding agent between representation and concept,
between religion and philosophy. For Rowan Williams, the concept of love is what
joins Hegel's doctrine of thought with the doctrine of God, dialectic with Trinity.314
Appealing to Hegel's definition of God as substance and subjectivity, in the
concluding passages of the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, Williams says that
Spirit is not in the world or dependent on it, but is the world as God has made it,
identical with the narrative of incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection and Pentecost.
Love is not an attribute ofGod, but is what God is. Yet, although Williams supports
the connection between dialectic and Trinity as made in Hegel's Science ofLogic,
Hegel's differs from Williams'. For Hegel, love is not "what God is", but is, instead, a
representation, a stage in historically and dialectically realized self-consciousness.
So what does the mature Hegel, of the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, mean
by "love"? Desmond appeals to the four different Greek meanings of the word love:
self-affirming love, which delights in its own communication ofbeing; eros, or self-
transcending desire, where the delight of being is mediated through love of another;
philia, or symmetrical reciprocity, which is porous and permitting; and agape, or
movement toward and for another, which is the result of a surplus, not a lack.315 The
love of the Christian God, especially as demonstrated on the Cross and in the
Resurrection, is an agapeic love.
It is surplus love, diffusive like the first, mediating like the second, allowing
and porous like the third, but not given from need for itself... [it is] affirming
beyond proportionality, a disproportionate relation of being good for the
other.316
Desmond argues that Hegel's God is an erotic, or "self-doubling", absolute; a self-
mediating, self-transcending desire in relation to the other, which is only an aspect of
the agapeic love ofGod, but not descriptive of the whole. This argument is consistent
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with Desmond's suspicion regarding the authenticity of recognition between the
mimic of representation and the true image of speculation. If the Trinity is only a
representational image of the divine life, how could one be sure that the love that
expresses each one is the same as that which binds them together?
Evidence ofwhat "love" means for Hegel comes from his discussion of self-
consciousness and the necessity ofmutual, or social, identification. Love, as Hegel
understands it, describes a situation ofmutual dependence and recognition. The
reason for any reflexivity between subjects is self-realization and independence. There
is no compulsion for the subject to love; if there were then love would not permit the
full independence of the subject. Love is merely built into the relational structure, as a
dialectical and mutual self-reassuring force. Love is, therefore, a description of the
situation in which the Other provides the basis for self-realization; it is not self-
negating or self-giving in an agapeic sense.
As for the concept of God's transcendence, a similar question regarding Hegel's
definitions arises. Desmond presents a simple typology by which he distinguishes
three different instances of transcendence in the Lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion. First, transcendence refers to the self implied in the social otherness of
beings external to self, but which are not the product of thinking. Second,
transcendence refers to the desire awakened in the individual who recognizes this first
level of transcendence, which resulting in an impulse toward wholeness. Third, there
is, for Desmond, a non-negotiable transcendent, typical ofmonotheistic religions,
which is not an exterior or interior power in the way ofbeing, but what Desmond calls
a "superior power ofpossibility".317
Because of his emphasis on God's self-realization through creation, human
consciousness ofGod in Christ, and resulting human self-consciousness, Hegel's
concept ofGod is phenomenal and immanent. According to Desmond, when Hegel
relates the God ofChristianity to the absolute of philosophy, the monotheistic, non-
negotiable concept of transcendent is re-fonnulated to resemble a self-completing
self-transcendence, in which "relating-to-other" results in a fuller self-relating. This
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leads Desmond to question whether the trinities Hegel describes involve a collapse of
eternity within time, of the infinite within the finite. On one hand, if the circuit of self-
othering and reconciliation is transcendent of time, how can it be recognized
temporally? On the other hand, if it is a temporal activity, how can it be confirmed as
eternally transcendent in origin, and by what authority?
Difficulty in discussing transcendence in Hegel may be due, in part, to Desmond's
definition of transcendence. Hodgson is critical of Desmond's distinction between
levels of transcendence in Hegel. He argues that Desmond's typology of
transcendence only permits a concept of God by which to be transcendent is to lie
entirely "beyond nature and humanity." Desmond accordingly leaves no room for
Hegel's "self-completing immanence" to be anything other than merely human, which
is ultimately a restriction on what defines God's transcendence.318 Hodgson pushes
this problem further, drawing an essential connection between dialectic and Trinity in
Hegel, with a result that is crucial for my interpretation of Tillich's concept
resembling Hegel's. He argues that Desmond's definition of God as utterly "beyond"
reduces the holism of cognition and existence that Hegel describes to sameness and
finitude. Hodgson says that Hegel's holism offers an alternative to monism and
dualism: "it is advaitic, not two and not one."319 To explain this, Hodgson says that the
source of Desmond's limitation is his interpretation of the structure of the logic, and
his assumption that the subject, or notion of absolute, at the beginning of the
dialectical unfolding is the same as the subject at the end.320
In agreement with Hodgson, my previous outline of the concept of logic, in Hegel,
suggests none ofDesmond's limitations. If the concept only reaches its fullness
through the process of its mediation, then of necessity it cannot in the end be the same
as it was in the beginning. The final term of Hegel's formal dialectic is "emphatically
not the same as the first". Within and at the end of the dialectical process, the subject
that was abstract unity, that particularized itself, and reflectively saw itself as the unity
of these two expressions, is changed. The cognitive repetition of the dialectical
process constitutes the ascent toward absolute knowing; the phenomenological
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repetition of this process constitutes the unfolding of absolute Spirit. That God is not
"beyond''' but immanent not only describes human knowledge of God but also
conceives of reality and ideality in such a way that neither is subordinate to the other.
Reality and ideality are in constant relation. Seen this way, the "immanent" God of
Hegel's dialectical Trinity is not simply a pantheistic whole, but a concept of essential
teleology.
The intimacy of dialectic and transcendence, however, raises a question regarding
logical necessity in the concept ofGod. If the absolute is bound to finite beings or
spirits, or is equated to them, then for two reasons it cannot be self-thinking or self-
determining; neither can it be an absolute, universal, or Spirit.321 As Bowie argues
concerning supposedly immediate being, finitude that knows itself as finitude has
already, in some capacity, transcended its limitation. Second, any apparent derivation
of the infinite from the finite would be problematic for Hegel. To assert that the
infinite is beyond human knowledge implies an absolutizing, or infinitizing, of the
finite - what Hegel called a "bad infinity".322
However, "the being which is determined as finite has this determination only in the
sense that it does not remain independent over against the infinite, but is rather ideal
(ideell), a moment of the infinite."323 Hegel's suggestion that "God is not God without
the world" reflects not God's dependence on the world, but suggests that a notion of
the infinite or absolute excluding the finite within it contradicts the logic of true
infinity. The Hegelian Trinity defines the finite as a possibility already included
within the infinite, logically prior to manifestation. Thus, the necessity of the world
for Hegel's God is a result of "good infinity", that what is manifest cannot be
considered apart from what is transcendent without destroying the integrity of both.
The integrity of infinity, however, does not place Hegel's description of God above
suspicion. For example, Houlgate summarizes Barth's critique that Hegel's God
becomes a prisoner, that revelation is no longer a free act, and that any knowledge of
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the real dialectic of grace, surfacing out ofGod's freedom, is impossible.324 Yet,
Houlgate counters that Barth's reading misinterprets Hegel. He argues that by
"necessary", Hegel does not subject God's self-revelation to a necessity that is not
God's own, but "because God is freedom, grace and love, he is not 'free' to withhold
himself'.325 Taylor supports this point of view: "God's love... is inseparable from its
expression in giving."326 It may be that Beiser's critique of theological readings of
Hegel holds true here: that they can confuse logical and ontological priority.327 In sum,
Hegel's God of love and transcendence relies on specific definitions of these
concepts. Because of the role of religion as a stage of thought, the theological content
of these concepts is renegotiated.
ii. Christ and Cognition
The issue of necessity in Hegel also arises in discussions of Incarnation. Joseph Fitzer
argues that Hegel's notion of Incarnation is not far from Aquinas, for whom the
Incarnation is the remedy for the Fall.328 Like Schelling, for Hegel the creature would
have no claim on God because the Incarnation occurs by divine initiative; yet the only
God we can know is the one who has created. Fitzer suggests that God also always
acts in the manner that is best for his creatures - God is love. If not necessary, then,
the Incarnation is at least restorative in a manner that logically follows from God's
loving response to human sinfulness. One could say that, for Hegel, the Incarnation
represents a philosophical necessity, bringing conceptual unity to religion and art, but
entails no human capacity to compel God.
The other problem arising from Hegel's concept of the Trinity concerns its second
person and Hegel's use ofChrist both as an analogue for the creation of the world and
for human nature in general. In the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, Hegel
identifies the second person of the Trinity with the logical moment of divine self-
objectification. There is a danger in this correlation in which the second moment of
Hegel's Trinity becomes the analogue of embodiment, of self-othering, and of the
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radical otherness and negativity of death. John McTaggart argues that the Son is
identified with "antithesis, a "stage" in the process toward self-consciousness; a stage
which, according to Hegel's model, necessarily implies its sublation in a more perfect
expression of its definition, meaning and purpose.329 That the Son could be thought of
as an "antithesis" represents a dissonance with Christian doctrine, which sees the Son
as completely God and completely human, for whom any further or ultimate
definition is not required.
Hegel's collapse ofCreation and Incarnation into God's "self-othering" only
compounds this problem by making it impossible to see Christ as anything more than
a dialectically negative moment. In addition to a lack of clarity concerning the
difference between God's self-objectification as Creation and as Incarnation,330
Hegel's account of the second person of the Trinity does not include an adequate
description of Resurrection. In the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion,
Resurrection and Ascension are essential to the Christian faith, as "an 'exaltation'
(Erhohung) of Christ", and "an 'elevation' (Erhebung) to God... But it is not a
material event like the crucifixion."331 For Hodgson, this implies that the resurrection,
like Hegel's notion of the birth narratives ofChrist, is demythologized and
refashioned as a "perspective" that arises within the spiritual community.
The notion of dialectical self-differentiation within the immanent Trinity is key to
avoiding a division of duties within the economic Trinity. Anselm K. Min suggests
that Hegel's concept of the persons, or moments, of God's self-reconciliation are
logically implicit in the idea, or absolute. If the Father is identified with a process of
internal self-differentiation and reconciliation, the sublation of the otherness of the
Son does not imply a simple division of duties wherein the Son is correlated to
incarnation and the Holy Spirit to reconciliation. Rather, both the second and third
persons of the Trinity are part ofGod's self-identity, whereby he mediates himself to
himself. The whole internal pre-history of God is an eternal process, in which the
differentiation of the second person from the first is retained even within their
sublation in the third. In this sublative model, the second person of the Trinity is no
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more directly and singularly correlated with one stage of reconciliation than is the first
person. "The Other is not a brute datum, but a medium thoroughly open and
transparent to the self-mediating action of the Father."332
Discussions of Christ in the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion require a more
careful definition ofwhat Hegel means by "dialectic" and, therefore, by "negation". In
light of dialectic in the Phenomenology ofSpirit, Hyppolite suggests that self-
consciousness includes an awareness of death, of the condition of existence itself, of
anxiety.333 In relation to the absolute, life itself becomes identified with history and
with the process of self-negation, which is nonetheless meaningful. In this way, death
is internalized and the negative is converted into being. The personal Subject contains
human history in its development and, therefore, remains free from the limitations of
the historicity of a particular being. Universal subjectivity is, for Hegel, eventually
identified with Christ, the unity of transcendence and immanence. Through the God
that dies, man is raised to the divine through history.
Problems emerge, however, in identifying the Son with self-objectification and the
Spirit with reconciliation, i.e. "God made actual". For Hegel the Trinity remains
incomplete until it acquires an economic expression in creation and consciousness.334
Phillip Blond suggests that this also implies, for Hegel, that the Trinity is
"accomplished" or fulfilled in history, and that the task ofmental life is to achieve full
consciousness of what has already occurred.335 Yet, while the Trinity is equal to the
task of describing the path of human cognitive development, it should not be limited
to this. Blond argues that the teleology of the Trinity must be more than prescriptive,
it must be "futural," and for two reasons. First, God's "completion" in history implies
the possibility of our exhaustive knowledge of him, while God's futurity does not.
Second, the negativity ofhistory, i.e. radical evil, must not be made into something
positive within a God already completed.
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Together these critiques suggest that Hegel collapses the "becoming of God" into the
becoming ofhumanity, such that God is not revealed to human history, but is human
history- what Peter Koslowski calls "idealistic monism".336 It would seem, then, that
the completion ofHegel's system implies that the end or goal of history is
accomplished, and that the role of speculative philosophy is simply to grasp this. "For
the Understanding, to be sure, the mysteries of Christianity are an impenetrable secret.
But, because they are speculative in nature, reason can grasp them. Nor are they
secret; for they are revealed."337 However, to say that the absolute idea is the telos of
history is not to say that it is the terminus of history.338 It may be that Hegel's use of
religious language is meant to indicate the absolute's transcendence of finite, or
historical, completion. Yet the Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion should not be
regarded as describing what philosophy has already done with respect to religion, but
as a call to speculative transformation of one-sided, or dogmatic, representational
thinking.339
Section II. The Trinity in Schelling
Prior to The Ages ofthe World, the polar opposition of Schelling's dialectical forces -
manifest in nature, consciousness and history - are grounded in the absolute, or God.
Humanity's freedom, the ability to choose, results from the dissolution, in humanity,
of principles that in God are indissoluble. Yet this fallen condition of brokenness,
between the absolute and its created manifestation, is a relationship whose dialectical
nature also implies its eternal potential. The root of divine freedom, and thus human
freedom, is actually a polarity of two forces. God is the identity of light, self-giving
essence, and dark, being-in-itself, or selfhood; an ideal which humanity can only
"really" access in unconscious intuition.340
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In The Ages of the World, Schelling argues that the problem with most philosophy is
that it is "negative philosophy," in which the dynamism of God is dissolved into the
static reason of logical negation. Without two distinct and mutually necessary forces
of self-positing, according to Schelling, God is reduced to spontaneous subjectivity
and an empty infinity. In response Schelling asserts that God appears as a single deity,
which is eternally both diversity and unity; or, the "No" of not-becoming, the "Yes"
ofbecoming, and the unity of the two.341 Neither an eternal No, nor an eternal Yes
could by itself fulfill the concept of productive nature. That the essence ofbeing is the
inseparable unity ofboth moments is the starting point of Schelling's "positive
philosophy." For Schelling, the problem facing positive philosophy is to describe how
and why principles that are united in and as God would become divided and manifest
as humanity and nature.
In this chapter I demonstrate that, despite the presence of the Trinity in Schelling's
later and more descriptive writings, the concept ofGod that dominates is polar.342
While the lectures on the Philosophy ofRevelation do expand on Schelling's doctrine
of the potencies, which he describes as analogous to the persons of the triune God, the
dominant structure of the Godhead in Schelling's later writings is not genuinely
triune. Like the description ofGod in the Freiheitsphilosophie, God in The Ages ofthe
World is polar, or binary, comprising God's nature, which is the ground of creation,
and God's freedom, which is the ground of the decision and reality of revelation.
A. Positive Philosophy and the Potencies
The later period of Schelling's writing is largely devoted to describing the inner
dialectic of the absolute, how this dialectic is manifest in the world and in history, and
how this relates to the history of religion and the philosophy of revelation. What
follows is a consideration of the presence of Schelling's positive philosophy within
his concept ofGod's tri-unity and revelation.
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In OfHuman Freedom, Schelling is more concerned to distinguish a sufficient
concept of a freely active God from the insufficient concepts rendered mostly by
various forms of pantheism. He argues that freedom and knowledge of God are the
result ofGod's free decision to manifest his nature. Revelation is God's insistent
finite activity posited against the inclination to remain infinite. The accomplishment
of the Freiheitsphilosophie is its description of the basis of the relationship between
God's essential nature as free and the human capacity for freedom, and thus evil.
However, the question of "why" God reveals remains unanswered. Andrew Bowie
suggests that, after OfHuman Freedom, "Schelling moves towards the idea that God
makes a free decision to create the world but that He does not have to make the
decision: it is only the fact of the manifest world that is our evidence of the decision,"
and that the purpose of the lectures on the Philosophy ofRevelation is to answer the
question of why.343
In his later works, Schelling is more explicit about the connection between religious
and philosophical statements concerning God and humanity. His intention, to
positively describe the ideal history and real revelation of God, is clear from the very
first section of The Ages ofthe World, in which he describes "the eternal life of the
Godhead as the whole or the construction of the complete idea ofGod."344 As in his
earlier work, the material human condition is reflected in and can be described by an
ideal concept involving two principles: the instinct to give form to infinite creativity
and the instinct to remain infinite. The mutual relationship of these two principles in
the continuous human present also points to a primordial principle ofunity, a mythical
time at which the two were not distinct but purely One.345 To describe God as the
underlying unity of all distinction and identity requires that God contain within
himself the positive, i.e. distinct and self-generated, grounds both of necessity and
freedom, or, the inclinations to be and not to be. For Schelling, however, in God
necessity must also be subordinate to freedom.
Schelling's solution is to distinguish God's nature and God's freedom as two poles
within the whole of God. The result, in Schelling's words, "runs the boundary
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between theosophy and philosophy, which the lover of knowledge will chastely seek
to protect."346 He states that, "Necessity lies at the foundation of freedom and is in
God itself what is first and oldest [and]... What is necessary in God we call the nature
ofGod... Therefore, in creation, God overcomes the necessity of its nature through
freedom..."347 The two poles within God are necessity and freedom. The evidence of
necessity's subordination to freedom, for Schelling, is creation. As we saw in the
Identitatsphilosophie, the reality of something distinct from God implies the logically
prior, ideal possibility of distinction within God himself; perfect unity can only be
said to be achieved after real distinction. A merely infinite God, therefore, is not
perfect or complete until it has limited itself in some way, or "created", and
subsequently overcome that limitation. Thus, only the polarity of necessity and
freedom can provide the ideal possibility for God to be perfect, i.e. a true infinite that
includes the overcoming of limitation.
However, Schelling has to avoid dualism in order for the concept ofGod to be truly
"infinite". While God's freedom can be distinct from God's nature, it cannot be
logically contrary to it. Thus, the positing of God's freedom over against God's nature
must be logically accounted for, or grounded within, God's nature. Even though it is
described as necessity, the nature ofGod must, in principle, contain the basis of God's
freedom. Schelling describes God's nature, the basis of God's freedom, in terms of
three potencies. Appealing to the law of contradiction, says Schelling, all three of
these potencies must be equally God's nature. They are not logical moments of
antithesis, but distinct and positive principles, potencies or powers that describe God's
nature and, therefore, the possibility ofGod's free activity of creation, and the ground
ofhuman existence and thought.348
Consistent with his earlier work, Schelling's first potency of God's nature is the
infinite, dark inclination not to be, against which finite being is posited. However,
although it is the first potency, "The beginning is only the beginning insofar as it is
not that which should actually be."349 If the result of the process is positive and
unified, its beginning must be negativity. So the first potency, also designated as
346
Schelling, The Ages of the World (author's Introduction), p. xxxix
347
Schelling, The Ages ofthe World, p. 5
348
Schelling, The Ages ofthe World, p. 11
349
Schelling, The Ages ofthe World, p. 13
185
"A=B", or simply "A", is the principle of negation, of original, pure infinity. The first
potency, like the dark Abgrund, is not "nothing", rather, it is "that which is not in
itself', not yet a thing - it is infinitely potential being itself. The inclination to not be is
the ultimate and transcendent power and strength ofGod, because it indicates the
complete lack of necessity for God to become determined.350
In combination with the first, the second potency forms God's personality by bringing
about the actual in God. Although logically subsequent, the second moment in the
absolute is simultaneous with the first; it is the positive response of assertive being in
response to the negative inclination of retraction from being. The second potency,
designated as "A2", represses the negating power, just as the first potency confines
positing power. This is the primordial polarity that constitutes God's aseity and
creativity. The two potencies can only be understood in relation and opposition to
each other.
The third potency is the inclination toward the unity of the two, designated not as the
original unity of infinite not-being, but as the actual unity of differentiated being, and
thus "A3".351 As the logically ultimate potency, it is indifferent to both former
potencies. As unity, it both succeeds and retains the first and second potencies and
their struggle within its unifying expression. Free ofboth, the third potency is the
purest, most essential potential expression of the absolute. To this point, Schelling
says his speculative system is not yet positing a moral nature in the third potency, but
only a blind principle.352 As the "sought after" condition of unity, however, the third
potency is logically ultimate.
Yet, it is only taken together that Schelling's potencies characterize the nature of
eternity itself. God is a life, a personality, the highest ofbeings which is yet eternal
becoming in the circular movement of the potencies. Crucially, separating him from
Hegel, Schelling says that this movement from lowest to highest, because it is
constant and "annular", eventually does not distinguish lowest from highest. The
potencies, as principles of God's nature, are an "unremitting wheel" of rotary
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movement. In an article on Schelling's theory of time, Walter Schopsdau says that this
concept of God as a unity of polar nature and freedom is a consistent theme in
Schelling's work.
Schelling's theory of time remains coupled with the doctrine of the potencies
as presented in the Philosophy ofMythology and Revelation. However, this
association can be seen earlier, in The Ages of the World, in which God is
more strongly set apart from the potencies. The potencies initiate the process
by which God's freedom is articulated. "Nature" in God, the wheel of the three
alternating potencies, against which God's freedom stands, is the actual "I"
over which God's sovereignty is established.353
God's nature is the basis ofGod's freedom, as the beginning of the process of God's
unfolding, and as that against which God's freedom is established.
As in OfHuman Freedom, the difference between the eternal nature ofGod and finite
humanity is that what is indissoluble in God is dissoluble in humanity.354 Together, the
first two potencies form the ground of the visible manifestation ofGod, both in nature
and in the human soul. The first is the substratum of the natural world; it is the pp ov,
the abyss, the deepest essence, the primary substance of everything different from the
divine subject.355 The second is the substratum of the spiritual world, which is both
tempered by the fist potency, and creates "yearning" within the lower, first potency to
elevate itself to subjectivity.356
Finally, the "absolute highest", the third potency, is the principle of that toward which
all humanity and history moves, the ultimate self-expression of God. The spirit world
(A2), says Schelling, stands to the absolute highest (A3) as nature (A) stands to the
spirit world (A2). The entire movement is a "universal magic, extending to the
highest."357 In this way, all of human activity is directed toward the full self-
expression of God, and it follows the divine pattern in doing so.
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Having identified the triadic "inner nature" of God, Schelling describes God's outer
nature, the "concept of spirit without nature [that is] the highest concept of the
Godhead."358 The organism of the potencies is an eternally posited "past" within God
from which "liberation and deliverance can only come through an Other that is
outside of it and wholly independent of it and exalted above it."359 Schelling here
appeals to a broad "ancient doctrine", that "God is the superactual, beyond that which
has being (das Uberseyende) (to imspov), therefore a sublimity beyond being and
Not-being."360 Although the triadic nature ofGod allows Schelling to account for
God's freedom as both distinct from and still part of God's nature, his description of
the nature of God gives way to the ultimate principle of polarity.
In his description of triadic potencies, Schelling intends to connect the ideal concept
ofGod and the historical reality of religion. As the ideal principles of the becoming of
nature - inwardness, expansiveness and productivity - the potencies are present even
in the early First Outline ofa System of the Philosophy ofNature.361 However, in The
Ages ofthe World the potencies attain a kind ofmythological status. They are the
"archetype of things [that] sleepfs] in the soul as that which has become dark and
forgotten", but which is "the intimation of and longing for knowledge".362
B. Trinity or Tri-Unity?
Despite tri-unity having given way to polarity in The Ages ofthe World, in his lectures
on the Philosophy ofRevelation, Schelling connects the three potencies of God's
nature with the persons of the Trinity, in order to describe the underlying pattern of
the historical development of religion. Essentially, for Schelling, the history of
religions reflects an epistemological evolution toward a triune concept ofGod. In the
All-One of early historical theism, God remains a simple posit, or, privation of the
absolute. In later pantheism, God is accepted as the immediate potency ofbeing, but
does not account for unity within God. In a triune conception, however, Schelling sees
a concept ofGod as both the proper monad of early theism, and the diverse ground of
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unity. Thus, God as a tri-unity represents the culmination of philosophical and
religious thought. In the lectures on the Philosophy ofRevelation, Schelling interprets
mythological and religious history in terms of its development toward a triune concept
ofGod.
Religion first occurs as mythology, which itself comprises three "epochs'", during
which the potencies receive articulation by collective intellect.363 The first epoch of
mythology is characterized by the absolutely dependent nature of the first nomadic
peoples, suggesting an inclination to worship ofwhat is immediately perceived in
nature. The highest principle of this kind of religion is astral, represented in the
unlimited, powerful and cosmic first potency figure ofUranos (Oopavos; "heaven").
The second epoch ofmythology is characterised by the transfonnation ofUranos into
the creative, female Urania.364 Mythologies emphasising the first or second potency
continue to replace each other, according to Schelling, until the abstract spiritualism
of Hinduism introduced the unifying principle of Vishnu, who represents the
unification of creating Brahma and destroying Shiva. The penultimate moment of
mythology is middle Greek mythology, in the triad of Hades (negative principle, first
potency), Poseidon (real, self-materializing, second potency) and Zeus (personal,
spiritual, unifying and non-material, third potency).
The final epoch of the mythological process is in the transition (der Ubergang) to
later Greek rationalism.365 The representation of the divine in the natural process
cannot reconcile God and that which is posited outside of God. In understanding this,
mythology attains self-consciousness and frees itself from natural limitations- an
inclination manifest in the belief in the immortal soul. The polytheism of the past is
actually a "natural" monotheism that gives divine status to human aspects ofbeing.
It is this rational process ofGreek philosophy, specifically the doctrine of the logos,
that represents, for Schelling, the bridge between the natural religion ofmythology
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and the revelation of God in Christianity.366 The first and second potencies are
deduced from intellectual intuition, in a human bid to determine the ideal origin of
being from the reality of being. However, the self cannot deduce God (den
Gegenstand derMysterieri) from the dialectic of the natural and cognitive, the real
and the ideal, the active and the reflective. The God who is the ground of reason can
only be found through revelation.
In the Philosophy ofRevelation Schelling identifies the potencies ofGod's nature
with the Trinity. He begins by recalling the construction of God's nature from The
Ages of the World:
Already before Creation, in the a priori concept of Creation, God had the three
potencies as the possibilities of a future Being. In Creation these potencies are
in effect. Prior to Creation there is a sufficiency ofpotencies and causes, to
which no independence is yet granted, yet through which a necessarily
independent One is working: the solitary, absoluteness of personality.367
In the same way that the potencies are described as positive, self-generating
principles, so, too, are the persons of the Trinity described in principle:
The Christian Trinity, however, comprises a sufficiency ofpersons, every one
ofwhich is God. Ifwe want the absolute personality designated with a
Christian expression, then we must call the author and beginner of the process
o Osos Kai navTrjp [the God and All].368
The main point of similarity between the philosophical concept of the potencies and
the religious doctrine of the Trinity is the authentic unity each expresses. For
Schelling, true unity is the result ofdiversity arising from original unity, and pre-
Christian monotheisms are not expressive of distinction and identity. For example, the
assertion of divinity in the form of Law or prophecy does not portray a God that has
undergone, or that comprises, true distinction and reunion within God's self. The
triune God, however, represents in its essence the truth of genuine unity, which
includes distinction, and reunion.
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Beyond their relation to the potencies in principle, Schelling identifies each person of
the Trinity with a potency through the concept ofbeing. First, the Father "is
established as the accepted actus purus ex actu [pure act out of act] that makes the
potencies. In this way, being creates distinction within itself, i.e. designates within
itself something different which is not yet real."369 For Schelling, a perfect infinite
does not act, as all possibility is accounted for within it. The act of Creation is
analogous to the distinction within the infinite ground that permits the possibility of
natural and cognitive productivity.
Second, Schelling identifies this distinction within being as God the Son; "Son by the
same glory as the Father, but given rule over being-itself, of which the Father was
original, by whom it is given to the Son."370 Like the "willing to be" of the second
potency, the second person of the Trinity is the assertion of finitude over and against
the inclination to remain infinite. In the long tradition of Christian theology, the Son is
the logos, the uttered instantiation of being. It is God's nature to become, to act, and
to speak. Thus, Schelling identifies the becoming of God, in the second person of the
Trinity, with the second potency of God's nature. Like the first two potencies,
Schelling stresses that the Father and the Son are equally the "Lord of Being", and are
logically distinct without temporal priority. Indeed, the life of the triune Godhead
occurs entirely outside of time.371
For Schelling, Christ is the perfect embodiment of this opening up of the divine, of
God's free revelation. Christ is not a necessity of God, yet is certainly natural; he is
not exhaustive ofGod, yet is certainly divine. As free, creative and conscious activity,
Christ personifies the speculative moment of distinction within potencies. As the
culmination of time and revelation, Christ draws humanity toward reconciliation with
God in the Spirit. Having been separated by Christ's personhood and united in his
reconciling salvation, the potencies cease to be potential and become real principle,
and their tension is finally dissolved.
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The awareness of the separation from and the moment of reconciliation with God,
through revelation, form the goal of conscious reason fulfilled. The pre-historical
potencies are re-capitulated in history through mythology and religion, and are
fulfilled in the Christ event. The dynamic nature and freedom of the absolute to
become, and the individual's freedom become conscious of God, is at the heart of
Schelling's positive philosophy. Historically, in attempting to understand its
relationship to the absolute, humanity deduces itself into a nature-dependent and un¬
conscious religion, causing separation from God. Reason, or, the rational moment in
history, establishes liberation from this natural bondage, "filling up the void" between
the world and God, preparing it for spiritual revelation.372 Revelation of the absolute,
the manifestation of the potencies of substance and form, is ideally represented in
Christ.
Third, however, the Holy Spirit is not only identified with the reunion of infinite and
finite principles within God, but is also identified with God's freedom. This
contradicts somewhat the structure of the potencies as set out in The Ages ofthe
World. In that volume, the third potency was only part ofGod's nature; it was not
identified with God's freedom, which stood over and against God's nature. In the
Philosophy ofRevelation, however, the Holy Spirit is identified with the "setting free"
ofbeing. The meaning of this becomes more clear, however, as Schelling relates
God's freedom with God's activity.
Spontaneous Being, as potency, can only set nature free ifBeing becomes
manifest as A2, and ifA3 has control over it. The third potency is, therefore, no
less Lord of the same Being, whose Lord is also the Son and the Father. Thus,
the third potency is also personality with same glory as Father and Son.373
The persons of the Trinity, identified with each of the potencies of God's nature, are
essentially pre- or a-temporal. They are the principles ofGod, ofbeing, which only
become manifest in revelation. But the free, revelatory activity of God only occurs as
the "higher principle" elevated over the nature of God. That "A3" has control over
"A2" reinforces the notion that only once the nature ofGod is understood as infinite
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unity, distinction, and reunification, does God freely reveal himself. The Trinity, for
Schelling, is an ideal principle.
The difference between the potencies and the Trinity, however, is that while the
potencies remain infinitely potential, the persons of the triune Godhead are only
fulfilled in the activity of revelation.
Before the son is fulfilled, the Father is invisible reality. The Father is only
Father if he has returned to himself as Being. Where Being implies the
possibility of reciprocity, then Being is the communal Being of the Father and
the Son, and applies also to the Spirit... Where, therefore, the opposition of
potencies ends, there are no longer potencies, but personalities... [and] the
Father, the Son and the Spirit are fulfilled.374
The difference between potencies and personalities is the difference between the
natural and the spiritual worlds.
Thus our reflection rises to a higher stage, into another world. In the potencies
we see only the developing process of concrete things. With the personalities,
however, the divine world opens, where only the higher meaning of the
potencies appears.375
The theory of potencies represents Schelling's final attempt to gather together the
process of identity - of subject and object, of positive and negative, of conscious and
unconscious - as sides of a contradiction in the person of God, in history and in
religion. Ultimately, however, he fails to describe the reason for revelation, or the
actualization of the absolute. As Bowie suggests, "The theory of identity in difference
has much to be said for it once the transition has been made, but not much as far as
the transition itself is concerned."376 The problem is that language is limited by the
fact that cannot account for itself: meaning is always conditioned by use. If nothing
can account for itself without some other reference, then neither can a totality be
described, because it requires something outside itself to substantiate its claim.
Even Schelling appears to admit that the relationship between infinite and finite can
never be described by what is finite:
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Why is what nature is nature, and what God is God; as both were really the
same? ... One cannot get to the bottom of this. It is just their lot. God is not
God for particular reasons but rather because He is God jure positivo?11
Nonetheless, Schelling's triune theory ofpotency attempts to describe the link
between the divine life and human life, between God's knowledge and the knowledge
ofGod. It is, however, because of the legacy ofhis own Naturphilosophie that
Schelling continues to assume that all finitude and existence must be accounted for, at
least in principle, in prior ground. The freedom of that ground, for Schelling, is
guaranteed by polar and equally positive forces, which also, as the inner nature of
divinity, account for the basis of all creation and cognition.
Ultimately, the triune potencies are subsumed under a polar model, which insists on
the positive distinction and identity of nature and freedom in God. They are, for
Schelling, the result of God's nature, but this is only one pole within God- the ground,
nature, or necessity of God. Because they are not also understood as the active
composition or reality of God's freedom, the potencies cannot be said to be
constitutive of the whole ofGod, but only of one pole in God. As the ideal principles
of the revealed triune Godhead, this description of the potencies limits the persons of
the Trinity to God's nature, preventing them from being as clearly associated with the
free activity of God. Although the very last description of the potencies in the lectures
on the Philosophy ofRevelation sees the Holy Spirit identified with freedom, this is
only an ideal identification; i.e. it is not a description of the activity of God as the
Holy Spirit, but only an account of the ideal possibility of God's activity as such.
As it is in his earlier work, for Schelling, freedom, as the power to act in accordance
with nature, is transcendent of nature - it is the highest principle. This leaves the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the communal description ofGod's nature, at the
level of analogue or principle. The doctrine of the potencies does not correspond to
the Trinity because it distinguishes between the presently enacted will ofGod - God's
freedom and activity as the Trinity - and the past of God's essential nature.
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Section III. The Relative Relevance for Tillich's Trinity
The complexity and diversity of thinking concerning the Trinity in German Idealism
cannot easily be reduced. Beiser characterizes the philosophy of this period as a
"struggle" against subjectivism, while Bowie characterizes it as an effort to replace
the providential God removed by the realism of the Enlightenment.378 Only one
English language publication treats the concept of the Trinity as anything more than a
simple metaphor drawn from the religious upbringing of the philosopher employing it,
and that work is concerned with the whole history ofGerman theology.379 The above
sections demonstrate, however, how different the function of the Trinity can be for
two philosophers of the same period, and even of the same Stift in Tubingen.
This section, firstly, draws parallels between Hegel's and Schelling's use of the
Trinity in their conceptual systems. Secondly, however, the differences that exist
between the two philosophers are considered in relation to Tillich's concept of the
Trinity. In neither case is it my intention to support or contest the arguments made by
commentators consulted in this chapter concerning the merits of either philosopher's
system or approach. My concern is to clarity, as much as possible, the difference
between the two philosophers in order to show that it is Hegel's concept, more than
Schelling's, which is evident in Tillich's Trinitarian theology.
A. Similarity: Hegel and Schelling
There are two main areas of similarity between Schelling and Hegel where religious
and theological thought are concerned. The first is their approach to the history of
religion and Christianity's place in it. For both Hegel and Schelling, historical
religions reflect human development. For Hegel, cognitive development leads human
expression away from the abstract immediacy of art, through representational,
religious thought, and forward into the more conceptual and more comprehensive
faculty of philosophy. For Schelling, the order is reversed, as human cognition
increasingly gives way to deeper and more fundamental expressions ofmeaning than
language is capable of capturing.
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There is a difference between Hegel and Schelling where the relationship of religion
and philosophy is concerned. For Hegel, religion is representational and philosophy
conceptual; the metaphorical power ofmyth and symbol are less comprehensive than
the concepts of a logical philosophy of consciousness. Thus, a religious symbol like
the Trinity ends up being an analogue for what is ultimately a cognitive construct. For
Schelling, however, the significance ofmyth and symbol are not diminished in
relationship to speculative philosophy. Schelling does not clearly separate his
conceptual work from his phenomenological work in the same way that Hegel
separates them, even by volume in the Phenomenology ofSpirit and the Science of
Logic. The result is that Hegel's Trinity is "demythologized", while Schelling retains
the necessity ofmyth as more than allegory. This may indicate a Schellingian
inspiration for Tillich's own project of "halfway demythologization".380 (STII, 33)
This difference notwithstanding, the similarity between Hegel and Schelling where
the history of religion is concerned extends to their shared belief that Christianity is
the culmination of historical religion. For both, God is the triune God of Christianity
and represents the highest religious concept. It is likely that the philosophers'
religious education caused them to demonstrate that Christianity is the ultimate
religion. Nonetheless, both Schelling and Hegel find in the doctrine of the Trinity the
best metaphor to describe the truth of their systematic philosophies.
For Schelling, the Trinity as the principle of God's nature is nascent in ancient
religions, as the potencies of the desire to remain infinite, the desire to become, and
the product of that polarity. Only Christianity, however, claims that this principle of
the nature of God is expressed in existence. The logos made flesh is, for Schelling, the
ultimate mythological expression of the singular meeting point of divinity and
humanity. For Hegel, the Trinity is the representational expression of what philosophy
understands conceptually, that is the process ofAufhebung, of posited infinity, actual
finitude, and the completed infinity that finally embraces both. The Trinity is an
expression, for Hegel, of the process by which subjective expression comes to
resemble what is objectively true, or, the absolute idea.
380 Simon Fisher, "Halfway Demythologization," Modem Theology 3/3 (Apr 1987) pp. 245-254
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For both, the centrality of the Trinity, or at least its position as the ultimate religious
expression of unity-diversity-reunion, makes Christianity the culmination of all
religious thought. The divine life forms the pattern of the "past" for Schelling, as a
kind of ideal blueprint of human development; for Hegel, the divine life is a
metaphor, a stage of thought that represents the "present," through and out ofwhich
humanity must pass. However, despite the differences, the doctrine of the Trinity and
its insistence that God is both diversity and unity, provide the ideal religious metaphor
for both Schelling and Hegel.
Although Tillich does not employ an historical account of religions he clearly agrees
that the Trinity provides the central concept through which to interpret history and
existence. Tillich's earlier emphasis on the kairos that gives meaning to all history
shows the influence of Schelling's logos-centered account of revelation. However, as
we have seen the emphasis in the Systematic Theology is not on the historical kairos,
but on New Being as the power ofbeing-itself, or essence manifest under the
conditions of existence. Tillich's concern for a Spirit-Christology is evidence of a
much more Hegelian approach in his system. Though both philosophers make use of
the Trinity as an interpretive tool, it is Hegel's concept of it that is more in evidence in
the Systematic Theology.
B. Difference: Relative Relevance
i. Tillich and Schelling
The first main characteristic of Schelling's account of the Trinity is his intention to
demonstrate consistency between God's ideal nature and real human existence;
between the history of consciousness and human history. The insistence on positive
polarity typical of Schelling's later works means that revelation is described as a kind
ofproductivity, the result of equal and opposed forces. God's nature is triadic, as the
potencies describe, but God's freedom is placed outside of this triadic principle.
God's freedom is opposed to God's nature in the ideal realm, only to be unified in
Christ. This means that although the third potency is analogically tied to the Spirit, the
function of the Spirit is not clear in Schelling's account of the Trinity, because God's
essential polarity makes a notion of the Trinity discontinuous with God's free activity.
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The second main characteristic of Schelling's account of the Trinity is its relationship,
in principle, to the three potencies. The potencies are "past", constituting an
unremitting, eternally circular wheel ofpotentiality and actuality. Schelling draws a
distinction between these grounding potencies and the "persons" of the Trinity:
persons refer to activity, while potencies are infinitely potential, or principles. God's
nature does not contain an account of aufheben, of immanent transcendence. The
result is that God's free activity is not accounted for within God's nature. Rather,
freedom is posited as the polar opposite of nature, and the two forces function in the
divine in the same way as they do in nature. Polarity is the root ofproductivity.
The polarized account of the nature and freedom of God is consistent with Schelling's
desire to account for the ideal basis of everything real. The reality of evil, discussed in
OfHuman Freedom, is accounted for by the polarity within the creative God, but in a
way that does not impute evil to God. The manifestation of God's nature is corrupted
not in God, but in the act of creation. The balance of nature and freedom in God is
perfect, and in existence it is imperfect.
As we have seen, the polarity of Tillich's ontology resembles Schelling's, as far as
being and non-being are concerned. In describing experiences of the abyss, or the
profundity of non-being, Tillich gives the opposition to being positive status, as does
Schelling. The perfection of divine essence and imperfection of existence is obviously
adopted by Tillich in his account of the passage from "dreaming innocence" to
existence; the divine essence is balanced, while existence is "undisrupted essence."
The discussion of "Trinitarian principles" in the first volume of the Systematic
Theology might also suggest an affinity of Schelling's potencies with Tillich's
initially speculative description of divine essence in terms ofprinciples of unity,
distinction and reunion.
However, Tillich diverges from Schelling substantially, and this has an impact on his
doctrine of the Trinity. Firstly, Tillich's discussion of "Trinitarian principles" in the
first volume ofhis system is filled out in the second and third volumes, in which
Christ and the Spirit do not remain analogues of an ideal "nature of God," but reveal
God's freedom. For Tillich freedom is part of God's nature; that is to say, there is no
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division between God's free, revelatory decision and activity, and God's nature as
undisrupted essence. Tillich does not assume, as Schelling does, any distinction
between the nature ofGod, or the pattern of revelation, and the event of revelation
itself. The nature of God is triune, as it is for Schelling; but unlike for Schelling, for
Tillich God's free revelation is fully triune as well.
Secondly, Tillich does not describe Christ only as the logos or as a form-giving
principle analogous to the potency ofbeing, as does Schelling. Tillich's description of
Christ does include reference to the concept of logos, but his description relies more
heavily on Christ as paradoxical grace, as the undisrupted manifestation of essence, as
agapeic self-negation. More than these, however, Tillich insists that the nature of God
is as the power ofbeing-itself. As New Being, not Kairos, the focus ofTillich's
account of revelation is not on the historical event of the Christ alone, but includes the
revelation of divine essence in the Spiritual Presence.
Tillich intends for the concept of the power ofbeing-itself to orient the Systematic
Theology not toward the data of revelation, but to the eschatological participation of
the Spiritual Community in the process of salvation, or essentialization. The centrality
of the Spirit is not just for the present activity of the Spiritual Community, but as the
power of the telos ofhistory and thought. The Kingdom of God and Eternal Life are
the goals ofTillich's system because his intention is not to describe the ground of
revelatory experience, but to demonstrate the meaning of revelatory events as
symbolic statements of the direction of humanity, according to God's providence.
Finally, although Tillich is at pains to demonstrate the ontological connection between
the nature ofGod and human nature, there is no possibility, as there is in Schelling,
that this connection of itselfwill bring human action or cognition to its zenith. Human
intuitive awareness of its "ultimate concern", and the inclination to pose questions
about it and seek it out, is part ofTillich's description of the human situation. Yet
human intuition and freedom are finite, for Tillich, meaning that the complete
development of cognition or awareness or self-consciousness cannot occur as a result
of its nature. Tillich expresses this in two ways: as the oscillation characteristic of the
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polarized elements of existence; and as the notion that humanity doesn't ultimately
"grasp" revelation, revelation "grasps" humanity.
This, despite Tillich's Spirit-Christology described above, makes the Christ a more
radical concept in Tillich's theological system than in Schelling's mythological and
philosophical system. For Schelling, Christ is the natural result of conscious religious
and aesthetic development. The polarity ofbeing and non-being is, after a long history
of religions grounded in the dynamism of the potencies, finally expressed in Christ,
the embodiment ofpositive opposition. For Tillich, in much the same way, Christ is
the chiefparadox of Christianity. Yet, the Christ is not only a statement of paradox;
the Christ is also the New Being, by which Tillich means the in-breaking of essence in
a totally new way. The being of the New Being is the same as the being of humanity,
but the New Being reveals to humanity what undisrupted essence looks like under the
conditions of existence.
In sum, the symbols of revelation - being-itself, New Being, and the Spiritual
Presence - are not natural developments of either history or consciousness. They are
symbols that express unprecedented experiences in human history, past and future.
This causes problems for Tillich's account of humanity's intuition that revelation is
for humanity. However, we have seen that Tillich has two responses. First, he asserts
that God is present before humanity "asks the question" about itself, which inspires
the quest for revelation. Second, human reason can be "grasped" and fulfilled by
revelation because of its ontological connection with undisrupted essence.
For such an ontologically concerned system, Tillich differs most substantially from
Schelling in that he does not seek to demonstrate consistency between divine and
human ground, or nature, but between divine and human telos. This is why futural
essentialization, and not pre-historic polarity, constitutes the dialectical structure of
the Systematic Theology. Likewise, the Trinity, for Tillich, is not as much a metaphor
for the being of God as it is a symbol of the meaning and goal of history that is God
and that God reveals. For this reason, the salvation rendered by the Christ event is not
the center ofTillich's system, as it is for Schelling. Rather, the work of the Spirit -
essentialization - is the center ofTillich's system. These differences from Schelling
are at the root of this thesis' question of the presence of Schelling's dialectical
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approach and concept of the Trinity within Tillich's Systematic Theology, which, in
turn, prompts the related question concerning Hegel's use of the Trinity and the
similarity ofTillich's account.
ii. Tillich and Hegel
In Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, religion is "picture thinking".
Though metaphorical, religious and doctrinal thinking is always tied to the
determinate, to the concrete: people, events, signs and symbols. Religious thinking is,
therefore, inferior to or at least less complete than the conceptual thought of
philosophy that embraces both what is abstract and what is concrete in a single,
transcendent concept. For Hegel, the benefit of this kind of thinking is that it
translates what is initially a posited and merely abstract concept, notion or account of
the absolute, or the idea, into a concrete representation. The task of philosophy, then,
is to bind the immediately intuited concept and the determinate, concrete experience
or expression of it into a single transcendent concept.
This is consistent with Tillich's doctrine of symbols, the concept of doctrine as the
human interpretation of the experience of revelation. Doctrine, in this way of thinking,
is not absolute. Rather, it is, in Tillich's terminology, subject to the critique of the
Spirit, according to the Protestant principle. For Tillich, as for Hegel, human terms
and concepts expressive ofGod are not in any way final or true in themselves.
However, Hegel's stratification of religion and philosophy in the Lectures on the
Philosophy ofReligion causes the religious representations that Tillich calls the
"symbols of revelation" to be sublated on the logical path to the concept. For
example, the Christ event ultimately points beyond the story of the crucified one from
Nazareth to a principle of the negation of posited being. Revelation is not complete
until it is mediated by self-consciousness, until human awareness of the object
common to religion and philosophy leads to the realization of a higher concept by
which the two can be understood. The Trinity is, to some degree, a way of reconciling
religious and philosophical thinking for Hegel. However, Hegel draws an
insufficiently strong distinction between the Trinity as an expression of the nature of
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God and as a symbol of the dialectic of self-consciousness, or a subjective picture that
will give way to a more comprehensive concept. Not only does Hegel's account of the
concept suggest that human comprehension of the reconciliation of divinity and
humanity occurs in self-consciousness, it also implies that divine self-consciousness
itself is dependent upon the dialectical development ofhuman cognition.
This is quite far from Tillich in two respects. Firstly, for Tillich, theology's concern,
the meaning of revelation, cannot be rendered by philosophy. Hegel's concept and
absolute idea would be just as "symbolic" for Tillich as the Christ, the Spirit, or the
Trinity. Secondly, however, for Tillich religion is not merely symbolic, or only
picture-thinking. The religious symbol or the theological concept, not the
philosophical concept, is the more expressive mode. The religious symbol is of
ultimate concern for Tillich because it, not the philosophical concept, expresses both
the conceptual and the concrete. This is directly opposed to Hegel's scheme in which
the philosophical concept, not the religious representation, is the location of identity
between abstract and concrete.
Nonetheless, the connection between Tillich's concept of the Trinity and Hegel's is
apparent in two ways. First, the concept of self-negation as constitutive ofGod's
nature and free revelation is strongly present in Hegel and Tillich. The transcendence
ofHegel's dialectical approach depends not only on a concept of inherent or logical
negation, but also on a self-aware "negation of negation", that is, the intentional
identification of the initially posited and its negation as incomplete and, on their own,
one-sided. The ascent of the concept to the absolute idea requires continual negation
of this one-sidedness. The process of self-consciousness, of the development of Spirit,
therefore, rests on continual self-negation.
For Tillich, self-negation has a more theological tone, exemplified as it is in the
agapeic love of the Cross. Yet the Hegelian sense remains, as Tillich argues that
overly historical or personal descriptions of Jesus and overly abstract descriptions of
the Christ are one-sided and empty. The Christ's negation of existential conditions in
favour of essential truth is, like Hegel's logical negation, inherent in the event itself.
In this way, the principle of self-negation is the basis of theological or doctrinal
balance between the concrete and the abstract, between what Hegel would call the
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"objective truth" and "subjective truth". Yet, self-negation is also the principle at the
basis of the Protestant principle, the voice of ecclesiastical self-critique that occurs by
the power of the Spiritual Presence in the Spiritual Community.
Secondly, Tillich's conceptual similarity to Hegel is apparent in the centrality of the
Spirit. Tillich's "divine Spirit" and Hegel's Geist are not direct cognates. Tillich does
make essentially the same distinction as Hegel between "Spirit" and "spirit," where
the former denotes the absolute meaning of the term that embraces all particularity,
and the latter refers to the various instances ofparticularity. Yet, for Tillich, the
different senses of spirit refer to the difference between divine and human, while for
Hegel, the difference is between universal and material. Furthermore, for Hegel
"Spirit" refers to the entire social process of unfolding self-consciousness; for Tillich,
it refers to the critical presence of divine essence. However, the focus on Spirit in both
Hegel and Tillich protects their systematic descriptions as historical, social, and
teleological.
Finally, it is in relation to these descriptions that the strongest comparison between
Tillich and Hegel is to be found. For Tillich, the process of essentialization, because it
involves participation in revelation, is never fully available to cognition as Aujhebung
is for Hegel. Nonetheless, Tillich refers to the Kingdom ofGod as "immanent and
transcendent" (STIII, 359), echoing his description of it as inner- and trans-historical.
This directly matches Hegel's own approach to the dialectical aufheben of self-
consciousness and history, in both religion and philosophy: the teleology of the
concept is immanent and transcendent.
The difference is that, for Tillich, the Kingdom remains forever transcendent of
history and finitude, while for Hegel, cognition eventually reaches the state of
absolute knowledge. Tillich's differentiation between the symbol of the Kingdom and
the symbol ofEternal Life is the key to his conceptual distinction from Hegel. For
Tillich, the Kingdom is the telos of the process of essentialization as it occurs in
history, while Eternal Life represents the judgment of history, the elevation ofwhat is
positive in existence to eternity. (STIII, 396-400) Aufliebung ends in identity;
essentialization ends in judgment.
203
Nonetheless, for both Tillich and Hegel the aim of their respective systems is to
demonstrate the universal validity of the process ofhistory itself, and to demonstrate
that the Christian religion, and its doctrine of the Trinity, is expressive of the
dialectical manner in which history unfolds. In this fundamental and conceptual
manner it is Hegel, and not Schelling, to whom the dialectical and Trinitarian nature
ofTillich's Systematic Theology bears the most resemblance.
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Conclusion
This thesis has addressed three areas requiring critical attention in Tillich scholarship:
the need to consider the Systematic Theology as a whole; the need to lift up,
distinguish and illuminate various dialectical structures occurring within and guiding
Tillich's system; and the need to clarify the relative presence of Hegelian and
Schellingian concepts and approaches within the dialectical and Trinitarian nature of
the Systematic Theology, in light of recent critical English translations and analyses of
their works.
Firstly, focus on the first volume of the Systematic Theology, within the majority of
scholarship on Tillich, produces an unbalanced emphasis on merely the beginning of
Tillich's systematic endeavors. Tillich's interpretation of the categories of being and
his statement of God as "being itself' in the first volume allow him to establish the
character of his system as ontological and existential. Yet, I have argued that the
polarity expressed in the first volume does not function coherently as an account of
the Systematic Theology as a whole. In the second and third volumes ofTillich's
system the polarity of being and non-being, and its relation to the categories of
essence and existence, is linked to the revelatory event of the Christ and the salvation
history of the Spirit. Therefore, the first significant contribution of this study to Tillich
scholarship is a repair of such restricted readings.
Secondly, the presence and significance of dialectical structures in the Systematic
Theology has never been comprehensively addressed. This thesis delineated two
different uses of dialectic that help clarify the structures guiding the Systematic
Theology. One is a two-sided, or polar, dialectic that abstractly describes the balanced
relationship ofbeing and non-being in essence and its imbalance in existence. The
other is a three-fold, or triadic, dialectic that describes revelation and the human
participation in revelation in terms of divine essence, human existence, and the
reunion of the two in essentialization. 1 have argued that this distinction is critical to
understanding Tillich's system, especially the connection between the revelation of
the "power ofbeing-itself' and the historical process of salvation. The experience of
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revelation offers a new possibility for human existence: reunion with divine essence.
The dialectic of essentialization describes the telos and process of salvation.
Thirdly, this thesis has taken the opportunity to consult recent critical editions of the
major works ofHegel and Schelling and a corresponding resurgence in commentaries
and critiques related to them. This has provided an unprecedented opportunity to
review the common but largely untested assumptions regarding the connection of
these philosophers' concepts of dialectic and the Trinity to those concepts in Tillich.
Without overlooking the presence of Schelling's ideas in several of Tillich's
philosophical terms and concepts, I have here argued that recognition of Schelling's
presence within the Systematic Theology remains limited to the concept of being and
non-being, which dominates the first volume. When considering all three volumes
together, Tillich's system reveals the presence of a Hegelian approach to the concept
of dialectic and to the Trinity. Thus, the third argument here offered to Tillich
scholarship is a Hegelian reading of the dialectical structure and Trinitarian content of
the Systematic Theology.
The articulation and defence of these claims occurred in four steps. In the first chapter
I outlined the structure of the Systematic Theology according to the concept of
dialectic. In the first volume ofTillich's system, dialectic describes the relationship of
being and non-being as constitutive of divine essence and human existence. In
Schelling's major works, the concept of dialectic is polar. Dialectic describes the
opposition of equal and positive forces that constitute the ideal basis of nature and
self-consciousness, and of history and God. Tillich's concept of polar being and non-
being as constitutive ofboth essence and existence reveals the inspiration of Schelling
to Tillich's theological approach. However, Schelling's dialectical concept of the
enduring polarity of essence and existence, despite revelation, highlights Tillich's
departure from Schelling on the implications of dialectic.
In the second chapter 1 outlined the structure of the rest of the Systematic Theology
according to the concept of dialectic, in order to call attention to the dialectical
structure that guides all three volumes ofTillich's system together. This approach
revealed that the dialectical elements of the entire system are not being and non-being,
but divine essence, human existence, and the reunion of the two in a process Tillich
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calls essentialization. I argued for the similarity of this concept to Hegel's triadic
concept of dialectic. For Hegel, the immanent transcendence of logical abstraction,
negation and sublation is a pattern that describes the continued movement of
cognition, self-consciousness, and history. Comparing Tillich's concept of
"essentialization" and Hegel's concept ofAufhebung reveals the considerable
presence of Hegel within the Systematic Theology as a whole work.
With the Hegelian dialectical structure of the Systematic Theology established, I
considered the relative similarity of Tillich's concept of the Trinity to those of Hegel
and Schelling. In the third chapter, therefore, I examined the major doctrines of
Tillich's system: God, Christ, Spirit, and the Trinity. The prevalence of
essentialization is evident in all of these discussions and indicates the presence of
Hegel in the Systematic Theology. The polarity of being and non-being initially
describes God in the Systematic Theology, but this abstract notion of God is given
more detail in Tillich's notion of the "living God", by which the "power ofbeing-
itself' is revealed in Christ and the Spiritual Presence.
In the doctrine of the Christ, the paradox of grace appears as divine essence manifest
under the conditions of human existence. Tillich distinguishes paradox from dialectic,
arguing that dialectic is the continual process of separation and reunion. While
polarity can continue to describe both essence and existence, it cannot describe their
relationship. The Christ, as an historical manifestation of essence, reveals to existence
that life is not conditioned by polarity only, but also by the hope of reunion with
divine essence in a process Tillich calls essentialization. Thus, only a three-fold
dialectic can describe the significance of the Christ.
In the doctrine of Spirit, the process of essentialization receives its ultimate
clarification, as the Spiritual Presence is described as the "power ofbeing-itself'
active within, but also critical of, the Spiritual Community. The salvation ofboth
human life and human history, which occurs under the dimension of Spirit, is
described according to a triadic pattern of self-assessment and change - ofmovement
outward, and return. In Tillich's discussions of the Trinity, the connection to Hegel is
most apparent in Tillich's insistence that the Trinity, although Christologically rooted,
must be understood as dialectical, not paradoxical.
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In the fourth chapter, with this evidence ofHegelian structure and content in the
Systematic Theology, I considered the relative similarity of Tillich's concept of the
Trinity to those of Hegel and Schelling. In Hegel's later works the Trinity functions as
a representation of the social and immanently transcendent development of human
cognition. In Schelling's later works, the Trinity is described as an analogue to the
triadic potencies that form the ideal basis of God's nature, and, therefore, human
nature. I concluded that the Hegelian notion of the Trinity as the religious symbol of
conceptual human development is much closer to Tillich's notion of the Trinity than
is Schelling's ultimately polarized account of the Trinity as the basis of God's nature,
against which God's freedom is posited.
There are significant differences, in both tone and intention, between Tillich's
approach in the Systematic Theology and the writings of Hegel and Schelling. First,
Tillich is a theologian and an apologist, and while he makes use ofphilosophical
concepts, he is ultimately theologically concerned. This results in a less rigorous and
less systematic use of dialectic in the Systematic Theology than in the works of Hegel
and Schelling. Second, Tillich departs from both Hegel and Schelling when it comes
to the non-symbolic transcendence ofGod because he is not willing to identify human
participation in revelation too closely with revelation itself. Unlike Hegel, Tillich
asserts that humanity is unable to perceive its telos, cognitive or otherwise, without
the aid of the Spiritual Presence. Also unlike Hegel, Tillich's process of
essentialization is eventually transcendent ofhumanity itself, while, for Hegel,
transcendence occurs within self-consciousness.
Nonetheless, the fact that the central themes of dialectic and Trinity in the Systematic
Theology examined here demonstrate periodic departure from Hegel, and not
Schelling, is itself an indication of the significant presence of Hegel, at least in these
respects, in the system. The presence of Schelling is apparent in the terminology
Tillich employs in the Systematic Theology, and especially in the dialectical polarities
he describes in the first volume. However, in addition to the presence ofHegelian
dialectic in the Systematic Theology, a Hegelian concept of the Trinity is also in
operation. The self-negation that defines revelation, especially in Tillich's description
of the Christ, is clearly influenced by Hegel's notion of the representation-sublating
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concept. Tillich's concept of the reunion of human life and divine life in the symbol
of Eternal Life bear clear resemblance to Hegel's telos of logical dialectic: the
Absolute Idea, in which subjective experience and objective truth are identified.
I argue that this demonstration of the presence of Hegel within Tillich's Systematic
Theology implies a significant contribution to Tillich scholarship. Tillich's other
works may also show the presence ofHegelian structures and concepts. If so, the
whole of Tillich's theology may require fundamental reassessment. Ifnot, and the
Systematic Theology stands alone among Tillich's works as demonstrating the
conceptual presence ofHegel, then, at the very least, its place in the trajectory of
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